Public Lecture Slides (11.21.2017) Deterrence, Assurance, and North Korean Strategy

We Produce the Future
Deterrence, Assurance, and North Korean Strategy
21 November 2017

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Disclaimer
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within
are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views
of the Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of
Defense, or any other US government agency.

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Outline
• Analyzing North Korea’s Emerging Nuclear Strategy
• Existing research on nuclear strategy
• Assessing North Korea’s nuclear strategy
• Theoretical Implications for Nuclear Strategy Analysis
• Domestic Debates in Japan and South Korea
• Policy Implications

Analyzing North Korea’s Emerging
Nuclear Strategy

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Research Questions
• What does North Korea’s behavior over the past ten years, in both
words and deeds, suggest about the kind of nuclear strategy/posture
that they have adopted, are adopting, and/or are likely to adopt?
• What policy implications can be drawn from this?

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Research on Nuclear Strategy/Posture
• Voluminous literature on the nuclear strategies of the “legacy” nuclear
powers
• e.g. Brodie, Schelling, Kahn, George and Smoke, Freedman
• Burgeoning literature on:
• Reevaluation of Cold War nuclear strategy
• e.g. Gavin (2012 & 2015)
• Nuclear weapons as tools of coercion
• e.g. Sechser and Fuhrmann (2017)
• Postures of “new” or “emerging” nuclear actors
• e.g. Narang (2014 & 2015)

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Narang – Posture Optimization Theory
• Focuses on regional nuclear
powers
• Posture Optimization Theory
• Argues that states choose a strategy
that will optimize policy goal
• Three identified nuclear postures
• Catalytic
• Assured retaliation
• Asymmetric escalation

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Alternatives to Narang’s Model
• Theory is parsimonious, states optimize postures to achieve policy
goals, but it assumes that every state has deterrence as its main
objective
• We know from Schelling (1956) that deterrence isn’t the only objective
that states may have with nuclear weapons
• Compellence may also be a goal
• What do we know about nuclear weapons and compellence?

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Nuclear Weapons and Compellence
Sechser and Fuhrmann
• Deterrent threats can be made credible because survival is at stake
• Coercive threats cannot be made credible because no state would risk
their own annihilation or break the taboo to change the status quo
• Quantitative and qualitative analysis shows that nuclear weapons are
poor instruments of coercion
• However, no cases of nuclear states postured to compel

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Deterrent vs. Compellent Postures
• Characteristics of Deterrent Postures
• Goal is to maintain the status quo
• Intention is to foster conditions that lead to inaction
• Can be of indefinite duration; are inherently stabilizing but can foster other state’s
pursuit of their own deterrent capability
• Characteristics of Compellent Postures
• Goal is revision; i.e., a change in the status quo
• Create strategic bargaining advantage through the acquisition and posturing of
capability
• Of finite duration, thus more targets of opportunity than deterrent ones

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DPRK: Deterrence or Compellence
• Apply Narang’s model to North Korea
• Capabilities used as a determining factor
• Claims that his categories are “empirically exhaustive and mutually exclusive”

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Posture Optimization Theory

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Modified Theory for nuclear strategy choice among regional powers and
empirical predictions
Regional Nuclear
Power
Stability Seeking Revisionist
Deterrence Posture Compellent Posture
Modified Theory

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North Korea Nuclear Posture
• We focus on intentions, not capabilities, by asking the following:
• What is the stated goal of the country’s nuclear program?
• Do they have longer-term strategic goals that may explain their acquisition and
development of nuclear weapons?
• Do they have existing capabilities that provide deterrent effect that makes their
nuclear weapons seem unnecessary?
• Do they possess or are they seeking to acquire capabilities that do not seem
useful for their stated deterrent goals?
• Does the state have a history of attempted compellence or the use of compellent
threats to achieve policy objectives?

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Case for a Compellent Posture
• What is the stated goal of the country’s nuclear program?
• KJU on 8 October 2017 - North Korea’s nuclear weapons are a “powerful deterrent
firmly safeguarding the peace and security in the Korean peninsula and Northeast
Asia,” Kim said, referring to the “protracted nuclear threats of the US imperialists.”
• Do they have longer-term strategic goals that may explain their
acquisition of nuclear weapons?
• Numerous statements suggesting long-term objective is the withdrawal of US
forces from the Korean peninsula and reunification with the South on the North’s
terms

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Case for a Compellent Posture
• Do they have existing capabilities that provide deterrent effect that
makes their nuclear weapons seem unnecessary?
• Existing capability to strike Seoul in the event of an invasion makes nuclear
capabilities seem unnecessary; has deterred action for six decades
• Do they possess or are they seeking to acquire capabilities that do not
seem useful for their stated deterrent goals?
• ICBM capability, especially one designed to strike the East Coast of the US (17
October 2017 statement by KJU), seems unnecessary for deterrence

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History of Compellence
• During the 1960s, Kim Il Sung tested the US-South Korea alliance
through a series of low-level attacks along the DMZ and a few much
more provocative actions, such as:
• The seizure of the USS Pueblo and the Blue House raid in January 1968
• Between 1966 and 1969, at the height of the Vietnam War, 75 US soldiers were
killed and 111 wounded in combat with North Korean forces along the DMZ
• Both KJI and KJU have routinely issued nuclear threats, above and
beyond what is normally required for deterrence

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Reasons for Compellent Posture
• May be seeking to create conditions where they have bargaining
advantage to fulfill their strategic objectives
• May seek to drive a wedge in ROK-US alliance by systematically raising
the provocation threshold; erode South Korean support for US alliance
• May initiate conflict with goal of using coercive leverage, through threats
against US homeland, to force the signing of a peace treaty or a reduced
US commitment to South Korea
• Would lead to the dissolution of the UN Command
• May precipitate US withdrawal from the peninsula

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Theoretical Implications
• Suggests a range of postures not oriented towards deterrence; need to
develop typology of possible postures
• Determine whether and to what extent deterrent and compellent
postures intersect
• Develop discourse analysis metrics to evaluate North Korean rhetoric

Domestic Debate in Japan and South
Korea

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Views from Japan
Security
• Strong support for alliance with the US
• Small majorities or pluralities are skeptical of US-Japan relations and the
international order under the Trump administration
• North Korea’s nuclear program is a top threat
Abe
• Approval rating for cabinet improved after October election victory
• More approve than disapprove of approach to US relations
• Opinions on constitution reform are divided, but majority oppose Article
Nine revision

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Views from South Korea
Gallup Korea
• Consistently view North Korean nuclear tests as threat to peace
• Since 2007, gradual decline in fear of war caused by North Korea
• Early September 2017, 37% said North Korea is likely to cause war (58% said not likely)
• Majority oppose US preemptive strike (as does Moon Jae-in)
• Moon has highest early term approval rating (>75%) since Kim Young-sam
• ~50% approval of North Korea policy
Asan Institute
• Strong support for US alliance, despite low favorability rating for Trump
• Believe US is necessary for South Korea to counter North Korean threat
• Optimistic about relations with US under Moon
• Divided opinion over providing aid or economic cooperation to North Korea

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Nuclear Breakout?
Japan
• Vast majority of public opposes developing nuclear weapons
• No calls for deployment of US nuclear weapons to Japan
South Korea
• Polling over last few years show ~55-65% support for developing
nuclear weapons
• Yet, would that support change if US alliance or prosperity threatened?
• Political calls for or inquiries into redeployment of US tactical nuclear
weapons
• Liberty Korea Party
• Defense Minister Song Young-moo

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Continued Nonproliferation?
Technical Capabilities
• Both have robust, advanced civilian nuclear sectors
• Japan has ENR technology and 47 tons of separated plutonium
• South Korea would have to develop ENR technology
• Both lack military nuclear doctrine and C2
Nonproliferation Constraints
• US extended deterrence and nonproliferation policy
• International treaties and norms
• Domestic factors (see Solingen and Hymans)
With growing North Korean nuclear threat, will past predict the future?

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Policy Implications
North Korea Policy
• Engagement with a deterrent-oriented state is fundamentally different
than one that is compellent-oriented
• Problem becomes much more time-sensitive; once they have the capability, it
becomes much more difficult to avoid situations where they may attempt to use
their nuclear weapons to compel
• Must clearly message that the US and allies will not be coerced or compelled
• Be cautious about doing things that might lead North Korea to initiate conflict;
might be just what they are wanting

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Policy Implications
Alliance Policy
• Resist decoupling pressures between US and allies
• Bolster public support for alliances; especially if, as predicted, North Korea ramps
up rhetoric and belligerent activities
• Consistent, high-level engagement and messaging
• Coordinate any changes in force posture or diplomatic/economic initiatives
• Improve regional defense
• Ballistic missile defense, including ISR
• Japan-South Korea relations
• Continue GSOMIA and confidence-building through trilateral cooperation
• Clarify role of Japan in Korean Peninsula contingencies
• History issues and territorial disputes won’t just go away

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