Russia is not a democracy in transition and there are no signs showing that it would become so. Fukuyama's end of history thesis needs to be reevaluated.

1. Why has Russia not transited to
democracy? Evaluating Fukoyama’s
end of history

2. Plan
• Introduction
• History-Marxism-leninism-Stalinism-
Gorbascev
• Post soviet union political environment
• Failure of liberal reforms.
• Return to increasing authoritarianism.

3. Introduction
• Geographically, the biggest country in the world. Most of
the population in Europe, and most of the territory in Asia
(Eurasia)
• 4/5th are ethnically Russian and the rest are of other
ethnicities fighting for more independence
• Identity crisis
 a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma (W.
Churchil)
 Unpredictable, confusing. Western/non western debate.
“idealism of Russian soul’’
 Economic growth under Putin improved public mood but at
the expense of greater authoritarianism thus lashing any
hopes for transition to democracy.

4. History-what went wrong?
• Failed experiment of Marx’s communism?
But what is Marxism?
• dialectic materialism-class struggle over material resources
shape history. All fighting essentially for economic interests.
• History of mankind is the history of means of production
(slavery-feudalism-CAPITALISM)
• Critical of capitalism-alienating, exploiting labor, hoarding
surplus value.
• The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains! They
have a world to win! Working men of all countries, unite!

5. Marx reloaded…
• But Marx did not lay down the post revolution
framework of running the society
• In Marx’s revolution, other cleavages like
ethnicity, religion etc were to be submerged
with the proletarian revolution

6. Russia welcomes Marxism
• Early industrialization phase. Only 8% were
proletariats but in miserable safety, legal
conditions as compared to western counterparts
• Workers and intelligentia’s disposition was
consistent with Marx’s ideas. Russia-a ripe
ground for revolution
• Bolshevic revolution 1917 (Lennin). One party
rule with democratic centralism model. Anti
Bolsheviks, anti communism factions were
banned. After a civil war, finally soviet union
formulated in 1923.

7. Stalinism
• Heir of Lenin
• Three opposition movements
Left-Trotsky=revolutionery momentum to be
carried on to western Europe.
Right-Bukharin=a gradual evolutionary socialism by
improving efficiency even by retaining the already
owners of factories i.e. the capitalists and letting
peasants produce freely.
The centre or orthodox=both rationalized economic
policies as well as spread of revolutionary ideals
of 1917.

8. Stalin cont…
Stalin’s position
• “Socialism in one country”. Trotsky and Bukharin expelled.
5 year planning system
• Agricultural collectivization-peasants were leftovers of class
struggle. Assaults and take over of peasant lands,
livestocks. 1932 , famine killed millions and finally party’s
control over food.
• centrally planned production targets for every manager and
worker within the Soviet Union
• During the First Five-Year Plan, an industrial infrastructure
was built inthe Soviet Union in an incredibly short period of
time

9. Stalin’s legacy (1952)
• A superpower against west (cold war).
Industrial production matched with West
• Years of dictatorship and terror had killed off
whatever popular enthusiasm had once
existed for heroic efforts to “build socialism’’

10. Count down to the fall
• Rampant corruption, black market. Immobility
of institutional authorities. Some stayed till life
time.
• By the mid-1970s, the Soviet economy
became dangerously dependent upon energy
exports and sales of vodka
• Afghan war
• International pressures (evil empire)

11. Gorbaschev-last blow to sinking
empire
Liberal reforms, undertaken by Premier Mikhail
Gorbachev, reduced the power of the state:
• Perestroika: Reduced state control over the economy
• Glasnost: Reduced state control over information
(media) and citizens’ political activity
Goal = Maintain Communist rule by modernizing
economy and devolving power. 1990 key:
a. Flawed elections create enormous pro-Communist
(anti-reform) bloc in the legislature (supreme Soviet)
b. Gorbachev and liberals (pro-Western/pro-
democracy) repeal Article 6 of Soviet constitution –
allows emergence of formal political parties

12. Toward free market and privatization
under Yeltsin
• Running on a platform of greater democracy and
marketization, Yeltsin gained 90 percent of the
votes in his Moscow electoral district.
• Yeltsin’s calculation: devolve power to Republics
(some of which want to secede). Reduce
Gorbachev’s power by undermining authority of
central government. Becomes president in 1991.
• Hardliners support coup which fails to bring down
Yeltsin.

13. Battle against parliament
• Yeltsin proposes “shock therapy” economic reform in
1992: rapid privatization and lifting price controls 
inflation  central bank raises interest rates to suck
money out of the economy  recession
• Communists block some policies in the Russian
Parliament (Supreme Soviet and Congress of People’s
Deputies).
• 1993: Yeltsin assumes “special powers” to implement
reforms by decree
• parliament impeaches. Yeltsin dissolves it. Military
sides by him

14. Privatization failure
1. Weak institutions
• Weak legal framework for corporate governance
• Political uncertainties
2. Managers had an incentive to maximize their
short-term capital gains by selling assets for
personal gain rather than keep the enterprise as
a going concern and maximize future profits
thus decapitalizing the enterprise at the expense
of other (smaller) shareholders.

15. Fig. 2. GDP change in FSU economies, 1989 = 100%
25
35
45
55
65
75
85
95
105
115
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Central Europe
Uzbekistan
Belarus
Kazakhstan
Estonia
Turkmenistan
Azerbaijan
Latvia
Lithuania
Tajikistan
Russia
Kyrgyzstan
Armenia
Ukraine
Georgia
Moldova

16. economic costs and increasing
concentration
 Real wages, down threefold since 1992!
• By summer 1996, most shares in Russia's
largest firms transferred to a small number of
major banks (and their owners) at shockingly
low prices.
• In Russia today, these “oligarchs” control up to
85% of the value of the country's leading
private companies.
• Democracy hijacked!

17. Hijack con…
• Private media is owned by oligarchs  supports
Yeltsin in 1996 elections.$500m spent however
law limited it to $3m.
• West supports Yeltsin due to his privatization and
free market economic model. Loan of $10b
granted
• Yeltsin wins. But cancels all promises made
during campaign.
• 1998 economic collapse (aftershock of Asian crisis) =
anti-Yeltsin sentiment. Oligarchs turn on him fearing
reforms. Yeltsin resigns.

18. Putin’s era
a. Unity: New “party of power” formed 3 months
before 1999 election
– active assistance from
• then President Yeltsin
• then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin
– Combines elements of platforms of all other
parties (non-ideological party) – draws support
from past centrists and nationalists

19. Party cleavages
• No successful party emphasizes freedom or
democracy:
• Nationalists advocate authoritarian state to
repress internal enemies of Russia,
Communists want return to command
economy, and
• Unity just wants people to support the
government

21. . Recentralisation  Construction of
an unitary state
• Presidential representatives in regions. Pressures on
regional leaders.
• Creation of federal districts: aiming at increasing the
federal government’s presence in the regions
• New Tax Code: Greater control over tax
receipts and greater share of taxes going to the
centre

22. Bye bye civil society
• Regional media absorbed into federally-run
media. Most of the mass media economically
or politically dependant on government.
Massacres and massive human rights
violations in Chechniya kept secret.
• Bye to independent workers unions. FNPR =
central organization of unions, left over from
Soviet Union. No significant internal reform to
date.
• 2001: Labor code restricts non-FNPR unions

23. Bye, Rule of law
• Putin issues decrees with no obvious source of
Constitutional authority
• Putin targets any oligarchs that oppose him
(i.e. give money to political opponents) but
not those that support him or stay out of
politics

24. In a nutshell
• Accumulation of power in the presidency
• Prime minister merely auxilary of the “omnipotent”
president
• No opposition in Parliament (death of party
pluralism)
• Weak civil society
• The Judiciary: not independent, ineffective, corrupt
• Central government and bureaucracy as solution for
everything, overcentralisation
• Additional effects of the war in Chechnya on the
political system: reinforcement of already existing
authoritarian pattern, cult of personality,
nationalism, centralism

25. 1. Data: Freedom House (1 most free, 7 least)

26. Personality cults
• October 2009 poll:
– 23%: All the signs of a personality cult around
Vladimir Putin already exist.
– 26%: More and more conditions are being created
for such a personality cult
– 38%: No sign of a personality cult
– 12% undecided

27. When will Russia become a democracy?
Russians’ opinions (2004):
• 18% - never
• 10% - it is a democracy already
• 5% - in 5 years
• 23% - in 15-20 years
• 13% - in 20-50 years
• 8% - in more than 50 years

28. Towards conclusion
• Russia is not a democracy in transition. It’s system of semi
autocracy that ‘works’.
• According to Nations in Transit 2004, President Putin’s
policies “have sought to centralize power, leaving little
room for a vibrant civil society, independent media, or
political opposition… While Russia has emphasized the
importance it places on maintaining strong ties to the West,
it is headed in an increasingly authoritarian direction.”
• Examples: repression of NGO’s, of independent media,
important influence on elections by Government

29. Fukuyama questioned
Russia is not democratic. The so called “Democratization” was a
means used by elites (Gorbachev then Yeltsin) to defeat opponents.
History is not ended!