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A presentation by:
Friday, 18 December 2015
1
2
• In Africa, it doesn't matter whether you are
a Lion or a Zebra; when the sun comes up
you had better be running!
2
In the Beginning……….
• Target Attack in the News!
 Data Breach!
 Stolen of data
 Accessing the web services
 Exploiting the web Vulnerability
 Propagation of targets
 Infiltration and Privilege Escalation
 Early Warning
 Bypass Security Measures
 The Blackpos Malware
 Information Stored In The Magnetic Strip
 Impacts on this Attack
• Mitigation
3
4
Time line before the actual event
5
Dec 18 Dec 19 Dec 20 January 10 January 13 January 16 January 17
The 30 days of the Attack, 2013-2014
Target letter to unlucky shoppers 6
 Stolen of data
 Phishing emails to HVAC vendors
Citadel malware(Zeus Trojan): password stealing
malware.
 Web browser cookies and stole credential
7
 Accessing the web services
 Stolen token was used
 According to Fazio Mechanical:
 Online billing system, online contracting system and online project
management.
 Stolen Credentials were used to access the hosted
services.
8 Exploiting the web Vulnerability
 Unknown vulnerability to the public
 Hint, xmlrpc.php file found on the attackers tool list.
 Use for user enumeration and Ddos attacks
 Through a legitimate file upload e.g. an invoice:- to
malicious
 Leverty from CSIRT gives an advisory on web shell:
 Known as Backdoor Trojan or Remote access tool
 Mostly written in php and .net
 Permissions as an administrator
 Connections to database server
 Search for password, configurations files or directories
 Self-deletes on detection
 Displays all security measures and file permissions
 Access to Phpinfo(): creates web pages and php configurations
9 Propagation of targets
 Reconnaissance detection to found intelligent
information, e.g. credit card
 Active Directory: allows to connect, search and modify,
e.g., using LDAP.Target uses Active Directory to store all their credentials, As said
by former security member.
Shared internet files and directories e.g. print services and
shared hard drives.
 Using Service principle name (SPN) to locate the
SQL server.
 SQL related tools found on the attackers tool list:
Osql.exe, bcp.exe and isql.exe.
 Perhaps these tools used to access the SQL server of the POS machine.
 2 Scenarios To Infiltration – ARIBA (The United States
Senate committee on commerce, science, and transportation, 2014)
OR CENTRAL REFREGERATION CONTROL Application Vulnerability
Exploitation (O'Reilly, 2015)
 Admin Access
 Malware Delivered As Patch Updates
10 Infiltration and Privilege Escalation
 Early Warning
(Howlett, 2014)
11Bypass Security Measures
 2 Sce
 0- Day Attack So Unlikely That Signatures Were Present
 To Fool The Ids
 Data Transfer Only Between 10 Am To 5 Pm
 Used The Name Best1_logic Which Is The Default Test User
Name In The Bmc Software
 Only Way For Detection Was Anomaly Detection
 NARIOS To Infiltration – Ariba (The United States)
The Blackpos Malware
 First Of All The Name Sounds Scary “Blackpos”-horror Flick
 It Is A Ram Scraper
 Why Is It A Success??
 Answer- POOR Pci-dss(payment Card Ind. Data Security Stndard)
POLICY
 Parties Involved In E-currency Transaction
 Issuer – Bank Who Gives Card Belonging To A Brand-
visa
 Brand – Offers Infrastructure For Connectivity Security
 Acquirer- Merchant Bank
 Psp – Payment Service Provider
 Pci-dss Requires Its Members To Send Only Encrypted
 But What About When It Is Swiped???
 Attaches Itself To The Registry To Run On Startup
 Checks For Pos.Exe – Bye Bye Pan
12Ram Scrapers
13
(Trend Micro,
2014)
 33 Data Tracks
 Track 1 Stores Pan Among Other Data
 Track Stores Ed – Expiry Date
 Dd- Discretionary Data Like Cvv1
 May Pass Card Number Through Luhn
14Information Stored In The Magnetic Strip
 Some Estimates Go Upto A Billion Dollars
 Customer Credit Cards Floating In The Dark Web For Sale
 40 Million Credit Cards Stolen
 Replacing Costs X 40 Million Credit Cards
Impact Of The Hack
 What Can We Do To Face A Zero Day Attack In This
Scenario
 Anomaly Detection
 Network Segmentation
 Changes In Pci Policy
 Pin Data Encrypted Only During Transit
 No Encryption When Data Transferred In Internal
Network
15Mitigation
Questions & Answer
16
Let’s meet at the top
Imrana Abdullahi Yari
25046111
Aneesh kumar
17

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tatget attack

  • 1. A presentation by: Friday, 18 December 2015 1
  • 2. 2 • In Africa, it doesn't matter whether you are a Lion or a Zebra; when the sun comes up you had better be running! 2
  • 3. In the Beginning………. • Target Attack in the News!  Data Breach!  Stolen of data  Accessing the web services  Exploiting the web Vulnerability  Propagation of targets  Infiltration and Privilege Escalation  Early Warning  Bypass Security Measures  The Blackpos Malware  Information Stored In The Magnetic Strip  Impacts on this Attack • Mitigation 3
  • 4. 4 Time line before the actual event
  • 5. 5 Dec 18 Dec 19 Dec 20 January 10 January 13 January 16 January 17 The 30 days of the Attack, 2013-2014
  • 6. Target letter to unlucky shoppers 6
  • 7.  Stolen of data  Phishing emails to HVAC vendors Citadel malware(Zeus Trojan): password stealing malware.  Web browser cookies and stole credential 7  Accessing the web services  Stolen token was used  According to Fazio Mechanical:  Online billing system, online contracting system and online project management.  Stolen Credentials were used to access the hosted services.
  • 8. 8 Exploiting the web Vulnerability  Unknown vulnerability to the public  Hint, xmlrpc.php file found on the attackers tool list.  Use for user enumeration and Ddos attacks  Through a legitimate file upload e.g. an invoice:- to malicious  Leverty from CSIRT gives an advisory on web shell:  Known as Backdoor Trojan or Remote access tool  Mostly written in php and .net  Permissions as an administrator  Connections to database server  Search for password, configurations files or directories  Self-deletes on detection  Displays all security measures and file permissions  Access to Phpinfo(): creates web pages and php configurations
  • 9. 9 Propagation of targets  Reconnaissance detection to found intelligent information, e.g. credit card  Active Directory: allows to connect, search and modify, e.g., using LDAP.Target uses Active Directory to store all their credentials, As said by former security member. Shared internet files and directories e.g. print services and shared hard drives.  Using Service principle name (SPN) to locate the SQL server.  SQL related tools found on the attackers tool list: Osql.exe, bcp.exe and isql.exe.  Perhaps these tools used to access the SQL server of the POS machine.
  • 10.  2 Scenarios To Infiltration – ARIBA (The United States Senate committee on commerce, science, and transportation, 2014) OR CENTRAL REFREGERATION CONTROL Application Vulnerability Exploitation (O'Reilly, 2015)  Admin Access  Malware Delivered As Patch Updates 10 Infiltration and Privilege Escalation  Early Warning (Howlett, 2014)
  • 11. 11Bypass Security Measures  2 Sce  0- Day Attack So Unlikely That Signatures Were Present  To Fool The Ids  Data Transfer Only Between 10 Am To 5 Pm  Used The Name Best1_logic Which Is The Default Test User Name In The Bmc Software  Only Way For Detection Was Anomaly Detection  NARIOS To Infiltration – Ariba (The United States) The Blackpos Malware  First Of All The Name Sounds Scary “Blackpos”-horror Flick  It Is A Ram Scraper  Why Is It A Success??  Answer- POOR Pci-dss(payment Card Ind. Data Security Stndard) POLICY
  • 12.  Parties Involved In E-currency Transaction  Issuer – Bank Who Gives Card Belonging To A Brand- visa  Brand – Offers Infrastructure For Connectivity Security  Acquirer- Merchant Bank  Psp – Payment Service Provider  Pci-dss Requires Its Members To Send Only Encrypted  But What About When It Is Swiped???  Attaches Itself To The Registry To Run On Startup  Checks For Pos.Exe – Bye Bye Pan 12Ram Scrapers
  • 14.  33 Data Tracks  Track 1 Stores Pan Among Other Data  Track Stores Ed – Expiry Date  Dd- Discretionary Data Like Cvv1  May Pass Card Number Through Luhn 14Information Stored In The Magnetic Strip  Some Estimates Go Upto A Billion Dollars  Customer Credit Cards Floating In The Dark Web For Sale  40 Million Credit Cards Stolen  Replacing Costs X 40 Million Credit Cards Impact Of The Hack
  • 15.  What Can We Do To Face A Zero Day Attack In This Scenario  Anomaly Detection  Network Segmentation  Changes In Pci Policy  Pin Data Encrypted Only During Transit  No Encryption When Data Transferred In Internal Network 15Mitigation
  • 17. Let’s meet at the top Imrana Abdullahi Yari 25046111 Aneesh kumar 17