Jjsms vol. 2, no.2. final

Jalingo Journal of Social and Management Sciences Volume 2, Number 2 March, 2020 Page 1-14
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Extending and Maximizing Benefits of Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) to Internally
Displaced Persons in Benue State, Nigeria.
1
Chenge, Andrew Aondohemba PhD,
2
Prof. Ofuebe, Chikelue and 3
Jev, Amos Asongo PhD
1
Department of Public Administration, Federal University, Wukari, Taraba State.
2
Department of Public Administration and Local Government, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.
3
Department of Public Administration, Taraba State University, Jalingo, Taraba State.
Abstract
Conflicts and protracted crises have resulted in a sharp rise in the number of Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Nigeria. Displaced persons not only face physical threats in such
circumstances of forced migration, but are also confronted with the challenge of economic
survival. In this context, Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) becomes an increasingly
important tool in humanitarian response and poverty reduction. In recent years, Nigeria has
deemed it necessary to embrace cash transfers as social protection instruments to tackle poverty
and vulnerability. This study examined the implementation of the CCT programme in Benue
State, Nigeria. The vulnerability theory was used as the theoretical underpinning of the study.
The study adopted both quantitative and qualitative methodological approaches to carry out in-
depth investigation. Survey and documentary sources were used for data collection, while
descriptive statistics and content analysis were used for data analysis. The data analyzed
revealed that the CCT Programme as presently implemented in Benue State covered the poor
and vulnerable, but did not extend to the large IDP population. It also established that IDPs in
Benue State were supportive of in-kind assistance, but indicated the need for a combination of
in-kind and cash assistance. The study recommended that in extending the CCT programme to
IDPs in Benue State, strategies such as establishment of a robust programming framework;
strong Measurement and Evaluation (M&E) mechanisms; and training to help beneficiaries
utilize from provided assistance, among others, should be adopted to maximize benefits and
mitigate possible risks associated with the programme.
Keywords: Cash transfers, Conditional Cash Transfers, Displaced persons, Internal
displacement, Poverty, Vulnerability.
Introduction
Conflicts and protracted crisis have resulted to a sharp rise in the number of Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Nigeria (IDMC, 2017; UNHCR, 2017). Displaced persons not
only face physical threats in such circumstances of forced migration, but are also confronted
with the challenge of economic survival. Abrupt detachment from economic activities
generates high levels of unemployment among IDPs which creates restrictions to basic
incomes. The consequences of unemployment and absence of income in displacement
situations can be far-reaching, with poor nutrition, lack of access to basic services,
psychological distress and social conflict as some of the possible results (Deblon & Gutekunst,
2017).
In this context, Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) Programmes become an increasingly
important tool in humanitarian response and poverty reduction (Addison, Gisselquist, Nino-
Zarazua & Singhal, 2015; Crost, Felter & Johnston, 2014; 2016; Deblon & Gutekunst, 2017).
CCTs are social assistance programmes that provide periodic cash transfers to targeted
households, often conditional upon parents, to enable them take care of the basic needs of their
children (Crost, Felter & Johnston, 2014; Jones, Vargas & Villar, 2008; Nelson & Sandberg,

Extending and Maximizing Benefits of Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) to Internally Displaced Persons in Benue State, Nigeria.
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2016). CCTs are understood to promote human capital development and help break life course
and inter-generational transfers of poverty by facilitating households’ capacities to ensure
children’s rights to adequate nutrition, health care and education (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009;
Jones, Vargas & Villar, 2008).
Over the past decade, CCTs have become one of the most important modes of
delivering development aid, and a large literature documents their positive impact on the
wellbeing of the poor (Crost, Felter and Johnston, 2014; 2016; Fiszbein and Schady, 2009;
Gore & Patel, 2006). State and non-state actors comprising governments, non-governmental
organizations, private individuals and companies, bilateral and multilateral organizations,
development partners and other members of the donor community encourage the adoption of
CCTs, particularly in developing countries where vulnerabilities to various kinds of risks
prevent the human capital development of households and communities (Akinola, 2014).
In recent years, Nigeria and her development partners have deemed it necessary to
develop social protection instruments as mechanisms to tackle such high rates of poverty and
vulnerability and to support progress in both the economic and the social spheres. Thus, social
protection has become an emerging and fundamental component of the policy objective of
government. As part of these efforts, cash transfers were identified at the federal level and some
selected states in 2007, to serve as potential instruments to achieve government’s goal of
building a socio-economic base for the poor and vulnerable people (Holmes, Samson,
Magoronga, Akinrimisi & Morgan, 2012).
Benue state constitutes one of the states captured in this initiative due to its general
poverty profile, high levels of social vulnerability, and susceptibility to shocks and stress. CCTs
as social protection mechanisms were adopted by the Benue State government to provide a
holistic approach of addressing poverty and vulnerability in all ramifications (BSIP, 2018).
However, the implementation of the policy has generated mixed reactions concerning the
selection process of poor and vulnerable beneficiaries. The study therefore investigates the
implementation of CCTs in Benue State to ascertain the potentiality of the policy in addressing
poverty and vulnerability among IDPs. The general objective of the study is to evaluate the
implementation of the CCT programme in Benue State. In specific terms, the study aims to:
1. Examine the scope and dimension of the CCT programme in Benue State.
2. Rationalize the need to extend the CCT programme to IDPs in Benue State.
3. Suggest strategies for maximizing benefits and mitigating risks of CCTs to IDPs in
Benue State.
Conceptual Clarification
Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs)
Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) are financial cash schemes that provide cash
directly to poor households in response to the household/individual fulfilling specific
conditions. The scheme creates incentives for households to adjust their behaviour towards
nationally accepted social goals (Cookson, 2016; DFID, 2011; Seeta-Prabhu, 2009). In
technical terms, the objective of such programmes is “to correct for market failures associated
with non-internalized positive externalities” (Janvry & Sadoulet, 2004, p.1).
In other words, they are used to (a) incentivize private behaviour to secure positive
externalities such as enhanced consumption of merit goods like health and education; and (b)
target vulnerable groups who are unable to access merit goods due to negative income effects
caused by cyclical downturns and/or exogenous shocks. These schemes have typically been
used to improve school attendance by children, boost attendance at health clinics and enhance
participation in immunization programmes (Seeta-Prabhu, 2009).

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CCTs are different from unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) – grants to vulnerable
persons/groups on the basis of certain pre-determined eligibility criteria. Social transfers such
as pensions to senior citizens, the physically challenged, etc., are the most common UCTs. The
main difference as compared to CCT schemes is that they are unconditional programmes and
do not attempt to influence individual/household consumption preferences (Lindert, 2013;
Seeta-Prabhu, 2009; UNHCR, 2012).
Internally Displaced Persons
The United Nations Secretary-General in 1992, defined IDPs as “persons or groups who
have been forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers, as a result of
armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violations of human rights or natural or man-made
disaster, and who are within the territory of their own country” (UN, 1992).
In 1998, the UN restructured this definition and elucidated IDPs as “persons or groups
of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual
residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations
of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and
who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border” (UN guiding principle on
internal displacement, 1998).
Unlike refugees, who are persons who have fled across the border of their countries
because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign
aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which
have seriously disturbed public order, and are therefore no longer under the protection of their
country of origin, IDPs are displaced citizens still under the territory of their country. Their
government is legally responsible for their protection and welfare (UNHCR, 1995; Cartagena
Declaration on Refugees, 1984).
Theoretical framework
The vulnerability theory of Martha Fineman (2008) formed the theoretical
underpinning of the study. The central thesis of the theory is that vulnerability is inherent to
human condition, and that the state therefore has a corresponding obligation to reduce,
ameliorate, and compensate for that vulnerability (Fineman, 2008 cited in Kohn, 2014).
Fineman (2008, 2010, 2013) posits that in order to meet its obligation to respond to human
vulnerability, the state must provide equal access to the “societal institutions”, that distribute
social goods such as healthcare, employment, and security.
In Fineman’s view, this obligation is consistent with the original purpose of the state:
to respond to human vulnerability. She further argues that it is the state that has legitimized and
given power to social institutions that increase resilience for some while undermining the
resilience of others; thus the state must accept responsibility for the “effects and operation” of
those institutions (Fineman, 2008, 2010, 2013).
Fineman has explicitly developed vulnerability theory as an alternative to theories of
social justice and responsibility that focus on achieving formal equality (equality that results
from sameness of treatment). Fineman sees vulnerability theory as capable of advancing
substantive equality (equality that results when people are equally benefited or disadvantaged
by a law or policy) in a way that traditional approaches to equality cannot (Fineman, 2012 cited
in Kohn, 2014). Fineman (2012) suggests that by focusing on the universal human condition,
vulnerability theory makes salient the need to alter institutional arrangements that create
privilege and perpetuate disadvantage.

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The vulnerability theory thus provides an alternative basis for defining the role of
government and a justification for expansive social welfare policies. In applying the theory,
the study maintains that:
1. The prodigious importance of the state and its responsibility of creating and supporting
systems that promote resilience across its diverse population inform the need for CCTs.
CCTs constitute government policies aimed at resolving inequality by ensuring that
vulnerable persons are provided with the economic means that grants them access to
basic social services.
2. Instead of directly advocating for equal access to societal institutions (a condition that
denies flexibility of choice and is capable of creating congestions and pressure on
existing social facilities), CCT policies or designs opt for provision of direct cash that
gives the vulnerable group a wide range of options regarding what social services to
obtain and where to obtain those social services.
3. In this way, CCTs as instruments for curbing inequality, considerably improve human
conditions by building the economic base of vulnerable persons. CCTs help to provide
a justification for the adoption of policies that create and sustain important social
welfare systems.
Literature Review
Evolution of cash transfer schemes
CCT schemes originated in middle-income Latin American countries that had good
infrastructure and supply systems. They were positioned as formal, publicly provided safety
net programmes that essentially supplied cash to the needy and helped them tide over the period
of economic crisis. The earliest of such programmes were identified in Brazil and Mexico
(Johannsen, Tejerina & Glassman, 2010; Maite, 2012; Ulrichs & Roelen, 2012). In Brazil, the
first CCT programme was started in 1996 with a focus on child labour. While some more
programmes based on the CCT philosophy were introduced to address specific areas, these
were integrated in 2004 into the now well-known programme ‘Bolsa Familia’. In Mexico,
Progresa was initiated in 1997 with a new approach integrating interventions in health,
education and nutrition. It was based on the understanding that these important dimensions
were direct correlates of human welfare (Seeta-Prabhu, 2009).
Other countries that initiated CCT programmes include Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
Jamaica, South Africa and Turkey. In Asia, Bangladesh had a Female Stipend Programme as
early as 1982 followed by a Food for Education Programme in 1993. Food grants were later
converted to cash grants in 2002.Indonesia launched a pilot CCT programme called Programme
Keluarga Harapan (PKH) in 2007. Its beneficiaries were very poor households that had
pregnant women and/or zero to 15-years-old children. The PKH required them to access
education and health services to be eligible for the cash transfer (Seeta-Prabhu, 2009).
CCT schemes represent a shift in the focus of social policy from supply-side
provisioning to addressing demand-side constraints. They typically have multiple objectives
that foster the virtuous cycle between social protection and human development. The early
CCT schemes had two main objectives – to reduce poverty and to enhance capabilities of the
poor. While these appear as two distinct objectives, in reality they constitute two phases of the
single objective of poverty reduction, with the cash transfer part addressing poverty in the
short-run, and the conditionality component addressing poverty in the long-term through
building of human capital/human capabilities and thereby reducing the intergenerational
transmission of poverty (DFID, 2011; Seeta-Prabhu, 2009; UNDP, 2009).

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The focus of the initial CCT programmes was on the urban poor in Brazil and rural poor
in Mexico. The schemes which were implemented in low-income countries (such as Nicaragua
and Honduras in Latin America) focused on the rural poor. The CCT programmes have also
been used to address the needs of vulnerable sections of the population such as IDPs
(Colombia), physically challenged persons (Jamaica) and households affected by HIV/AIDS
(Zambia). In Chile, the programme makes psychosocial assistance available to all beneficiaries
in an attempt to help them acquire the social skills and training needed to escape poverty. The
scope of the programmes has also expanded beyond school enrollment and immunization to
cover aspects like secondary school completion (Mexico) and adult education, microcredit and
housing (Brazil) (De la Briere & Rawlings, 2006).
With the use of CCTs, transfers are made in cash rather than in-kind, the reason cited
being that cash transfers provide greater discretion to the poor households to spend on items
they consider important, allowing the decision-making power to be with the households. Cash
transfers are also relatively simple to administer than in-kind transfers. Generally, cash
transfers are made to the woman in the household as the literature on the subject indicates that
women spend a greater proportion of the money under their control on children’s education,
health and nutritional requirements (Lund, Noble, Barnes & Wright, 2008).
The term ‘conditionality’ in CCT schemes is specific rather than holistic; they do not
prohibit but incentivize. Thus, they do not require a household to reduce its consumption of
demerit goods but allow it to supplement the consumption of merit goods. This is because the
transfer of cash is conditional on certain requirements, e.g. school attendance (minimum
attendance norms), and/or visits to health clinics, immunization of children and soon. The
objective is to induce households to change their behaviour in a manner that contributes to the
realization of a nationally accepted consensus that the achievement of common social goals
requires the protection of a minimum-level of merit good consumption by all households
(Cookson, 2016; Nelson & Sandberg, 2016; Bloom, Mahal, Rosenburg & Sevilla, 2010; Seeta-
Prabhu, 2009).
The Emergence of Conditional Cash Transfers in Nigeria
Nigeria is a middle-income country with high dependence on oil revenues, although
there has also been growth in the non-oil economy in recent years. Despite strong economic
growth, 54% (approximately 75 million people) of Nigeria’s population lives in poverty. While
recent forecasts suggest that poverty may be reducing slightly, of most concern is the fact that
the poverty rate has doubled in the past 20 years. Nigeria is also highly unequal: the Gini
coefficient was 43.8 as of 2005 (Ortiz & Cummins, 2011). Meanwhile, income inequality is
just one dimension of poverty in Nigeria; poverty and vulnerability are also highly influenced
by social and other factors, including geography, ethnicity, age and gender. The severity of
poverty and vulnerability has also been exacerbated by the recent conflicts and instability in
the country (Hagen-Zanker & Holmes, 2012; Holmes et al, 2012; Holmes, Akinrimisi, Morgan
and Buck, 2011).
In attempt to tackle the high rates of poverty and vulnerability, the government of
Nigeria and its development partners sought to develop social protection instruments in the
country which could foster economic and social development. Thus, cash transfers were
identified by the federal government as potential social protection instruments to achieve these
goals. Basically, cash transfers based on the Latin American model (that is, using conditions
linked to education and/or health) are the main types of transfer programming being
implemented in Nigeria (Holmes et al, 2012).
The first cash transfer programme, known as, In Care of the People (COPE) started as
a pilot in 2007. The objective of COPE was to break the intergenerational transfer of poverty,

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to reduce the vulnerability of the core poor in society against existing socioeconomic risks and
to improve their capacity to contribute to economic development in the community, state and
nation (Akinola, 2014; 2016; 2017). In the COPE, beneficiaries selected using geographical,
community and categorical targeting methods received a Basic Income Guarantee (BIG)
ranging from N1,500 Nigerian Naira per eligible child (approximately US $10) to a maximum
of N5,000 (US $33) for 4 children and above monthly (NAPEP, 2007). An additional N7, 000
was put aside every month on behalf of every participating household and a total of N84, 000
(US $560) was given to the household as investment fund after 12 months when participants
were required to exit the programme (NAPEP, 2007). This investment fund was known as the
Poverty Reduction Accelerator Investment (PRAI) (Akinola, 2014).
The second CCT (referred to as CCT for girls’ education) was implemented through
the state education sector in Nigeria, supported by the United Kingdom Department for
International Development (DFID), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World
Bank, in Kano, Bauchi and Katsina states. The CCT was targeted at reducing girls’ dropout
resulting from early marriage specifically in the transition period from primary to secondary
school (Holmes et al, 2011; 2012).
Holmes et al (2012) averred that examining the appropriateness of the early CCTs in
the context of high rates of poverty and vulnerability in Nigeria highlights a number of
important issues. A main concern was the limited coverage of these cash transfer programmes.
For instance, COPE coverage was 0.001% of the poor. The targeting policy, based on the CCT
design, restricted eligibility to a subsection of the poor by limiting the number of potential
beneficiaries to households with school-age children plus another categorical identification
(e.g. elderly, female-headed, HIV and AIDS affected). There was therefore a need to think
about possible sequencing of cash interventions which cover a larger section of the poor, which
may mean attaching different conditions or eliminating the issue of conditionality completely.
The current CCT operational in Nigeria is the CCT embedded in the National Social
Investment Programme (NSIP) which was established by the Federal Government in 2016. The
NSIP consists of a suite of programmes which focus on ensuring a more equitable distribution
of resources to vulnerable populations, including children, youth and women. The CCT
programme of the NSIP directly supports those within the lowest poverty bracket by improving
nutrition, increasing household consumption and supporting the development of human capital
through cash benefits to various categories of the poor and vulnerable. The support is
conditioned on fulfilling soft and hard co-responsibilities that enable recipients improve their
standard of living (NSIP, 2018).
In the NSIP CCT, beneficiaries selected through a Community Based Targeting (CBT)
method receive N5,000 monthly. They also receive a mandatory training on various forms of
skill acquisition and business development to help them have a sustainable livelihood at the
end of the programme. The idea is that beneficiaries cannot be getting N5,000 monthly ad
infinitum since the amount cannot sustain them if they are not doing any business alongside
it. The N5,000 is primarily to cushion their feeding while they build their capacity to have
sustainable livelihood. Apart from the N5,000 basic payments, households with pregnant
women, infants and children of school age, are given another top-up of N5,000 and that makes
it N10,000 monthly transfer for such beneficiaries. The top-up only comes on the condition
that beneficiaries satisfy the defined co-responsibilities (antenatal visits, immunization for
children and children’s education) (NSIP, 2018; Onehi, 2017).
Currently, 16 out of the 36 states in the Federation are captured in the programme, with
over 300,000 households registered. However, the households recorded to have been receiving
the cash transfers since October, 2017 are 70,000. The target of the programme is

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1,000,000,000 people and it is expected that the target will be met when all states in the
Federation are captured in the programme. The programme is expected to span for six years
with beneficiaries limited to three years of participating in the programme (NSIP, 2018; Onehi,
2017).
Implementation of the Conditional Cash Transfer Programme in Benue State
The adoption of CCTs in Benue State was due to the high poverty profile of the state.
Benue State is one of the thirty-six states of the Nigerian federation and has been identified as
the 13th
poorest state in the country (Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative
[OPHI] Report, 2017) (Table 1). Poverty in Benue State is absolute, severe, widespread, multi-
dimensional and has increased in the last decades. Poverty in the state is also identified to be
predominantly rural (Ikwuba, 2011).
Table 1: Poverty profile of states in Nigeria
Lagos
Osun
Anambra
Ekiti
Edo
Imo
Abia
Rivers
FCT(Abuja)
Kwara
AkwaIbom
Delta
Kogi
Ogun
Ondo
Enugu
Bayelsa
Oyo
Nasarawa
CrossRiver
Plateau
Ebonyi
Kaduna
Adamawa
Benue
Niger
Borno
Kano
Gombe
Taraba
Katsina
Sokoto
Kebbi
Bauchi
Jigawa
Yobe
Zamfara
8.5%
10.9%
11.2%
12.9%
19.2%
19.8%
21.0%
21.1%
23.5%
23.7%
23.8%
25.1%
26.1%
26.4%
27.9%
28.8%
29.0%
29.4%
32.4%
33.1%
51.6%
56.0%
56.5%
59.0%
59.2%
61.2%
70.1%
76.4%
76.9%
77.7%
82.2%
85.3%
86.0%
86.6%
88.4%
90.2%
91.9%
Source: Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative [OPHI] Report, 2017
In attempt to tackle the high poverty profile, the state keyed into the CCT of the Federal
Government NSIP in 2017 (BSIP, 2018). Thus, the implementation of the programme in Benue
State applies the design and implementation mechanisms of the NSIP. The broad objective of
the programme is to: reduce extreme poverty and bridge inequalities gaps among citizenry as
well as prevent the vulnerable from falling further down the poverty line and build resilience
to withstand shocks and risks. The specific objectives of the programme are to: increase and
improve household’s consumption of the extreme poor; improve human capital development;
and deliver regular and reliable targeted cash transfers that are easily accessible to the extreme
poor (BSIP, 2018).
Methodology
The study adopted both quantitative and qualitative methodological approaches to carry
out in-depth investigation. Surveys using interviews and questionnaires, as well as
documentary sources were used for data collection, while descriptive statistics and content
analysis were used for data analysis. The sampled population for the study consists of 102
respondents comprising of 90 IDPs in Benue State, 6staff of the Benue Social Investment
Programme (responsible for the disbursement of CCTs), and 6staff of the Benue State
Emergency Management Agency (responsible for the management of IDPs).
Result of Findings
Scope and Dimension of Conditional Cash Transfers in Benue State
The eligibility criteria of the CCT programme in Benue State defines the scope and dimension
of the programme. The eligibility criteria simply outline the conditions that qualify people as
beneficiaries of cash transfers.
In the interview session with informants from the BSIP, it was noted that while beneficiary
households were mostly located in geographical areas and communities with low human
development indicators, lack of access to the basic needs of life such as food, clothing and
shelter formed the primary eligibility criterion for every household. In selecting beneficiaries,
preference was given to households living in extreme or abject poverty.

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BSIP informants further asserted that the selection of households was done through a
process known as Community Based Targeting (CBT). This means the community identifies
the poorest people because the programme is not just targeted at the poor but the poorest within
the community. Various poverty criteria have been thrown up so far; in some cases, people
have said it is the number of times they eat, the state of the shelter they live in, mortality rate
and access to basic medical care, the size of farmland or type of crops grown, etc. The identified
beneficiaries receive N5,000 monthly payments under the CCT as a form of social safety net
for the poorest and most vulnerable, for a period of 3 years, not subject to renewal.
It was also gathered that although the policy stipulates N5,000 monthly payments, the
money was paid bi-monthly, which totals N10,000 for each beneficiary, so as to condense
logistics constraints in the disbursement of funds. The beneficiaries also receive training on life
skills, savings and business development to make them self-reliant after the programme.
Informants from BSIP and BSEMA maintained that IDPs were not captured in the CCT
programme.
Rationalizing the need to extend the CCT programme to IDPs in Benue State
The scope and dimension of CCTs in Benue State clearly reveal that IDPs are not
covered in the programme. However, a thorough examination of the eligibility criteria shows
that IDPs also meet the stipulated conditions that qualify people as beneficiaries of the
programme. IDPs are among the poorest and most vulnerable in the sense that their means of
livelihood has been destroyed and as such, they depend entirely on society for their basic means
of survival (Figure 1 & Figure 2).
Figure 1: Internal displacement & IDPs income activities/sources
Source: Field Survey, 2018
Source: Field survey, 2018
86, 96%
4, 4%
Internal Displacement isolates
IDPs from income
activities/sources
Internal Displacement doesnot
isolates IDPs from income
activities/sources
82
8
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Internal displacement causes poverty and
dependency for IDPs
Internal displacement does not cause poverty and
dependency for IDPs

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Figure 2: Internal displacement, IDPs poverty and dependency
In the field survey conducted, 86 respondents (96%) indicated that internal
displacement had cut them off from their income activities and sources. Similarly 82
respondents (91%) noted that internal displacement had caused poverty and dependency for
them. Thus, the aftermath of displacement has been the need for IDPs to fall back on
government to rescue them from the precarious situation.
Concerning the efforts by government to take care of the welfare needs of IDPs in
displacement situations, 87 respondents (97%) maintained that government was supportive in
providing in-kind assistance in the form of foodstuff and other material goods (Figure 3).
Fig. 3: Government and in-kind assistance to IDPs
Responding to the issue of perceived impact of in-kind assistance from government, 52
respondents (58%) posited that in-kind assistance had an extremely positive impact on their
wellbeing, while 38 respondents (42%) posited that in-kind assistance had a moderately
positive impact on their wellbeing (Fig. 4)
Fig. 4: Perceived impact of in-kind assistance to IDPs
87
3
0
20
40
60
80
100
Govt.has
providedin-
kindassistance
Govt.hasnot
providedin-
kindassistance
52, 58%
38, 42%
In-kind assistance has an
extremely positive impact
In-kind assistance has a
moderately positive impact
In-kind assistance has no impact

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In response to whether government gave support in the form of cash assistance, 90
respondents (100%) indicated that no cash assistance was made available by government (Fig.
5).
Fig. 5: Government and cash assistance to IDPs
88 respondents (98%) further argued that the presence of cash assistance would have
spawned an extremely positive impact on their well being, while 2 respondents (2%) opined
that the presence of cash assistance would have spawned a moderately positive impact on their
well being (Fig. 6).
Fig. 6: Perceived impact of cash assistance to IDPs
Thus, regarding the issue of most preferred form of assistance that IDPs desired from
government, 46 respondents (51%) indicated preference for a combination of in-kind and cash
assistance, 24 respondents (27%) indicated preference for only cash assistance while 20
respondents (22%) indicated preference for only in-kind assistance (Fig. 7).
Source: Field Survey, 2018
0
20
40
60
80
100
Govt. has provided cash
assistance
Govt. has not provided cash
assistance
0
90
88, 98%
2, 2%
Cash assistance can spawn an
extremely positive impact
Cash assistance can spawn a
moderately positive impact
Cash assistance has no impact
20
24
46
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
In-kind assistance only
Cash assistance only
Mix of in-kind & cash assistance

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Fig. 7: Preference of IDPs on government assistance
It could therefore be extrapolated from the above analysis that, IDPs like other poor and
vulnerable groups in society require CCTs in order to help them cope with prevailing shocks
and stresses, and to help them develop the long-term potential of household members
particularly children.
The interview discussions with IDPs corroborated with these findings as 13 out of 15
IDPs interviewed (86%) expressed their support for CCTs, since the mechanisms were more
flexible safety nets that provided opportunity for people to purchase goods/services according
to their needs or preferences. Similarly, 11 out of 15 IDPs interviewed (73%) maintained that
CCTs were desirable as they represented a more empowering and dignified form of support.
Strategies for maximizing benefits and mitigating risks of CCTs to IDPs in Benue State
Some crucial measures should be considered in ensuring that the extension of CCTs to
IDPs in Benue State generate maximum benefits and mitigate possible risks associated with
the programme. The measures adopted for this study are basically drawn from strategies used
in providing direct cash assistance to IDPs in post conflict regions and regions that that have
experienced intense natural disasters around the globe. This is for reason that the IDP situation
in Benue State over the years has been traced to conflicts as the predominant cause, with
flooding also noted as a minor cause. These strategies are examined below:
The establishment of a robust programming framework is necessary for the successful
implementation of CCT programmes. The choice of the form of implementation depends on
the objectives of the programme. Thus, there is need for simple and clear objectives, tailored
to the needs identified. Given objectives are clear and the programme is planned accordingly,
the potential advantage of cash-based approaches is that they potentially allow linking
assistance and recovery, by alleviating short-term poverty through allowing people to address
their direct needs, while incentivizing families to invest in longer-term activities and human
capital impacting on their livelihoods.
The adoption of strong Measurement and Evaluation (M&E) mechanisms come in as a
follow up in monitoring the implementation process. There is need for M&E mechanisms that
involve multiple stakeholders (government, CSOs, donor organizations etc) through a public
process to mitigate dissipation of funds. The synergy between multiple stakeholders in the
implementation of CCT programmes will ensure that parties involved act as checks for each
other. M&E mechanisms also ensure that beneficiaries apply the funds appropriately to meet
up with the intended objectives of the programme.
IDPs who meet the requirements to be beneficiaries of the CCT programme should
receive appropriate training to equip them with the necessary knowledge that would help them
utilize from provided assistance. CCTs normally impose behavioural conditions on transfer
recipients which set minimum requirements on beneficiaries’ attention on the education, health
and nutrition of children. Through advocacy and awareness campaigns, beneficiaries could be
effectively sensitized on how best to apply these funds in order to meet up with the objectives
of the programme.
There is need for improved security and protection for IDPs with the introduction of
cash based assistance. The growing feelings of physical insecurity are driven by rising
unemployment, lack of basic services and subsequent levels of crime. These feelings are
triggered by members of host communities who have a lower assessment of their personal life
situation as compared to IDPs who have received some form of cash assistance. As a result,
the provision of cash assistance to vulnerable IDPs increasingly causes tension within and

12
outside camp settlements, which can result in physical conflict, particularly during periods of
distribution of assistance.
Emphasis on transparency and accountability in the CCT programme to ensure that
power brokers do not misappropriate cash. This could be facilitated with the adoption of
electronic payment systems to avoid diversion of funds and to maintain proper tracking of cash
transfers/ flows. However, a context and conflict sensitive approach is necessary to ensure the
safe access of beneficiaries to payments. If there is no functioning banking system or digital
infrastructure, it may be necessary or preferable to use existing payment mechanisms, but
braced with effective transparency and accountability mechanisms.
Conclusion
CCTs are social protection mechanisms adopted by government to address social and economic
vulnerabilities such as poverty, old age, disability or unemployment and to complement
household income in times of exposure to shock (Gore and Patel, 2006). The CCT
implementation in Benue State has so far not been targeted at IDPs who constitute an extremely
vulnerable group. Evidence derived from the study shows that it is important to extend CCTs
to the large IDP population if they are to serve as holistic and effective strategies for alleviating
poverty in Benue State.
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15
Institutional Building and Defence Transformation in Nigeria: An Appraisal of the role
of the Military
Manpaa Aliyu Musa, Ph.D, Adole Raphael Audu, Ph.D and Shehu Mustapha Liberty
Department of Public Administration, Faculty of Management Sciences, University of Maiduguri, Borno State.
Email:adolecabs@yahoo.com manpapella@gmail.com
Abstract
The military as an institution has transcended many phases of human civilization. Although
this institution may vary in terms of its organisation and level of sophistication, there is no
disputing the fact that the military had long been acknowledged as the foundation of most, if
not all societies. This is evident in the quantum of scholarly narratives and historical accounts
of invasions and conquest of the weaker and vulnerable communities by the stronger and
militarily superior ones. Traditionally, the role of the military globally has been defending the
territorial integrity of the state. Cold War struggles between the Eastern and Western bloc.
During the Cold War, global polity had witnessed unprecedented cases of praetorianism; when
military intervention became contagious like bush fire across Africa, Asia and Latin America
sweeping all the newly installed democratic governments. The two ideological blocs have been
fingered as culpable in the menace of military intervention providing ideological platform,
training, resource and logistics for their puppet military officers. First, to overthrow the existing
democratic institutions and later to perpetuate themselves in power. The exit of USSR from the
global power theatre in October 1989 marked the official end of cold war and the ascendancy
of new world order, the unipolar arrangement under the American hegemony making military
rule an aberration. As alternative, they imposed liberal democracy and capitalism as the only
acceptable political and economic order. It is in the light of the above that this Paper examined
the role of institutional building in defence transformation and democratic governance in
Nigeria. The paper relied on Esman’s Model of Institution Building as basis for analysis. The
methodology for this paper was scholarly narratives based on library documentation. The paper
concludes by advocating for a paradigm shift from the misconstrued view of the military being
an aberration to one in which it is taken as an instrument of defence transformation of the
country through the absorption of the principles of Institution Building Model.
Keywords: Appraisal, Defence, Defence Transformation, Institution Building, Military,
Nigeria.
Introduction
The military as an institution is as old as mankind transcending and transiting from one phase
of human evolution to the other. Although the institution varies in their organisation and level
of sophistication, it has long been acknowledged as the foundation of most societies in both
ancient and modern nation states alike. Scholarly narratives and historical accounts are
awashed with the stories of invasions and conquest of the weak and vulnerable societies by the
stronger and military superior communities from time immemorial. Within the context of the
pre-colonial Africa and Nigeria in particular the military existed in the ancient kingdoms of
Kanem Borno Empire, Old Oyo Empire, Dahomey kingdom as well as the ancient Benin
kingdom among others (Osabiya, 2015).
One peculiar characteristics of this said period was that the military as an institution was
saddled with the primary responsibility of expansion and defending the territorial integrity of
the state. Although such powerful institution was regularly consulted even on matters that are
purely political they have no direct control over the affairs of the state as they essentially

Institutional Building and Defence Transformation in Nigeria: An Appraisal of the role of the Military
16
remained subordinates to the political authorities (Lai, 2004). However, the unusual happened
when this institution chose to abandon her primary traditional responsibility and decided to
embrace the secondary unpopular option of taking over the state power (Osabiya, 2015).
Consequently, the military that hitherto been regarded as the protector of the emperor or the
Praetorian Guard suddenly transformed into political class and from this moment onward
military praetorian became associated with the overthrew of legitimate and elected government
(Larry, 1997). This is what became known in the military literature as praetorianism, meaning
the direct intervention by the military in politics of the state.
This development has altered the scholarly narrative about the role of military institution from
that of the custodian of the state to an aberration so much such that it is no longer only
normative but a necessity that any form of infraction in the process of human advancement or
even developmental debacles are often theorised and linked to the period of protracted military
rule. There was a time in African history when military rule or praetorianism had become a
resilient paradigm in politics in both practice and praxis. During this period the drive for the
new found gold mine has attracted many young graduates into the military for obvious reasons;
as a medium for acquiring political power, as convenient means of acquiring wealth and
economic power as well as prestige and status symbol. Thus the military which ought to have
represented integrity, modesty, and discipline has been enmeshed into sleaze and moral
decadence often expressed in affluent and ostentatious life style as primitive accumulation and
conspicuous consumption has gradually became the order of the day.
Globally, the military as an institution had been a symbol of nationalism and patriotism. While
this perception had been retained elsewhere in the world the general perception about the
military has been negative. The defeat of the Naxi Germany and its triple alliance by the allied
forces and the passing of the UN resolution 13…which provided for equality and self-
determination has triggered the massive agitation for and eventually granting of self-
government to the hitherto colonies of the European superpowers. The independence of India
in 1945 became the turning point and gave impetus to the anti-colonial struggles particularly
in Latin America, Asia and Africa. No sooner did these “Third World Countries” (a term often
used to describe countries that secured independence and appear at the global scene after the
second world and are faced with the challenges of developmental debacle) emerge and the
planting of new democratic institutions in these new sovereign states than the ideological
struggles between the Eastern and the Western bloc commenced. Although the cold war was
ideological struggle, the real battle field has been shifted to third world countries. This
phenomenal cold war had further reinvigorated and reinforced the space for praetorianism by
providing ideological platform, logistics and financial support to their puppet regimes, which
resulted in the collapse of the newly installed democratic government and institutions across
Africa. Hence the new found military rule became endemic and contagious like bush fire
sweeping across the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. The two ideological blocs
have been fingered as culpable in the menace of military intervention providing ideological
platform, training, resource and logistics for their puppet military officers. First, to overthrow
the existing democratic institutions and later to perpetuate themselves in power. The exit of
USSR from the global power theatre in October 1989 mark the official end of cold war and the
ascendancy of new world order the unipolar arrangement under the American hegemony
making military rule an aberration. As an alternative, they imposed liberal democracy based
on capitalism as the only acceptable political and economic order. It is in the light of the above
that this paper examines the role of institution building in defence transformation and
democratic governance in Nigeria.

17
Meaning of Institution Building
The term institution building has over the years gain global currency and is widely used by
people from all walks; scholars, policy makers, development experts, donor agencies as well
as development aid workers. This reality has exposed the concept to scholarly polemics and
disputes on its actual meaning, which make the definition of the concept complex, ambiguous
and contestable. The term institution building is often conflated with similar concepts such as
institution development and organisational building so intricate that the terms are usually used
inter changeable.
Paradoxically, the lack of consensus on the meaning of the concept has spill to the
contemporary with little or no change to what it used to be when the concept first appears in
the development aid literature as a standard item of jargon in development aid activities. This
ambiguity and lack of clarity in the concept has been attributed to three main forces.
Fundamental ambiguity in English language; a marked preference among some practitioners
of the academic discipline of sociology and organisation theory for abstract conceptual debate
and jargon generation; and the fact that unclear terms are frequently useful in political and
policy context (Moore, Stewart & Hudock, 1994). The term institution building as constructed
by inter-university research programme denotes; an approach to the understanding of social
change. It is an effort to identify operational methods and action strategies that will be helpful
practitioners, to persons actively engaged as change agents especially in a cross-cultural
situation. Thus the inter-university research programme defines institution building as the
planning, structuring, and guidance of a new or reconstituted organisation which (a) embodies
changes in values, functions, physical and/or social technologies. (b) Establish, foster and
protect normative relationship and action pattern; and (c) Attain support and complementarity
in the environment (Esman & Blaise, 1966;1). The institution building approach has a
pronounced social engineering bias. Its proposition is rooted in the believe that a very large
proportion of the most significant contemporary changes especially in the developing countries
are deliberately planned and guided and can be clearly distinguished from those changes that
occurs through gradual evolutionary process or as a consequence of political or social
revolution (Esman,1967).
The institution building approach presupposes that the vehicle for the introduction change is
primarily a formal organisation. As it is this organisation that symbolises, promote, sustain and
protect the innovation, and that it is the organisation as well as the new normative relationship
and action patterned they foster which must become “institutionalised” meaningful and valued
in the societies in which they functioned. From another perspective Moore et al (1994)
conceptualised institution building from trajectories; the positive and the negative. From the
positive perspective, institution building refers to an attempt to improve the functioning of the
society by creating, structuring, or changing institutional software- the way people relate to one
another in the context of public action and public activity.
Negative institution building on the other hand serves as a label for those development
activities that do not centrally involve (only) physical construction, the transfer of physical and
financial resources or major policy change. Institution building is a term used for a wide range
of activities that have not been historically viewed as the proving of core professional discipline
of the aid fields; Economist, Engineers, Natural resources, Specialist, Medical personnel and
Population specialist (Moore et al, 1994). The definition of institution building is abstract and
confusing to make it more concrete requires its conceptualisation within the context of the
“core” and “periphery”. The core institution building is the organisation building; the enterprise
of trying to support improvement in the effectiveness of the organisation separately or in
networks by changing their structures, management procedure etc. the objective is the more

18
effective accomplishment of the task that a particular organisation(s) are supposed to undertake
for example (auditing public account). The means are building up capacity of the
organisation(s) to do this task. Within the context of this paper therefore, institution building
refers to series of interrelated deliberate actions guided behaviour. This denotes the
identification and appropriate utilization of human and material resources for the entrenchment
and sustenance of pristine core values in a characteristics and manner that is normative,
gradual, and willing among the organisational client or target population in line with the broad
mission and vision of the organisation concern. Institution building has Leadership, doctrine,
program, resources and internal structure. They are interconnected that without one the other
structure and processes established for the operations of the institution will not function
effectively.
Meaning of Defence Transformation
The term Defence transformation (DT) came into common usage in the later 1990’s. Like
every other social science concept, it has been defined by stakeholder military officials’
scholars’ analysts and observers differently. This made a single universal acceptable definition
not only difficult but impossible. According to David (2000) there is no single process called
Defence transformation as every country’s experience and starting point are different. This
makes its conceptualization and understanding contextually and country specific. However,
despite this variation in countries experience and starting point which sharpen their
conceptualization of the subject. There exists a common stand point among various
stakeholders regarding to the origin of the concept. This is owing to the fact that most if not all
stakeholders agreed that the concept Defence transformation is rooted in the decline and fall of
the cold war system and the consequences which followed from that (David, 2000)
The US Department of Defence (2008) defines defence transformation;
‘‘as a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and
cooperation through new combination of concept capabilities, people and
organization to exploits our nations advantages and protect against
asymmetries vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position which help
underpins peace and stability in the world.’’
Operational Guide Note (2016) defined defence transformation as a major and long lasting
changes to the structure, functions and ethos of the defence sector of a control, (from this
perspective. Defence transformation is, therefore, more extensive than simple incremental
improvement to a country’s defences sector such as happens all over the world; this Defence
transformation typically occur after a major political conflict or crisis usually involving
violence and often on a large scale. Within the above context defence transformation is more
ambitious than the reorganization of defence sectors following peaceful transition such as those
in the Eastern Europe after 1989. It should be seen therefore as a component of whole security
and justice transformation process.
Looking at the defence transformation from the general perspective the concept can be thought
of as large scale discontinuous and possibly disruption changes in military weapon,
organization and concept of operation (i.e. approached to war fighting) that are prompted by
significant changes in technology or the emergence of new and different international security
challenges. David (2000) argues that the dynamics of the Cold War although dangerous and
illogical did at least provide the majority of states in the world with platform and kind of
framework within which to make defence and security policies. He went further to state that
Countries that were freed from the intellectual shackles of the cold war begun to wake up and
think for themselves about what they need their military for. This no doubt has been a painful

19
intellectual demanding process and in many part of the world has not progressed very far. The
greatest obstacles have been conceptual rather than tangible, and have reflected the fact that
people found adoption to sudden change difficult.
The implication of the aforementioned development is the polarization of perception and
emergence of divergent opinion on what constitute the actual meaning of defence
transformation. First and foremost, there are bands of cold war nostalgic who try to cling to the
ideas of the 1980’s substituting Islam for communism but otherwise changing little. There are
also those security conservatives who argued that one should stick to the old is being tried and
trusted. There are also the liberal vigilantes who after years of calling for smaller armed forces
or none at all suddenly want them to be greatly expanded and sent all over the world. Caught
in the web of the complex intellectual polemics of the above nature, David (2000) thus defined
Defence transformation as the process by which nations are adapting their defence policies to
the post-cold war world and rethinking defence from the ground up. Although, it covers issues
such as budget, organization and accountability. Here Defence transformation begins with the
fundamental question about the role of Armed forces and their place in society and the way in
which the Defence community make and implement defence policy.
In distinct context the Bush administration has adopted a broad based conceptualization of
Defence transformation. According to the regime Defence transformation encompasses wide
range of process and interrelated events which include; the making changes in department of
defence business policies, practices and procedures particularly with an eye towards stream
lining operation and achieving efficiencies so as to reduce cost and move new weapon
technologies from the laboratories to the field more quickly. In addition, the administration had
equally expanded the concept of Defence transformation to refer to proposed changes in
matters such as the budget process and environmental matters affecting military training. There
is also some Defence Transformation Advocates who attempted to clearly distinguished
Defence transformation from incremental or evolutionary military change brought about by
normal modernization. According to them defence transformation is more likely to feature
discontinuous or disruptive forms of change. They equally emphasized that while much of the
discussion about transformation revolves around changes in military weapons and systems,
changes in organization and concept of operation can be as important as or more important than
that of weapons and systems. To bring the much needed transformation some have argued that
change in organisation and concept of operation can lead to achieving defence transformation
even without changes in weapons and systems. They further buttress that even with the
dramatic changes in weapon and systems without corresponding change in organisation and
concept of operation might not lead to transformation. The implication of the above is that
these advocates tend to advocate more of institution building approach than the garrison or
militarised approach to defence transformation.
Some transformational advocates mentioned that the best period during which transformation
can and should be pursued is the period of military dominance and political stability. This is
because states that suffered defeat in military related conflict tends to learn and adjust fast from
their war experience than do countries that emerged victorious as victorious countries they
argued can become complacent making only incremental improvement to military forces and
concept of operation that appears dominant and are then unpleasant sprits in subsequent conflict
by adversaries that in meantime have developed new and unforeseen military capabilities.
Similarly, some observers have equated transformation principally with the idea of making
United States forces more mobile, agile and lethal through greater reliance on things such as
unmanned vehicle (UVs), advanced technologies for precision strike operations and the special
operation force. There are also other advocates that primarily equated transformation with
concept of Network Centric Warfare (NWC) and the C4 ISR technologies to implement NCW.

20
From the forgoing, it is clear that the concept of defence transformation is both complex and
ambiguous. This notwithstanding, we can operationalize defence transformation within the
context of this paper to mean a well thought of and deliberate process of interrelated series of
activities directed towards improving the institutional capacity, concepts of operation, military
weapons, command and control through robust policy formulation and implementation with
sole aim of securing the internal and external environment of nation states. In other words,
defence transformation is the post-cold war defence policy measures that were adopted by
individual state with the view of creating safe haven for the realization of their nation interest.
Theoretical framework
The institution building theory is not a single theory but a broad variant conventional model
put forward by organization and management scholars to guide the process of development.
The institution building theory is rooted in the works of Esman and Blaise (1966). The main
theoretical disposition of institution building based of Esmanetal conceptual model is that
development should be conceived as a social engineering bias. It is rooted in the proposition
that very large proportion of the most significant contemporary change especially in developing
countries are deliberately planned and guided and can be distinguished from those that occur
through gradual evolutional process or as consequences of political or social revolution.
Further, the approach presupposes that the introduction of change take place primarily in and
through formal organization. I.e. the formal organization serves as a vehicle for achieving
institution building. When these organizations and change inducing, change protecting and
formal, they are considered to be the institutions.
These organisations and the new patterns they foster become institutional e.g. meaningful and
valued in the societies in which they function. This process involves complimentary set of
interactions between the institutions and the environment. The environment varies in its
readiness or resistance to change both overtime and from place to place. Basic to Esmans
approach is the assumption that the effacement assimilation of the new physical and social,
technological requires that the environment provides supporting values, normal process and
structures which usually are not present when the new model changing the environment to
compliment or accommodate the new technologies are primary introduced in and through
organizations the supportive values, norms, processes and structures must be institutionalized.
In and through these organisations, that is normative relationship and action patterns and
performs functions and services that are valued in the environment. The result of analysis of
these institutionalized changes can serve as guide to social action. Hence the assumptions that
institution building is agency social process. A set of element and action can be identified which
is relevant to institution building in giving the research framework that guided institution
building programme contain three major elements.
i. A set of institution variables, notably;
a. Leader b. Doctrine c. Programme d. resources & internal structures.
ii. The linkages the interdependence which text between an institution and other relevant
parts of the society? the institutionalized organization does not exist in isolation as such
it must establish and maintain a network of complementarity in its environment in order
to survive and function, there are basically four (4) linkages;
a. Enabling linkages
b. Functional linkage
c. Normative linkage
d. Diffused linkage
iii. “Institution” as an end state.

21
It must be made clear that Esman based his approach on three (3) Analytical categories
in his institutional building universe.
These institutional variably are those elements thought to be necessary and sufficient to
explain the systemic behaviour in an institution.
Institution Building and Defence Transformation in Nigeria
Institution building and defence transformation are closely related and mutually supportive
concepts. While institution building provides the framework and guidance for the achievement
of defence transformation, the primacy of defence transformation is to create a secure
environment for institution building. The common feature shared by both concepts is that they
are made up of series of interrelated activities and process that are change and innovative
driven. The focus of this segment therefore is to examine the role of institution building in
facilitating defence transformation in Nigeria. However, before delving into the real issue, it is
imperative to highlight: the key objectives of defence transformation, stages in defence
transformation as well as the operational areas expected to be covered by defence
transformation.
Objectives of Defence Transformation
Mention was made at the onset of this paper that defence transformation as a concept is a
continuous process that varies from one region and country to another. Owing to the fact that
every country has peculiar historical, cultural and technological capabilities which by
implication affect its drive towards achieving defence transformation. This variation in
economic and technical competence in addition to the point at which a country began its
defence transformation struggles to a large extent shapes the process and levels of
development. It is noteworthy however, to state that despite the wide range of controversy
surrounding the concepts there is consensus among stakeholders; Scholars, security experts
and policy analysts that defence transformation as a concept is rooted in the development
surrounding the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of cold war struggles which saw the
emergence of new world order (disorder) under the auspices of the United States unipolar
hegemony. The question therefore is what is the rationale behind defence transformation?
Defence transformation (DT) is incumbent because historical account indicates that attempting
to have a perpetual grip on the existing state of affairs no matter how expedient, advantageous
or prosperous looks it wear, is short-sightedness approach and often proved to have come with
disastrous outcome. In addition, the continuous threat both real and perceived posed by wide
and complex terrorist networks such as Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM), Al-shabaab, Islamic State of Iraq (ISIS), Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), etc.
Similarly, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the collapse of traditional
imaginary national boundaries as a result of rapid technological advancement and the impact
of globalization in the 21st
century have resulted in the rapid and increasing porosity of
boundary between political, economic as well as military domains. This emerging gale of
globalization has miniaturized the world like never before making non-sense of distance and
time and as well, shifting the battle field from elsewhere to nowhere. Thus, the necessity for
finding an improved and better way of working with our numerous coalitions allies, leveraging
new technologies and operation concepts in order to create our dominance coalition advantage
against current and potential future adversaries. Furthermore, it is globally acknowledged that
even the world best military forces like United States, Russia, China Germany etc., are
transforming their defence what more of economically and technologically dependent nations
like Nigeria.
Consequent upon the above the US Transformation Planning Guidance (2016) identified four
(4) imperatives that lend urgency to the need for transformation Viz:

22
i. Strategy
ii. Threat
iii. Technology
iv. Risk mitigation
It should be noted however, that these factors identified could be applied universally though
differently in accordance with individual nation’s preparedness and level of technological
advancement it is imperative to domesticate and replicate these imperatives within Nigerian
context.
Strategic Imperatives
The primary goal of defence transformation is to build a strong viable and globally unparalleled
power that will contend both the present and future adversaries. To achieve this objective
requires the development of agile, network centric force that can take action from forward
position rapidly reinforce from other areas with the view of growing capabilities that will defeat
our present and future adversaries swiftly and decisively. In addition, the phenomenal shift of
battle field from the old wars i.e. wars among sovereign states with definite boundaries to new
war in which battle field appears to have no boundaries required defence planners both military
and civilian to brace up by building a capability based, rather than threat based forces.
In Nigeria, however we have a long way to go in order to materialize this objective as the nation
neither has the political will power to neither do this, nor have those in charge demonstrated
the technical competence to realize our manifest destiny among nation-states in the global
power theatre. Today the nation is grappling with security challenges posed by its internal
adversaries in collaboration with their external allies, yet Nigeria relied almost 100% on the
western military hardwires, war tanks and fire arms to wage the battle. It is imperative to note,
therefore, that if the world’s supper power with older technological development and military
weapons are still striving for defence transformation, then Nigeria must take its defence
transformation very serious. Most especially in the face of the glaring emergence of internal
insurrection from across all the region which ranges from the Boko Haram insurgency
dominant in the north east, the perennial clashes among farmers and herders men in the
northeast and north central, the issue of kidnapping and cattle rustling in the north west, the
rise in cultism and militancy in the Niger delta and the insurrection by indigenous people of
Biafra (IPOB) led by Namdi Kanu.
Threat Imperative
Of the entire imperatives that compelled both advanced countries (US Russia, Germany, China,
etc.) and the emerging powers like Nigeria to embark upon the defence transformation agenda,
the most disturbing is the issues of uncertainty of global policy owing to the high level of
threats both perceived and real. There is no doubt that we are all living today in a world
operating in the first predictable threat environment comprised of what was experienced before
and during the cold war struggles. I.e. the period of mutual assured destruction in practical
terms each and every country developed or developing, including but not limited to Nigeria
have many axes of approach to defend against both in the endogenous and exogenous. Today,
regional and global powers alike are developing capabilities which pose threats to everyone’s
national interest or stability. This scenario is worsened by the velocity at which sovereign states
strive towards the realization of their defence transformation goals. This development made
self-preservation and return to the Hobbesian state of nature in the international system with
utmost certainty. Similarly, both state actors (STAC) and non-state actors (non-STAC)
adversaries are attempting to compensate and neutralize US military hegemony by developing
asymmetrical capabilities. Furthermore, the upsurge and proliferation of chemical, biological,
radiology and nuclear (CBRN) capabilities have raised the spectre of such weapon cheaply

23
falling into the hands of the terrorists. In Nigeria, specifically, this is evident in the calibre of
weapons in the hands of Boko Haram and their counterparts, Niger Delta terrorists which often
dwarf and outmatch the obsolete ones used by poorly equipped Nigerian armed forces. In many
cases when the poorly equipped and poorly motivated Nigerian army comes under the superior
fire power of the enemy, they have no option but to retreat. Invariably, the non-STAC using
the international seaways and airways of global commerce has also greatly diminished the
protection afforded by most nations including Nigeria by virtue of geographical distance. This
made such countries vulnerable hence the need for defence transformation.
Technological Imperative
The technological imperative that necessitated the defence transformation is closely linked to
globalization as a result of revolution in science and technology, more specifically information
technology has resulted in the collapse of traditional imaginary national boundaries and
miniaturization of world into global village making nonsense of this distance and time.
This development has not come without negative price. First, it has resulted in accessibility to
highly capable technologies at low thereby weakening the barriers in places where hitherto the
global policemen, the US enjoying uncontested advantage. Today however, the story is no
longer the same as this globalization has created new forms of competition among both state
and non-state actors in the space and cyber space. Similarly, the proliferation of information
technology has also increase the potential for miscalculation and surprises, particularly
involving Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their delivery system. In the light of this,
it become necessary for any serious nation Nigeria, inclusive to heed to continuous basis
update, redefine and exercise its new technology especially in the defence sector.
Risk Mitigation Imperative
The dream of every sovereign state that embarks upon defence transformation is to create a
force today that meets the presence as well as the future challenges. To achieve this onerous
and herculean task requires a discreet and careful balance of today’s needs in relations to the
needs of tomorrow. In line with this, it is incumbent on the national force of today to be agile
and lethal in order not to be put in jeopardy as defence department rebalances its investment
towards designing and building the force of the future. For Nigeria to realise the above goal,
its defence sector should borrow a leaf and replicate the risk management framework provided
by the defence department of the USA and other technological advanced nations taking local
context in to consideration. Alternatively, it should develop framework modelled along that of
US. The components of categories of risk to be envisaged are many, however, the popular four
(4) identified by the US defence department are:
i. Force management risk
ii. Operational
iii. Challenge
iv. Institutional
(i) Force management risk: management involves planning, organizing, and
coordinating and control elements among others. Force management risk therefore
is not an exception. This is because the force size and population is influenced by
interplay among series of internal and external variables alike.
The force population is daily faced with the challenges which if those responsible for its
management did not take proactive measures will expose the force to risk in the future. These
challenges include reduction in the number if personnel which could be as a result of death,
retirement or sickness among others. Similarly, there is problem of development and
procurement of new military wares. The barrier in areas where hitherto the global policeman
United States was enjoying uncontested advantage has been broken. Today the story is no

24
longer the same as this technological advances had created new form of competition in space
and cyber space, they also increased the potential for miscalculation and surprise particularly
involving WMD and their delivering system; in the right of the above it become necessary for
every series governance nation state Nigeria among but not limited to, need to on continuous
basis update, redefine and exercise it new technology especially in the defence sector.
Force Management Risk:
Management involve planning, organizing coordinating and control elements among others,
force management risk therefore, is not an exception as the forces population day in day out
are faced with series of challenges which if those responsible for its management not take
adequate proactive measures will expose such force to risk in the future, some of these
challenges include; reduction in the number of personnel due to death, retirement and sickness
among others. Similarly, there is challenge of development, procurement on new military
hardware in which case the knowledge of the personnel needs to be update in order to brace up
with how to handle this weaponry. Thus the Nigerian Defence headquarter should embark on
the continuing challenge to recruit, train and retrain the calibre of personnel to prevail in
combat. In military operation as in other organization qualitative personnel is the key for
efficient and effective war management.
Scope of Defence Transformation
Defence transformation we have argued is a continuous process without end and it is by nature
all embarking process of thinking creatively in order to work better together with other
stakeholders and agencies. Because of the broad based nature of the scope of defence
transformation which makes it complex and ambiguous there is a need for us to draw a
boundary concerning areas that will constitute our attention in the course of defence
transformation. Within the context of this paper the scope of defence transformation in Nigeria
will be tailored towards the realization of three flash points identified by the United States
Defence Department these three areas are;
i. Transforming how we to business inside the Department
ii. Transforming how we work with our interagency and multinational partners
iii. Transforming how the fight
It is imperative to note at this juncture that in application or practical realities the scope
borrowed from the United States would only provide us with institutional framework to guide
our focus. In the implementation moreover, there is significant difference in our approach as
we have distinct level of socio-economic and technological development.
Transforming Ways of Doing Business
The 21st century have provided sovereign nation state with a big challenge of compressed time
cycle. Achieving Defence transformation goals of these countries therefore requires creative
and innovative transformational business and planning practices to adopt that will appropriately
and conveniently fit into the compressed time cycle. These measures include adaptive planning,
a more entrepreneurial, and future oriented; capabilities based resource allocation planning
process. Similarly, there is need for accelerated acquisition circles build on spiral development
output based management, and a reinforced analytical support agenda.
Transforming our Work Relationship with Others
The September 11 terror attack on the twin towers of the United States has no doubt altered the
Global perspective of Defence and security. The question was if the defence headquarters of a
globally acknowledged military sophisticated unified power would be achieved by the terrorist
which nation is save. This single development has enormous altered the defence and security
perception and strategy of many sovereign nation including but not limited to the U.S. This

25
resulted in the demand for increased relationship and synergy among various agencies and
multinational partners. Of particular interest, the attack has increased premium on defining new
and more efficient ways of interacting with other agencies of the state and other multinational
partners. In addition, there is also increased demand to promote improved coordination across
all level of government (Federal, state and local). The purpose of this is to increase intelligence
gathering, corporation, more rapid response and the ability to conduct seamless operation. The
implication of the above is that if the nation’s military transform, those responsible for defence
transformation needs military capabilities that can be effectively applied in concert with
multinational an interagency capability. It is against this background that reworking or
rethinking the way Nigerian Defence transformation managers relates with other agencies
military, paramilitary or civilian to a larger extent affect its capability in realization of the goals
of Defence transformation.
Conclusion
It is not contestable that Nigeria as nation is in dire needs of transforming its approach to
warfare to meet up with the contemporary global best practices and international rule of
engagement. Nigeria still relied on the obsolete war strategy and since force transformation
depend on creativity and innovative development of future joint war fighting concepts and
experimentation it become necessary to evaluate these new concepts. There is a need to subject
this concept to rigors combat simulation condition at our various training facilities and
interoperating lessons learned from both domestic experience in the war against Boko Haram
and Niger Delta as well as those learned by virtue of participating as a member of the
multinational joint task force as well as other aspect of on-going global war on terrorism.
Recommendations
In the light of the foregoing conclusion, the following recommendations are made:
1. Operational Risk: Here the Nigeria military management should develop the ability to
support near term contingencies and operations of the military by providing the military
genuine equipment and hard ware that can make them stand external aggression.
2. Future Challenge Risk: As the name implies this involve futuristic exercise, most
particular to tackle head long the challenge of investing in new capabilities for the
future. For instance, the Military should send its personnel for the right type of training.
This will equip them with modern intelligence and tactics in the field of operations.
3. Institutional Risk: Here the main concern is on the challenges of ensuring that one
manages our resource effectively by allocating into functional and optimal usage. The
Military should endeavour to judiciously use the money budgeted by the Federal
government on the fight against insurgency by been accountable and responsible for
their actions and inactions.
References
Ake, C. (1994).
Claude, A. (1994). Democratization of disempowerment; Malt House Monograph Series,
Lagos, Nigeria
David, C. (2000). Defence Transformation: A short guide to the issue Institute for Security
Studies, Pretoria South Africa
Esman, M.J. (1967). Inter-University Research programme in Institution building: The
Institution building concepts- An interim appraisal. Pittsburgh Syracuse Indiana,
Michigan St
Esman, M.J. and Blaise, H. (1966). Institution building Research: The Guiding Concepts,
University of Pittsburgh, and GSPIA

26
Huntington, S. (1957). The Soldier and the State: The theory and practice of civil military
relations. Harvard University Press: Massachusetts Cambridge.
Lai, O. (2004). Democratization and the military in Nigeria in: O.L. Anifowose
(eds) Democratization and the military in Nigeria. Frankard Publisher Lagos Nigeria
Larry, D. (1997). Transition without end. Vintage publishers’ Ltd Ibadan, Nigeria
Moore, M., Stewart, S. and Hudock, A. (1994). Institution building as development assistant
Method, A review of literature and ideas report. Vastergotlands, Trycker skara sausex,
Brighton
Osabiya, B. (2015). Democratization and the military in Nigeria: A case for enduring
civil military relations in the fourth Republic and beyond. Review of public
Administration and Management. Vol. 3(1).
Operational Guidance Notes (2016). Defence Transformation https://issat.dfcaf.ch>pdf
Tilly, C. (1990). Coercion, capital and European states, AD990-1990, oxford university
Press, Cambridge MA Basil Black Well
United State Department of Defence (2007). Defence Transformation: background and over
sight issues for congress (RL 32238)
United State Department of Defence (2004). Elements of Defence Transformation
available on the internet http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/libraryfiles/documents
383 ELT of DT I.R pdf
United State Department of Defence (2003). Office of the Secretary of Defence, Director
Force: Transformation, Military Transformation; Strategic Approach Fall.

27
Impact of Financial Sector Reforms on the Performance of Deposit Money Banks in
Nigeria
Alfred Anthony Kwanti
Department of Accountancy, Taraba State University Jalingo, Nigeria.
Email: kwantianthonyalfred@gmail.com
Abstract
The study assessed the impact of financial sector reforms on the performance of Deposit Money
Banks (DMBs) in Nigeria. The specific objectives were to determine the impact of financial
sector reforms on Return on Assets (RoA) and Return on Equity (RoE) of the Deposit Money
Banks (DMBs). Secondary data were employed, spanning a period of thirty years (i.e. 1986-
2016). The RoA and RoE were used as proxies for DMBs performance while bank credits,
bank deposits, real interest rates, and exchange rates were used as proxies for financial sector
reforms. A multiple regression analysis was used, while the specified models were estimated
using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) technique. The results obtained showed that, though the
effect of financial sector reforms on bank performance in Nigeria for the period of study has
been significant (especially as measured by the proxies of Return on Assets and Return on
Equity), it is not efficient enough to transform the nation’s economy to the desired level. Hence,
the study recommended that more and proper recognition be given to the nation’s Deposit
Money Banks that will improve banks liquidity and stability which will in no doubt go a long
way in boosting shareholder’s and investors’ confidence in the financial sector; and this will
further improve the efficiency of the banking sector. The study also suggested a stable
macroeconomic environment as a precondition for the efficiency of the financial sector which
is essential in ensuring that government fiscal policy is assigned to complement monetary
policies to help restore domestic and international confidence in the Nigerian banking system.
Keywords: Deposit Money Banks, Impact, return on Assets, Financial Sector Reforms, Return
on Equity.
Introduction
The financial sector is of central importance for a country’s growth and development,
but its importance cannot be exploited unless there exist an efficient structure of intermediaries
which will channel idle balances into more productive units at the highest available rate of
return, and with less transaction costs (Killick & Martin, 1990). The institutions operating in
the financial sector can be grouped into financial market, (such as money market, capital
market and foreign exchange market), development finance institutions and other financial
institutions. The major function of the money market is to facilitate the intermediation of short
term loans/funds from the surplus to the deficit units of the economy. The institutional players
in the money market, which serves as conduit for monetary policy implementation, are the
Deposit Money Banks (DMBs), discount houses and money market dealers (CBN, 2009).
However, for the purpose of this study, attention is focused on the DMBs because they
constitute a major segment of the money market and play a vital role in the sustenance and
development of the market. Furthermore, the DMBs mobilize funds in form of deposits and
facilitate money creation by extending credit facilities to individuals, corporate organizations
and governmental bodies. The banks also engage actively in secondary market trading of
money market instruments and also create other investments, such as bankers’ acceptance,
commercial papers and promissory notes that are sometimes used in the market (CBN, 2009).

Impact of Financial Sector Reforms on the Performance of Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria
28
As the prime mover of economic life, the banking sector is a key unit of the financial
system. All over the world, the banking sector plays vital roles in the economic growth and
development of any nation by acting as a bulldozer in the mobilization of funds and the creation
of wealth. The effectiveness and efficiency in performing its roles, particularly the
intermediation between the surplus and the deficit units of the economy, depend largely on the
level of development of the financial system (Nkoro & Uko, 2013).
Studies by Gurley & Shaw (1967), Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), Jayarantne
and Strahan (1996), Kashyap and Stein (2000), Beck et al (2000), Beck et al (2003), Driscoll
(2004), as cited by Akpansung and Babalola (2012) posit that financial sector development can
influence and foster economic growth by increasing saving, improving the allocation and
effectiveness of loanable funds, and promoting capital accumulation. Akpansung and Babalola
(2012) argued that well-developed financial markets are necessary for the overall economic
advancement of under-developed and the emerging economies.
Financial intermediation can be a major factor for economic growth; it can also lead to
the failure of economic growth of a particular country. The study by finance-led growth
hypothesis usually focus on the role played by a financial sector in mobilizing domestic savings
and investment through a more open and more liberalized financial system, and in promoting
productivity by providing efficient financial market (Akpansung & Babalola, 2012).
Financial sector reforms in Nigeria could conveniently be discussed under the
following eras: The post Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) era (1986-1993), the re-
introduction of regulation from (1993-1998) and the pre Soludo era. The first is the financial
system reforms (1986-1993) which led to the deregulation of the banking sector which was
dominated by indigenous banks with over 60% federal and state government stakes, interest
rate and foreign exchange policy reforms. Basically, the deregulation of financial reforms in
Nigeria took place in the fourth quarter of 1986 with the setting up of a foreign exchange market
in September, 1986 (Akpansung & Gidigbi, 2014). Prior to the financial sector reforms most
salient features dominated the financial sector including the following:
i. Control on entrance into the banking sector as well as restriction on foreign
ownership of domestic financial institutions.
ii. Imposition of interest rate ceilings in lending and deposit rates which resulted
in improved real interest and large margin among deposit and saving rate.
iii. Imposition of limits on the collection choices of financial institutions in the form
of inspiring the highest ceilings for vital lending to definite activities and
iv. Imposition of greater liquidity and required reserve ratio, the liquidity ratio for
banks remained at 25% (Adesegun, 2014).
The second phase began in the late 1993- 1998 with the re-introduction of regulations.
During this period, the banking industry suffered deep financial distress which necessitated
another round of reforms designated to manage the distress banks. The third phase began with
the advent of the civilian regime in 1999 which saw the return to liberalisation of the financial
sector accompanied with the adoption of distress resolution programmes. This era also
witnessed the introduction of universal banking which empowered the bank and non-bank
financial institutions. The fourth phase began in 2004, and it is informed by the Nigerian
monetary authorities who asserted that their catalytic role in promoting private sector could be
further enhanced through a more pragmatic reform (Balogun, 2007).
The fourth phase also embraces the extant regime of Sanusi Lamido Sanusi which, with
intense globalisation attendant with increased pressure on financial performances brought
about significant changes in the financial sector as the country adopted comprehensive

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