Deforming Thai Politics

1. Techer Cmlosirior Ltd, Salisbur,v
6t20t2011
Third Text, Vol. 25, lssue 4, july, 2011, 419-429
cTTtis87587
fi tntr*a*un.iq*p
ll
Routledoe
Deforming Thai Politics
As Read through Thai Contemporary
Art
10
Pandit Chanrochanakit
THE GHOST OF THAKSIN
1. Apichatpong
Weerasethakul, P itni tiue,
CUIO, Milan, 2009, p 13
2. The Ministry of Culture
organised the exhibition
'Imagine Peace'at rhe
Bangkok Art and Culture
Centre betrveen 25 fune
and 22 August 2010.
According to its curator,
Apinan Poshyananda, the
exhibition was meant to
express'the desire tbr peace
and reconciliation', See
'Inagine Peace: Thai
Exhibit on [the] Political
Crisis', http//ww.
artdaily.org/index,asp?intsec=1
1
Ecint_new=3904fJ,
accessed 10 August 2010.
3. The letter to Montien
Boonma is part of Navin
Rawanchaikul's
installation P lease Dotnte
Your ldeas to a Silpathc'nr
Artst in his Silpathom
award-winning exhibition
held at Queen Sirikit Art
Gallery from 29 July to 10
August 2010.
4,
I refer to
each artist by his
or her first name, following
Thai custom.
5. The PAD, the anri-Tlraksin
movement also known as
the 'yellow shin'
movement, was founded on
8 February 2006. The
founders were Sondhi
Limthongkul, Chamlong
fA]gbost uill appear under certain condi:tions, uthen it is ttot qaite light
and nat quite darh. (at tbe break of dautn flnd at uailight).t
20
Apichatpong Weerasethakul, Primitiue, 2009
After the May 2010 military crackdown on rhe Red Shirts, the United
Front of Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), the governmenr of
Abhisit Vejjajiva encouraged the country's best-known artists to organise
an exhibition. Titled 'Imagine Peace', the exhibition was intended to
reconcile the mptures caused by three years of protracted domestic political conflicts from 2006 to the present. As Navin Rawanchaikul stated in
his letter to the late Montien Boonma:
Actually there is currently a huge show called 'Imagine Peace' at the
Bangkok Art and Cultural Cenrre.' They claim that the aim is to heal our
30
sociery through art, after the recent political conflic that climaxed in unexpected violence and bloodshed on the sreets of our country. Although I like
a few pieces in that exhibition, including your powerful drawing, it is sad to
see that artists are being used as tools for government propaganda.s
35
Back in 2006, groups of people formed an anti-Thaksin movement and
wore symbolic yellow shirts to represent their support of the king. Many
artists helped to paint the protest stage backdrop, including Vasan Sitthiket, an outspoken 'Yellow Shirt' artist on rhe side of the People's Alliance
for Demouacy (PAD), the leading anti-Thaksin faction. Although Vasan
has denied any affiliation as such, he has appeared on rhe PAD sfage,
participating in poetry readings on various occasions that collectively reaffirm his opposition to Thaksin Shinawatra and the Red Shirt movement.4
Moreover, Vasan ioined the PAD the very day of its formation.s His affiliations are explicitly articulated in a group exhibition titled '2A /20', where
Vasan juxtaposes rwo paintings. The first, 1,7-1,9 May 7992, refers to the
}lf:ay 1992 movement which saw thousands prorest against the government of General Suchinda Kraprayoon as a democratic movement.
A man holding a national flag is shot by a rifle, and at the top of the
Trird Texr ISSN 0952'8822 print/ISSN 1475-5297 online
(Q
http://ww.tandf .co.ukljournals
DOI: 10.1 080/09528822.201 1..587687
Third Text (2011)
4.5
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2. 424
Srimuang, Somsak
Kcaisuk, Sornkiat
Pongpaibul, Pipob
Thongchai and Suriyami
Katasila, Vasan and many
othe. affists loined the
PAD, using their art to raise
funds via art auctions,
campaign T-shirts etc.
work is a sentence which readst '77-19 May 1.992 - Thais dead for
democracy.' The second painting portrays the May 2010 movement involving the protests staged by Thaksin's 'Red Shirt' supporters as a nondemocratic movement. Titled 19 May 2010 (2010), it bears another
legend: 'Thais dead for the crook.' The painting shows a man in a red
shin about to throw a burning Molotov cocktail. The man's red T-shirt
shows the face of Thaksin Shinawatra, the former Prime Minister ousted
in a military coup.6 According to Vasan's painting, he advocates the
Yellow Shirts' opposition to Thaksin, whom he portrays as a man of
evil. His statement in suppon of the exhibition clearly states this:
I do my political art to warn Thai sociery about how ugly Thai politics
6. Thaksin Shinarvatra served
two terms as Prime
Minister of Thailand from
2001 to 2006. He was
ousted by a military coup
on 19 September 2006, See
Pasuk Phongpaichit and
Chris Baker, Thaksin,
second edition, Silkworm
Books, Bangkok, 2009 for
more details.
60
is,
and to show the misery and sufferin_g of the Thai people who are born to be
rhe prey of political power games.l
Vasan is not the only Thai artist who targets Thaksin; a number of nonPAD artists have also worked on themes with an anti-Thaksin sentiment.
For exanrple, Pichaya Khunnawat's Mr. Tricky 12005*2007) shows a
man with a square face walking on four legs; the face is a caricature of
Thaksin with dollar signs in his eyes.8 The painting is meant to represent
65
70
the Thaksin government as greedy and corrupt. In August 2005,
Porntaweesak Rimsakul held a solo exhibition based on his childhood
80
85
90
;il
'..*
Porntaweesak Rimsakul, RGB's War,2005, mixed media installation, courtesy of the artist, photo: Steven Pettifor
100

3. 421
7. Vasan Simhiket, 20120: 20
Years
20 Artists:
Ann iuersary Ccl e b ati on
Fxhibitiof, , 3 August- t 5
A,ugst 2A10, Bangkok Art
and Culture Centre and
Ahko Art Gallery,
memories of growing up in a province whose activities were centred on a
military base. In the exhibition, Porntaweesak took a number of soldiers'
helmets and repurposed them as radio-controlled cars. The audience
could then control each helmet by using a remote control, using the
helmets to fight each other and produce colours - red, blue or g.reen on a wooden board. Ark Fongsamut notes:
Bangkok, 2010, p 24
8, Elaine W Ng,'Thailand',
ArtAsiaPacifc Alnduc
2008 13).,2Q08,pp267268
9. Ark Fongsamut,
'Pomtaweesak Rimsakul',
P ornraue esa
k's E* hi bi t ion
7 September-Z9 Octobet
2006, 100 Tonson Gallery,
Bangkok,2006
10. ln Phongpaichit and Baker,
op cir, pp 278-279. See
another tmnslation from
Wikipedia which reads: 'In
horse racing they have the
stable and the owner of the
stable ovsns the horse. The
jockey comes and rides the
horse during the race. but
the jockey does not own the
horse. It's very easy [to
comprehend].'
Vikipedia.org, 'Prem
Tinsulanonda', accessed 20
August 2010,
I 1, I use the term 'middle class'
in the manner of a
discursive concept; a$
suggested by James Ockey,
there are two outstanding
Iroups among the middle
class, The first is the group
made newly rich by the
economic prosperity of the
1980s and 1990s that
Ockey calls the 'consumer
middle class'. They enloy
the fruitful products of
economic development bur
are scldom sati$fied with
public policy. The second
group enjoys careers that
grant them a higher status
than that of the rural poor.
See Chapter Seven,'Thai
Middle Class Elements:
I:ading in Democracy?', in
James Ockey, MaAiag
Democra cy : Leadersh ip,
Class, Gender, atd
I P alti cipa tion in
Thailand, Silkworm,
Bangkok, 2005, pp 151P olitica
177.
12. See discussion on Thaksin
Shinawatra and his charges
in Phongpaichit and Chriq
op cit, and debates on
The military, in command during the time of a weak political system, has
now become a servant as political parties have gained in strength. A one
paffy system raises so many doubts about political power that people
focus on the commercial benefits, as if money can buy anything. The
corflict between political benefits and public benefits is thus raised. Porntaweesak cannot help wanting to examine and raise this question, in which the
state of authoriry and the state of being under a commander are revised.e
115
Porntaweesak's work recalls a famous phrase uttered by General Prem
Tinsulanonda in his speech at Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy
shortly before 19 September 2006, when the Royal Thai Army staged a
coup against Thaksin's government. In it Prem stated:
120
I am a member of the cavalry and know a thing or two about horses. In
horseracing, horse owoers hire jockeys to ride their horses. The jockeys
do not own the horses, they iust ride them. A government is like a horse,
surprises soldiers, but the real owners are the country, and the king.
Some jockeys ride well, and other don't, Governments are the same.lo
125
It
In his work, Porntaweesak echoed Prem's impressive speech, in the way in
which it allowed the audience to control the soldier's helmets and project
colours onto the canvas. The freedom to mobilise helmets allowed the
audience to exercise their desire to control the military, a desire that
was realised during the PAD campaign. The project was highly appreciated by its audience, mostly members of the Thai middle class.ll The
curator, historian and critic Apinan Poshyananda remarked, for instance,
that Porntaweesak capttues the feeling of Bangkok residents and the ways
130
in which they support military intervention in Thai politics.
Shortly after Porntaweesak's exhibition, the army staged its coup
d'6tat. The junta, the so-called 'Council for Democratic Reform'
(CDR), stated that Thaksin had destroyed the checks and balances
designed to protect independent organisations in accordance with the
1997 constitution.lz The Thaksin governmenr was also charged with
corruption, and allegations that these practices had personally enriched
the former prime minister himself. As a result, the image that remained
of the Thaksin government was that of a corrupt state which it was ethically iustifiable to remove. When the CDR seized power from Thaksin,
the iunta dissolved Parliament and the Senate, and a 'year zero' was
announced. Bangkok residents celebrated the coup by giving army
officials garlands and gift baskets, flirting with the tank drivers by
wearing 'coyote' (skimpy) costumes and hot-pants, and even taking
wedding photos in front of the tanks. It was the first time that the Thai
army had received such a warm welcome and public support since the
violent suppression of protests against anofher military government in
145
150
May 1.992.
Yet despite such support, it was only the start of what might
be
described as an illusive freedom. Thai politics after the 2005 coup has
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4. 422
Thaksin's undemocratic
acts and reasons to
overthrown him and his
government in Kasian
Techapira, 'Toppling
Thaksin', Nera LeF Rca!ru
39, May-June 2006, pp 537 and Thongchai
Winichakul, 'Toppling
Democracy',,forzal o/
Contentporury Asia,vol
J8, no 1, Febrnary 2008,
pp 1 1-37.!?inichakul's
argrments support
Tamada's anallsis of
the process of
de-democratisadon and
the rise of pro-monarchist
been a process of limited democracy with more iudicial intervention
known as 'Tulakarnpiwat', whereby the judiciary has been allowed a
greater role in auditing legal processes, as well as in inspecting and
recruiting personnel into organisations entrusted to maintain a system
of checks and balances in legal and political processes. Tulakarnpiwat
reveals a tension between popular sovereignfy and an autocratic
regime. Porqtaweesak's remote-controlled helmets are not iust toys and
objects of art, but rather a sign of the different aesthetics of contemporary
Thai cultures, which reflect back upon one another. As Arjun Appadurai
observed, the work of imagination operates in the 6elds of both arts and
politics.l3 Aesthetics and politics are interfwined and it is the deformation
of both that will serve as the focus of this article.
sntiments.
RED SIIIRTS
v YELLOW SHIRTS: A SIGN AF THE
'DEFORJVT,ATrON'
160
165
t70
AF THAI POLITTCS
Eoetybody's contem7orary and eternal rec11tteflce,14
Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Proiect
Rural voters form the maiority of Thai society and elect the majority of
representatives who are then empowered to form a government. Yet as
the well-known political scientist Anek Laothamatas points out, although
rural constituents elected the government, it was the urban middle classes
which overthrew it. He stresses that the key to economic and political
reform is to empower the middle classes, so that they can elect their
13. Ariun Appadurai,
Modemity at Large,
University of Minnesota
Press, Minneapolis, 1 996
14.
Valter Beniamin, T/:e
Ar eadcs Ptoj ect, Howard
Eiland and Kevin
McLaughlin, trans,
Belknap Press, New York,
20Q2,p 917
15. Anek Laothamaus, $oag
nagara prachathippatai
{Tales of Tuo Denocratic
Cities: A Path to Economia
and Political Refumation
for
D em ocra cy,
Matichon
hess, Bangkok, 7995, p 12
16. Thamrongsak
Petchlertanan, Kordng
haffi Pa tiu'st -fi tpr a h aftt -
kabot nai kcmmourg thai
patchxban: Batwihroh lae
ekasarn lExcuses for
Rmlxtion-Coup-
Rebellion in Carrent Thai
Politics: An Aflalysis aftd
D o ctm e utsl, Foundation
for the Pmmotion of Social
Sciences and Humanities
Text Books Proiect,
Bangkok, 2007, pp I 3-,14
representatives, while at the same time allowing their rural, workingclass counterparts the capacity to control, and even remove, the government, thereby creatin_g a new balance of power between the urban middle
class and rural poor.rr Anek's bold statement reflects a belief on the part
of the Thai middle class who consider representatives from the rural provinces to be mostly under-qualified and simply local tycoons or part of a
local mafia. The Thai middle class is constantly dissatisfied with what it
perceives as the low calibre of available candidates, To its members, it
is this low standard that has led to mismanagement and political corruption. Though the 1997 Constitution was a product of participatory drafting and thus itself a democratic instrument, the Thai middle class would
not tolerate 'wicked politicians', as was made clear by their support of the
military coup on 19 September 2006. Chai-Anan Samudhavanija,
another Thai political scientist, characterises this cycle as the 'vicious
circle' of Thai politics and the path of Thai democracy since the 1"932
revolution has been disrupted by a number of coups. The main reasons
given for carrying out the coups have focused on the corrupt management
of government, on conflicts between bureaucratic officials and politicians,
and on the Llse maiest| law.16
Thai elites believe that democracy is a product of Western civilisation,
so to establish democracy in Thai society is akin to growing an apple tree
in a tropical forest - it is simply impossible to reproduce'Western models
within a Thai cultural framework. Hence, democratic culture does not fit
with Thai society and Thai culture. According to this viewpoint Thais
have to adapt some of the elements of democracy to the particularities
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795
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5. 423
of their socio-cultural environment; only then will it be possible to create
a Thai-style democracy. This democracy is characterised as an adapted
version of Western practices so that Thais still have an excuse not to
follow l0estern standards of democratic government, and the idea of
an elected government is not a necessary pre-condition, if the government
in power proves itself efficient.
This represents a significant schism befween rural and urban people's
understanding of how democracy is meant to be practised. It is believed
that rural people expect their representatives to address questions of
lack by ensuring their welfare and overall standard of living through a
so-called patronage system. On the other hand, the urban middle class
seeks more advanced policies to cope with rapid global changes and challenges. The middle class's distrust of politicians, mainly elected by the
rural poor, compelled those who drafted the 2007 constitution to limit
the powers of the House of Representatives but enhance those of the ludicial branch. It is widely controversial whether such constitutional practices are democratic. I argue that such claims are the point from which
to assess the deformation of Thai democracy.
The alibi of Thai-style democracy can be measured by examining a
process of de-democratisation. Yoshifumi Tamada, a long-time scholar
of Thai politics, states that such a process began with the critiques of
the extra-stability of government, a phenomenon of the 1,997 constitution. The triumph of Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai Parry after the first
term in the 2005 election was a threat to the middle class, who felt that
Thaksin would monopolise the political realm.17 As a result, Thaksin
was condemned with ldse maiestd charges and manipulating the rural
poor through his populist policies. He was also charged with corruption,
an accusation which prompted the architects of the 2007 constitution to
delegate further powers to the iudiciary, allowing them to recruit
members for political institutions and the so-called 'Tulakarnpiwat'. As
mentioned earlier, the 2006 coup was supported by the PAD and urban
middle class who also look for a higher moral standard from politicians.
They even proposed a 30:70 proportional representation divided between
rural and urban representatives. The de-democratisation started when
210
215
235
exceptions were deployed.
I argue that Thai-style democracy is deforming Thai politics, since it
has been employed by the Thai establishment in order to consolidate
even more power within the bureaucratic and political elites. The deformation is revealed in the field of democratic practices that reduce partici-
pation by the general public, preventing them from engaging with
complicated challenges while putting the real power of decision-making
into the hands of a narrow circle of elites - ie the judicial branch and
highly respected persons - those most likely to express their hatred of
'bad politicians' while taking little part in the actual process of electoral
17,
Ychifumi Tamada,
'Demaracy,
Democratization and Dedemocratization', Fa Diaw
l(cn, vol 6, no 4,2008, pp
98-1 39
18. Iola Lenzi, 'BACC Opens to
Contemporary Art', C Arrs
6, November-December
2008, pp 98-102
politics.
Over the years, many works of Thai art have been produced on the
subject of the urban/rural dichotomy; for example, Chalud Nimsamer's
Rural Sculptare 17982).18 Araya Rasdjarmrearnsook's The Two Planet
Series (2008), which comprised videos and photographs recording the
responses of Thai rural villagers to canonical W'estern arfiivorks, pushes
the questions of aesthetic displacement further by articulating the displacement of democratic practices in which democracy is imagined, localised
255

6. 424
and comprehended from below. Mdnet's Luncheon on the Grass and
Thai Villagers (2008) is one example, in which Araya is shown displaying
Manet's Luncheon on the Grass to villagers, asking them to discuss what
they see. The subsequent conversation revolved around how the villagers
'!7hy, for
perceived the work and its subjects as odd.
example, did the
model have to be naked? Why was she a 'floozy'? Vhy did the legs of
the male subiects convey such intimate feelings towards the naked
female subjects? Ifhy did the men in the painting have their clothes on
while the women are naked or half-naked?le
The focus of the work lies in bringing a painting originally intended
for an indoor gallery space outside, where it could be seen next to
ordinary villagers. Araya explains that she wanted to introduce European
masterpieces to Thai farmers and listen to their uninhibited reaction; the
p,rrpori was to find out what she could learn from Thai
260
265
270
farmers.2O
However, such an experiment might be considered as an allegory to the
notion of democracy and its practice in Thailand. The middle classes
who condemn rural people {or not understanding international values
and the practices of democracy will themselves never fully understand
what democracy is meant to be. In contrast, the rural people feel that
the middle class have privileges over and above their own situation as
manifested through the ways in which they can gain access to a standard
of living superior to their own. This disagreement leads to an aesthetic
iudgement where the politics of aesthetics begins.
Here we have a well-known painting and a question as to whether or
not rural people could understand and appreciate it. This offers parallels
to questions about democratic values and a process of democratisation,
which might lead to the understanding and practices of a democratic
regime. How can one agree on the rule of law and popular sovereignty
but disrust the decision of the majority? Likewise, what might we
rightfully expect from the arts? Araya's practice enables us to contemplate the fact that democracy from the Western world, which should be
a universal value, has been transformed and translated in Thailand into
a spatial practice - a deformed democracy. It is a democratic regime of
275
280
285
290
exceptions.
LOSTIAI THE CrrIES
Jim Thompson, the American merchant once known as the'King' of Thai
silk, disappeared in 1967 during a trip to the Cameron Highlands in
Malaysia. In order to celebrate Thompson's 100th birthday, the Jim
Thompson House Museum commissioned Navin Rawanchaikul to
organise an art exhibition. Navin made a series of cartoons based on
the question: .What if Jim Thompson came back to Thailand in the
year 2005?' Navin imagined that Jim would certainly have been
19. Araya Rasdjarmrearnsook,
'In This Circumstancet the
Sole Object of Attention
Should Be the Treachery of
the Moon', Ardel Gallery
of Modem An, Bangkok,
2008
20. Ibid
amazed by the changes to the ciry in which he once lived. The installation
comprised a life-size Jim Thompson sculpture, with a set of pictures narrating the imagined return of Jim Thompson to the streets of Bangkok
more than thirty years after his disappearance. In the piece, he searches
for his old home, only to find that Bangkok has changed so drastically
he cannot find his way. Old Thompson only remembers thet he had a
home near Saen Saeb canal and that he once owned
a Thai silk
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7. 425
Navin Rawanchaikul, detail from lost in tbe City (Long krung),2006, acrylic on canvas, 220 x 1,624 cm, photo courtesy
Navin Production Co, Ltd, collection of Narong lntanate
company. Thompson travels to Sanamluang nearby the Grand Palace,
without knowing his destination or having any friends; there he meets
Navin who is trying to make ends meet by selling peanuts. Navin
brings Uncle Jim along with him, thus starting the adventure.
Navin entitled the exhibition 'Lost in the City' or 'Long krung' and
reproduced a street scene, sefting up a footpath in the exhibition hall,
where he then installed a series of murals representing scenes from
daily life in Bangkok. These remarkable murals employed a contempor-
ary-traditional Thai style with both realistic and fictitious stories.
from the streets of Bangkok were rendered on an eight-panel painting which showed not only a growing and disorderly Bangkok, but also
the failed attempts to cope with the demonstrations by the PAD
'Yellow Shirts'. On panel six, the PAD are shown gathering in front of
Democracy Monument in central Bangkok, whose distinctive towering
wing-like pillars were erected to commemorate the 1932 coup that
resulted in the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. Holding
Scenes
35.5

8. 426
Navin Rawanchaikul, losl in tbe City (Long krung),2006, mixed media, installation view at Jim Thompson Art
Bangkok, photo courtesy Navin Production Co, Ltd, collection of Narong lntanate
21. Police General Kovit
'Wattana,
a former Chief oI
the National Thai Police,
who at that time u,as the
Minister of the Interior,
answering a question posed
by the opposition in which
he used the term'mob
meesen'to imply that the
PAD is supported by the
elites in Thailand,
especially pro-monarchists
and ultra-royalists. It is the
major reason why the PAD
was able to seize
Government House for 193
days (from 25 May to 2
December 2008) without
being disbanded. The PAD
seized Don Muang and
Suvanabhumi Airpons
from 25 November to 2
December 2008. In
Center,
banners reading gu chart ('rescue the nation') and toftan rabob Thaksin
(down with the Thaksin regime), they march on Rajadamnern Avenue,
and at nearby Democracy Monument there is a tank with riot police in
tow. The tank's gun is filled with roses, a reference to both rhe actual
moment of, and the PAD's support for, the 2005 coup. On the far right
of the mural is a group in red shirts fighting with a man wearing
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400
a
yellow shirt.
Navin's murals underpin the political turmoil of the street protests in
which the PAD had an advantage over the United Front for Democracy
against Dictatorship, or the UDD, some of whose members are known
to be Thaksin suppofters. The PAD movement is outspoken about who
its supporters are; one police general referred to the PAD as mob
meesen ('the privileged mob').21 The way in which the UDD has been
treated raises the question of double standards in terms of law enforcement and democratic practices in Thailand. There was a call for order
when a military-led crackdown on UDD protesters was ordered by rhe
government's Centre for the Resolution of the Emergency Situation
41.5

9. 427
contrast, the UDD gathered
on Raiadamnern on 12
March 2010 and were
violently crushed by roops
on 1 0 April 2010. The
death toll reached twentysix. As a result, the UDD
moved to Raiaprasong
Road on 14 April 2010.
Tragically, Apbhisit
Vejjajiva st up the Cenre
for the Resolution of the
Emergency Situation
{CRES) on 7 April 2010,
under the State of
Emergency Act 2005, to
deal with the mass protest.
In the end, the military,
acting under the ordere of
the CRES, broke up the
UDD protest site at
Ra japrasong Junction on
19 May 2010. UDD
protesters and members of
the public, including two
foreign joumalists, were
killed, bringing the total
number of deaths to ninetyone. The creation of the
CRES as a reacdon to the
UDD protests, in conrast
to the (lack of) reafiion to
the PAD protests, raises the
issue of double standards in
Thai politics.
22. The legal civil war is not an
ovcr-simplifi cd statcmcnt.
It is widely known that
CRES closed down and
blocked more rhan 65,000
websites accusing them of
posting matters {alling
under ldse majest6
legislation. Many
community radio stations
were also shut down, Yet
the CRES, the Minister of
Justice and Army leaders
announced that they would
hunt down anyone
involved in acts of ldre
malest6 including even
organising anti-lise maiest6
networks. Ironically,
freedom of expression and
freedom o{ the mcdia were
promoted after the May
1992 massacre and posited
in the 1997 constitution as
well as the 2007
constitution. Under the
state of emergency such
freedom is banned,
however.
23. Walter Beniamin,'Theses
on the Philosophy of
History', I llumin ations,
(CRES) on 19 May 2010, yet in that same month more than forty UDD
protesters were fatally shot. CRES denies that the Royal Thai Army
used live bullets against demonstrators, claiming instead that a group of
black shins who appeared from nowhere started kiling people on the
streets in order to frame CRES for murdering civilians.22 As of November
2010, the state of emergency still existed in parts of Thailand, and recalls
lTalter Benjamin's view of the state of emergency as declared by a fascist
regime.z't The state of exception becomes a condition and rule or, in other
words,. a historical norm. It is what Giorgio Agamben calls 'a legal civil
waf .24
420
425
DEFOR}ffNG THAI POLITICS
Before the sound of niltety rounds of gunfire rang out, Kru r-ong
proclaimed.: 'May dicutorship be destroyed, long liue democraqt."
430
Apichatpong'Weerasethakul, Primitiue, 2009
Inhis Primitiue project, Apichatpong Weerasethakul resurrects an unspoken story of the first violent clashes between the Communist Party of
Thailand (CPT) and the Thai government at Nabua Village in Renunakorn district in the province of Nakhorn Phanom, which took place on
7 August 1965. The CPT announced a conventional war against the
Thai government in order to liberate Thais from government rule
during the so-called 'bureaucratic polity' period. In this context, the
435
440
case of Krong Jundawong was an exemplar. Krong, a local teacher who
joined the Free Thai Movement during the Second'l7orld War, was influenced by socialist ideology and had represented Sakolnakorn province on
many occasions. He was later indicted under the Communist Act BE
(7942) and sentenced to death under Article Seventeen of the Consti-
2495
445
tution BE 25AZ fl959'1. According to local history, his last words were
'long live democracy'. His body was riddled with more than ninery
bullets.26 Krong's execution represents the height of Thailand's dictatorial rule. Along with many other young intellectuals and local politicians,
he was a victim of this dictatorship. Many fled to foin the CPT in the
jungle. The story of Nabua Village and Krong are intertwined in Apichatpong's frlms Phantoms of Nabua (2009), and later Uncle Boonmee-Who
Can Recall His Past Liues (2010). The latter, which focuses on reincarnation and the Buddhist concepts of life, was awarded a Palme d'Or at the
2010 Cannes Film Festival.
Despite their international success, Apichatpong's films have been frequently subjected to bans and censorship, especially as the 1930 Film Act
still controls freedom of expression in Thailand. Syndromes and a Century
(Saeng Satau.,atl was banned from theatres in Thailand for containing
scenes in which a Buddhist monk plays a guitar, a doctor drinks alcohol
while working in a hospital, and a doctor has an erection while kissing
his girlfriend. These scenes were alleged to be inappropriate and disrespectful as they portrayed both the Buddhist clergy and the medical profession in a negative light. The targeting of Syndromes and a Century
antagonised young film-makers and the art community at large. Apichatpong set up an online petition in mid-July 2007 and gained more than
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455
460
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10. 428
5000 supporters, avowing that it was 'a matter of basic human rights and
the dignity of human beings under a democratic society""
Apichatpong's interest in primitivism and ghosts can be seen as symbolising the deformation of democracy. As he points out' the Power of
ghosts is unknown and invisible:
Schocken Books,
New York, 196&, p 257
Ghosts
24. Giorgio Agambeo, State
Excep ti on, Kevin Attell,
trans, University of
Chica go
of
Pres, Clhicago,
200.5, p 2
25.
Veerarthakul, Pimitiue,
op cit, P 12
26. hap://ww.komchadluek.
net, accessed 15 August
2005
27. Brian Mertens,
'Apichatpong Bids to
Unshackle Thai Cinema',
ArtAsiaPacific 55,
September/October 2007,
p93
28. Apichatpong
Wcrasthakul.'Influencc:
Today and Tomorrow',
ArtAsiaPacific Almanac
2008, no 3, 2008, p 269
29. Nick Nostitz, Red as
Yellou Vol 1: Thailand's
Crisr of ldeztrry, White
Lotus, Bangkok,2009, p vi
30. Head was presented to
CTV as a gift from the
Indian Embaxy to
commemorate sixty-two
years of the Indian-Thai
relationship with the
suppon of the Ministry of
Culture, the Bureau of the
Crown Propeny, the lndiaThailand Chamber of
Commerce, and the Cenral
Pattana Group.
31. Susan Buck-Morss, T&e
Dialectix of Seeing: Waltet
Bmiamin and tbe Arcades
Prolact, rVIT Press,
Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1989, p 8l
32. The proiect'Shopping to
Rescue the [Thai] Nation'
was held right after the
May 2010 massacre. The
Abhisit Government and
BMA worked closely to
make sure that shop
owners could get space and
make a good return after
the UDD had been
dispersed.
in
December 2004...
are utilised as a
device to contol and set moral standards. This ultimate, hidden institution
evokes fear and, at the same time, provides cornfort.2s
Ghosts stalked Thailand after the Tsunami struck
-
the unknown, invisible powers in society
-
Democratic organisations such as the UDD and PAD wield a power that
is similarly unknown, although it tends to provoke anxiety more often
than it provides comfort. On the one hand, the PAD enioys a certain
advantage in that charges of terrorism and seizing the airport have
since been disputed. Moreover, PAD supporters continue to watch their
television station, consume their products and connne themselves to a
closed circle. One photographer noted that the PAD movement is more
of a cult than a demonstration.2e
At the height of the UDD protests, between 14 April and 19 May
2010, more than 10,000 UDD supporters gathered in front of Raiprasong's shopping arcades and centres. On 19 May, the CRES ordered
the military to storm the UDD protest camp from their position across
the other side of the street. The death toll went up steadily, even
though the killing zone was located near Central Vorld (the building
.World Trade Center', but when it was sold to
was formerly called the
Central Pattna Public Company Limited, its name was changed to
Central forld), a luxurious shopping arcade.
Indian artist Ravinder Reddy's Headbore witness to the shooting of
rhe UDD protesters, given its location immediately outside the Zen
department store adjacent to Central'World.ru A rumour spread afterwards that the head was a sign of redemption from sickness, bad luck
and black magic. According to Thai custom, when a person gets sick
and believes that the sickness is caused by an evil spirit, he or she
makes a small doll and takes apart its head as a gesture of sacrifice.
Installed near the Phra Trimurati (God of Love) shrine, Head was
believed to be a bad omen for UDD protesters who camped at Rajaprasong junction, which is also an area where the famous Bhrama, Narai,
Laksmi, Indra and Ganesha shrines are located. Such superstition is widespread among urban middle classes, whose business and living conditions
depend on economic and political stability. The haunted Head and the
death of UDD protesters contaminated these Bangkok shopping sites,
yet their deaths as well as those of international iournalists have been
intentionally dismissed in the wake of the middle classes' call to return
to the good old days of Siam Square's shopping centre and Central
Vorld. Their call re0ects Benjamin's notion of the phantasmagoria
470
475
480
485
490
495
500
510
attached to the fetishism of commodities,3l in which the Thai middle
class interests itself, as Susan Buck-Morss highlights. After the protest
was over, they came to Siam Square, started cleaning the street signs,
footpaths and bus stops, and resumed their shopping. The Abhisit
government and Bangkok Metropolitan Adminisration (BMA) allowed
shop owners and shopping malls to use the streets of Bangkok as a
venue for the campaigi-Sfr"p Cbuay Clal ('shopping for the Nation').32
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11. 429
In his analysis of Francis Bacon's work, Gilles Deleuze explains that
the sensation felt lies in what is painted, and that sensation is the
master of deformation. The sensation is thus beyond figurative representation; it goes directly to our instincts.33 Deformation starts from the very
moment that we realise the sublect exists, a quality that in this context
may be regarded as 'the ghostly deforming of the UDD', which reveals
the fact that rural subjects are no longer confined to the middle-class
imagination. As Kham Phaka, a writer and activist, states: 'Thailand is
no longer the same; Thai people have changed, only the elites can no
longer capture these changes and deceive themselves.'3o Her article
reminds me of Giuseppe di Lampedusa's words, 'things have to change
so that they can stay the same'.'t' To paraphrase di Lampedusa, the
UDD had to be dispersed so that the Thai elites and middle class could
stay the same. Nevertheless, the UDD and affiliated democratic movements haunt the Abhisit government, persistent in their calls for a truly
democratic regime.
525
530
535
DEMOCRACYDEFORMED
I
33. Gilles Deleuze, Froncrb
Bacon: The Logic of
Sersalioz, Daniel 7 Smith,
trans, University of
Minnesom Press,
Minneapolis, 2002, pp 3138
34. Kham Phaka,Ntb tae nee
pai mai meun derm lProm
Now On [Thai People]
W// Nor Be the SaueJ,
Matichon Sudsapda
(Matichon l?eekly), 24-30
April 2009
35. Sven Lutticken, 'On Gerald
Raunig: Art and
Revolution', Art Forum,
September 2007, p 83
36.
See
have explored the terrain of contemporary Thai art and politics and
explained that the violent intervention of the Thai army is often supported by the middle classes, who have implemented various forms of cultural governance within the arts. It should be noted that the Thai
government's cultural governance prolect is still under way; it employs
art as propaganda even as it attempts to de-politicise art. Exemplary in
this regard is 'Imagine Peace', the exhibition organised by the Ministry
of Culture with which I began this anicle. The project sought to bring
happiness and reconciliation back to Thailand and on the surface it
might have succeeded: participating artists have refrained from criticising
the government and itsuse of violence against UDD protestetr.3t Y.t, us
can be inferred from Apichatpong Weerasethakul's statement in2007 in
which he declared the presence of 'cultural cops' among us, and in Navin
Rawanchaikul's letter to Montien Boonma, it is possible to see that Thai
state ideology is heavily contingent on the assumption and exercise of
control. It is the propagation of a new form of Thai-style democracy,
one that might be described as a democracy deformed.
540
545
550
5S5
http://ww,matichon,
co.th/news-detail.
php?newsid=
1277631908&grpid=
&catid=0, accsed
October 2010.
l8
I dedicate this article to those who fell during the'legal civil war'in Thailand in April
and May 2010. I would like to thank the editors Joan Kee and Patrick Flores for their
ceaseless efforts in helping me with my difficulties during the political turmoil in Thailand, and also Araya Rasdjarrearnsook, Gridthiya Gaweewong, ITilliam Warren
Library, Thanom Chapakdee, Worathep Akrabutr, and the Kyo Reading Room.
Special thanks are also due to Amporn Jiranikorn for her review of my paper and
her useful comments, and to Navin Rawanchaikul for his prompt support.
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