60944508 pila-cases

The Holy See vs. Rosario
Facts:
Msgr. Cirilos Jr., on behalf of the petitioner and the PRC agreed to sell 3parcels of land to Ramon Licup.
A condition was agreed upon by the parties whereby an earnest money shall be paid by Licup and the sellers shall
clear the said lots of squatters. Licup assigned his rights to Star bright Enterprises. The private respondent
demanded the undertaking but due to the refusal of the squatters to vacate the land, Cirilos proposed that the
private respondent shall be the one to undertake the eviction or he shall return the earnest money. Private
respondent counter proposed that it would undertake the eviction but the price of the land shall be decreased.
Consequently, the earnest money was returned. Thereafter, without the notice to the private respondent, the
petitioner and PRC sold the lots to Tropicana. Private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner but the
latter moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that there is lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from
suit. But the private respondent argued that by entering into a business contract, the Holy See shed off its
sovereign immunity. The DFA filed for an intervention on behalf of the Holy See.
Issue:1. Whether or not the Holy See can invoke the doctrine of immunity
2. Whether or not the Holy See entered into a commercial transaction
Held:
1. The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. Through
the Papal Nuncio, its Ambassador, it has had diplomatic representation in the Philippines since 1957. Moreover,
the DFA has already certified the Embassy of the Holy See as a diplomatic mission to the Republic of the
Philippines, exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic
mission in the country. Hence the executive branch has already recognized and affirmed the status of the Holy See.
As such, it shall be recognized by the courts so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the government in
conducting foreign relations.
2 .The Court has distinguished the transactions by a state with private parties as jure imperii and jure
gestionis. Jure imperii has been defined as public acts of the government or the exercise of the sovereign activity
thereof, while
jure gestion is are those private acts that are usually proprietary and commercial
in nature .A state impliedly waves its immunity upon entering into contracts that are commercial or proprietary in
nature. However, mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test of
it proprietary functions. In the case at bar, the Holy See did not buy and sell the lot in the ordinary course of
business. In fact, a part of the land, specifically Lot 5-A,was a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila, not for
commercial purpose but
for the residence of the Papal Nuncio. The sale of Lot 5-A was not entered into for profit or gain. It merely wanted
to dispose off the same because it is impossible or the petitioner to use is for the purpose of donation due to the
refusal of the squatters living on the said parcel of land to vacate it. Hence, the decision to transfer the property
and the subsequent disposal are clothed with a governmental character. The petition was granted and the civil case
against it was dismissed.
ISSUE: Can an extradition treaty be applied retroactively?
HELD: Applying the constitutional principle, the Court has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal
legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused. This being so, there is no absolutely no merit in
petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty's retroactive application with respect
to offenses committed prior to the Treaty's coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal
legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for
prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time
the treaty was ratified.
Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, 322 SCRA 160 (2000)
FACTS: On June 18, 1999 the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request
for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The
Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition were
attached along with the request. Charges include:
1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US
2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax
3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television
4. False statement or entries
5. Election contribution in name of another
The Department of Justice, through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of
the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for
copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it.
The Secretary of Justice denied request on the ff. grounds:
1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that point in time, the
DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069—
Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting
Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases
making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.
2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the documents.
3. Finally, the country is bound to the Vienna convention on the law of treaties such that every treaty in force is
binding upon the parties.
The respondent filed for petition of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. The RTC of NCR ruled in favor of the
respondent. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further
proceedings.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not private is respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing
RULING: Yes. Section 2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as “the removal of an accused from the Philippines
with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable
the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him
in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him
under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government.” Although the inquisitorial power exercised
by the Department of Justice as an administrative agency due to the failure of the DFA to comply lacks any
judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels for the extradition process which may ultimately result in the
deprivation of the liberty of the prospective extradite. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: The
provisional arrest of the prospective extradite pending the submission of the request and the temporary arrest of
the prospective extradite during the pendency of the extradition petition in court. Clearly, there is an impending
threat to a prospective extraditee’s liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. Because of such consequences,
the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the
consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the
procedure for and ultimately the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extradite. In essence, therefore, the
evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. There are certain constitutional rights that are
ordinarily available only in criminal prosecution. But the Court has ruled in other cases that where the
investigation of an administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life, liberty, or property, the administrative
proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, and such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. In the case at bar,
similar to a preliminary investigation, the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings which may result in the
filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty.
Thus, the extraditee must be accorded due process rights of notice
and hearing according to Art. 3 sec 14(1) and (2), as well as Art. 3 sec 7—the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern and the corollary right to access to official records and documents.

The court held that the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation, having consequences
which will result in deprivation of liberty of the prospective
extradite. A favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country,
thus exhibiting the penal aspect of the process.
The evaluation process itself is like a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same result –
the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent. The basic rights of notice and hearing are applicable in criminal,
civil and administrative proceedings. Nonobservance
of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting
their interests, and upon notice, may claim the right
to appear therein and present their side.
Rights to notice and hearing: Dispensable in 3 cases:
a.When there is an urgent need for immediate action (preventive suspension in administrative charges, padlocking
filthy restaurants, cancellation of passport).
b.Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, and the respondent is not prevented from enjoying the right
to notice and hearing at a later time (summary distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer,
replacement of an appointee)
c.Twin rights have been offered, but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.
2. Whether or not this entitlement constitutes a breach of the legal commitments and obligation of the Philippine
Government under the RP-US Treaty?
No. The U.S. and the Philippines share mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their
respective jurisdictions. Both states accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. The
administrative investigation doesn’t fall under the three exceptions to the due process of notice and hearing in the
Section 3 Rules 112 of the Rules of Court.
3. WON there is any conflict between private respondent’s basic due process rights and the
provisions of the RP-US Extradition treaty
RULING: No. Doctrine of incorporation under international law, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of
international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to national legislative acts. Treaty can repeal
statute and statute can repeal treaty. No conflict. Veil of secrecy is lifted during trial. Request should impose veil at
any stage.
Judgment: Petition dismissed for lack of merit.
Kapunan, separate concurring opinion:
While the evaluation process conducted by the DOJ is not exactly a preliminary investigation of criminal cases, it
is akin to a preliminary investigation because it involves the basic constitutional rights of the person sought to be
extradited. A person ordered extradited is arrested, forcibly taken from his house, separated from his family and
delivered to a foreign state. His rights of abode, to privacy, liberty and pursuit of happiness are taken away from
him—a fate as harsh and cruel as a conviction of a criminal offense. For this reason, he is entitled to have access
to the evidence against him and the right to controvert them. Puno, dissenting: Case at bar does not involve guilt or
innocence of an accused but the interpretation of an extradition treaty where at stake if our government’s
international obligation to surrender to a foreign state a citizen of its own so he can be tried for an alleged offense
committed within that jurisdiction. Panganiban, dissenting: Instant petition refers only to the evaluation
KHOSROW MINUCHER vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO
March 6, 2009 by raquel
FACTS:
Khosrow Minucher, an Iranian national and a Labor Attaché for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and Manila
came to the country to study in 1974 and continued to stay as head of the Iranian National Resistance Movement.
In May 1986, Minucher was charged with an Information for violation of Republic Act No. 6425, Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. The criminal charge followed a “buy-bust operation” conducted by the Philippine police
narcotic agents in his house where a quantity of heroin was said to have been seized. The narcotic agents were
accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo who became one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution.
In August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for damages on the ‘trumped-
up’ charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.
ISSUE:
WON private respondent Arthur Scalzo can be sued provided his alleged diplomatic immunity conformably with
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
RULING:
The SC DENIED the petition.
Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission involve, the representation of
the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with the receiving state. Only “diplomatic
agents,” are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. Indeed, the main yardstick in
ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he
performs duties of diplomatic nature. Being an Attache, Scalzo’s main function is to observe, analyze and interpret
trends and developments in their respective fields in the host country and submit reports to their own ministries or
departments in the home government. He is not generally regarded as a member of the diplomatic mission. On the
basis of an erroneous assumption that simply because of the diplomatic note, divesting the trial court of
jurisdiction over his person, his diplomatic immunity is contentious.
Under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit, the precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a
foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a
foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his
official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its
consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not
accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim – par in parem,
non habet imperium – that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The
implication is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to
satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit
must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be
established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an
indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns.
The “buy-bust operation” and other such acts are indication that the Philippine government has given its
imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during

the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo
hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.
PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT vs. CA, G.R. No. 113213 August 15, 1994
Australia and the Government of the Philippines in the suppression of crime, entered into a Treaty of Extradition
on the 7th of March 1988. The said treaty was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective 30
days after both States notified each other in writing that the respective requirements for the entry into force of the
Treaty have been complied with. Petitioner contends that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the
extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Can an extradition treaty be applied retroactively?
HELD: Applying the constitutional principle, the Court has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal
legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused. This being so, there is no absolutely no merit in
petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty's retroactive application with respect
to offenses committed prior to the Treaty's coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal
legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for
prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time
the treaty was ratified.
G.R. No. 99358 January 30, 1995
DJUMANTAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANDREA D. DOMINGO, COMMISSIONER OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION, HON.
REGINO R. SANTIAGO and HON. JORGE V. SARMIENTO, COMMISSIONERS BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION, respondents.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with preliminary injunction, to reverse
and set aside the Decision dated September 27, 1990 of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID),
ordering the deportation of petitioner and its Resolution dated January 29, 1991, denying the motion for
reconsideration.
I
Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract worker.
On April 3, 1974, he embraced and was converted to Islam. On May 17, 1974, he married petitioner in accordance
with Islamic rites. He returned to the Philippines in January 1979.
On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez, (two-year old Marina and nine-month old
Nikulas) arrived in Manila as the "guests" of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the
family of petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in Indonesia.
When petitioner and her two children arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport on January 13, 1979,
Banez, together with Marina Cabael, met them.
Banez executed an "Affidavit of Guaranty and Support," for his "guests," stating inter alia, that:
That I am the guarantor for the entry into the Philippines of Mrs. Djumantan, 42 years old, and
her two minor children, MARINA, 2 years old, and NIKULAS, 9 months old, all Indonesian
citizens, who are coming as temporary visitors.
That I am willing to guaranty them out of gratitude to their family for the hospitality they have
accorded me during the few years that I have stayed in Indonesia in connection with my
employment thereat.
That I guaranty they are law abiding citizens and I guaranty their behavior while they are in
the Philippines; I also guaranty their support and that they will not become a public charge.
That I guaranty their voluntary departure upon the termination of the authorized stay granted
them by the Government (Rollo, p. 41).
As "guests," petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez.
Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors under Section 9(a) of the
Immigration Act of 1940.
In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and petitioner. She filed a complaint for
"concubinage" with the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan against the two. This case was, however,
dismissed for lack of merit.
On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary visitor to that of permanent
resident under Section 13(a) of the same law. On April 14, 1982, petitioner was issued an alien certificate of
registration.
Not accepting the set-back, Banez' eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint with the Ombudsman, who
subsequently referred the letter to the CID. On the basis of the said letter, petitioner was detained at the CID
detention cell. She later released pending the deportation proceedings (DEP Case No. 90-400) after posting a cash
bond (Rollo, pp. 15-16). Thereafter, she manifested to the CID that she be allowed to depart voluntarily from the
Philippines and asked for time to purchase her airline ticket (Rollo, p. 10). However, she a change of heart and
moved for the dismissal of the deportation case on the ground that she was validly married to a Filipino citizen
(Rollo, pp. 11-12).
In the Decision dated September 27, 1990, the CID, through public respondents, disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Board of Commissioners finds the
second marriage of Bernardo Banes to respondent Djumantan irregular and not in accordance
with the laws of the Philippines. We revoke the Section 13(a) visa previously granted to her
(Rollo, p. 23).
Public respondents denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in their Resolution dated January 29, 1991
(Rollo, pp. 31-33).
Hence, this petition.
We issued a temporary restraining order, directing public respondents to cease and desist from executing or
implementing the Decision dated September 27, 1990 and the Resolution dated January 29, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 34-
36).
On September 20, 1994, Leonardo C. Banez manifested that his father died on August 14, 1994 and that he and his
mother were withdrawing their objection to the granting of a permanent resident visa to petitioner (Rollo, pp. 173-
175).

II
Petitioner claims that her marriage to Banez was valid under Article 27 of P.D. No. 1085, the Muslim Code, which
recognizes the practice of polyandry by Muslim males. From that premise, she argues that under Articles 109 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 68 of the Family Code and Article 34 of the Muslim Code, the husband
and wife are obliged to live together and under Article 110 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the husband is
given the right to fix the conjugal residence. She claims that public respondents have no right to order the couple
to live separately (Rollo, pp. 5-7).
When asked to comment on the petition, the Solicitor General took the position that the CID could not order
petitioner's deportation because its power to do so had prescribed under Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act of
1940 (Rollo, pp. 57-74).
III
We need not resolve the validity of petitioner's marriage to Banez, if under the law the CID can validly deport
petitioner as an "undesirable alien" regardless of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Therefore, to be first resolved
is the question on petitioner's immigration status, particularly the legality of her admission into the country and the
change of her status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. Upon a finding that she was not lawfully
admitted into the country and she did not lawfully acquire permanent residency, the next question is whether the
power to deport her has prescribed.
There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner's entry into the country and the change of
her immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. All such privileges were obtained through
misinterpretation.
Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the immigration authorities in her applications for
temporary visitor's visa and for permanent residency.
The civil status of an alien applicant for admission as a temporary visitor is a matter that could influence the
exercise of discretion on the part of the immigration authorities. The immigration authorities would be less
inclined to allow the entry of a woman who claims to have entered into a marriage with a Filipino citizen, who is
married to another woman (Cf. Shiu Shin Man v. Galang, 3 SCRA 871 [1961]).
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to the public
interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the country (Annotations,
8 ALR 1286). this right is based on the fact that since the aliens are not part of the nation, their admission into the
territory is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which creates no obligation on the part of the
government to permit them to stay (3 Am. Jur. 2d. 72).
The interest, which an alien has in being admitted into or allowed to continue to reside in the country, is protected
only so far as Congress may choose to protect it (United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shauhnessy 180 F. 2d. 489).
There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be given
permanent residency, in the Philippines.
The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the operation of the immigration laws
governing the admission and exclusion of aliens (United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shauhnessy, 338 US 537 94 L.
Ed. 317, 70 S. Ct. 309 [1950]; Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 US 460 56 L. Ed. 1165, 32 S. Ct. 734 [1912];
Annotations, 71 ALR 1213). Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a
Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the country upon the expiration of her
extended stay here as an alien (Joaquin v. Galang, 33 SCRA 362 [1970]).
Under Section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1940, it is not mandatory for the CID to admit any alien who applies
for a visitor's visa. Once admitted into the country, the alien has no right to an indefinite stay. Under Section 13 of
the law, an alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and "may be admitted" as a
permanent resident. Among those considered qualified to apply for permanent residency if the wife or husband of
a Philippine citizen (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 13[a]). The entry of aliens into the country and their admission
as immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they are legally married to Filipino citizens.
IV
We now address the issue raised by the Solicitor General that the right of public respondents to deport petitioner
has prescribed, citing Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940.
Said Section 37(b) provides:
Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of this section at
any time after entry, but shall not be effected under any clause unless the arrest in the
deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause for deportation arises.
Deportation under clauses 3 and 4 shall not be effected if the court, or judge thereof, when
sentencing the alien, shall recommend to the Commissioner of Immigration that the alien be
not deported (As amended by Rep. Act No. 503).
Section 37(a) of the said law mentioned in Section 37(b) thereof provides:
The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other
officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration
after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged
against the alien:
1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false and misleading
statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a designating port of entry or at
any place other than at a designated port of entry.
2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act, who was not lawfully admissible at the
time of entry;
3) Any alien who, after the effective date of this Act, is convicted in the Philippines and sentenced for a term of
one year or more for a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after his entry, is so convicted
and sentenced more than once;
4) Any alien who is convicted and sentenced for a violation of the law governing prohibited drugs;
5) Any alien who practices prostitution or is an inmate of a house of prostitution or is connected with the
management of a house of prostitution, or is a procurer;
6) Any alien who becomes a public charge within five years after entry from causes not affirmatively shown to
have arisen subsequent to entry;
7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition under which he was
admitted a non-immigrant;
8) Any alien who believes in, advises, advocates or teaches the overthrow by force and violence of the
Government of the Philippines, or of constituted law and authority, or who disbelieves in or is opposed to
organized government, or who advises, advocates, or teaches the assault or assassination of public officials
because of their office, or who advises, advocates, or teaches the unlawful destruction of property, or who is a
member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining, advocating or teaching such doctrines, or who on any
manner whatsoever lends assistance, financial or otherwise, to the dissemination of such doctrines;
9) Any alien who commits any of the acts described in Sections forty-five and forty-six of this
Act, independent of criminal action which may be brought against him: Provided, That in the
case of an alien who, for any reason, is convicted and sentenced to suffer both imprisonment
and deportation, said alien shall first serve the entire period of his imprisonment before he is
actually deported:Provided, however, That the imprisonment may be waived by the
Commissioner of Immigration with the consent of the Department Head, and upon payment by

the alien concerned of such amount as the Commissioner may fix and approved by the
Department Head, and upon payment by the alien concerned of such amount as the
Commissioner may fix and approved by the Department Head (as amended by R.A. No. 144);
10) Any alien who, at any time within five years after entry, shall have been convicted of
violating the provisions of the Philippine Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred and
fifty-three, otherwise known as the Philippine Alien Registration Act of 1941 (now Republic
Act No. 562), or who, at any time after entry, shall have been convicted more than once of
violating the provisions of the same Act;
11) Any alien who engages in profiteering, hoarding, or black-marketing, independent of any
criminal action which may be brought against him;
12) Any alien who is convicted of any offense penalized under Commonwealth Act Numbered
Four hundred and seventy-three, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Laws of the
Philippines, or any law relating to acquisition of Philippine citizenship;
13) Any alien who defrauds his creditor by absconding or alienating properties, to prevent
them from being attached or executed.
Under clause 1 of Section 37(a), an "alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means
of false and misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a
designated port of entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry" is subject to deportation.
The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has a prescriptive period and "shall not be
effected ... unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause for deportation
arises" (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 37[b]).
Congress may impose a limitation of time for the deportation of alien from the country (Costanzo v. Tillinghast,
287 US 341 77 L. Ed. 350, 53 S. Ct. 152 [1932]; Guiney v. Bonham [CA 9] 261 F. 582, 8 ALR 1282).
In Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 853 (1991), we held that under Section 37(b) of the
Immigration Act of 1940, the deportation of an alien may be barred after the lapse of five years after the cause of
deportation arises. Justice Feliciano, in his dissenting opinion, qualified the broad statement of the law as follows:
Examination of the above quoted Section 37 (b) shows that the five (5) year limitation is
applicable only where deportation is sought to be effected under clauses of Section 37 (a)
other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12; that where deportation or exclusion is sought to be
effected under clauses of Section 37(a), no period of limitation is applicable; and that to the
contrary, deportation or exclusion may be effected "at any time after entry."
Justice Davide, in his dissenting opinion, clarified:
Note that the five-year period applies only to clauses other than 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of the Section.
In respect to clauses 2, 7, 8, 11, and 12, the limitation does not apply.
In Lam Shee v. Bengzon, 93 Phil. 1065 (1953), the alien admitted that she had gained entrance into the Philippines
fraudulently by making use of the name of a Chinese resident-merchant other than that of her lawful husband. The
Court, however, held that she could no longer be deported "for the simple reason that more than 5 years had
elapsed from the date of her admission."
The right of public respondents to deport petitioner has prescribed.
Petitioner was admitted and allowed entry into the Philippines on January 13, 1979 on the basis of false and
misleading statements in her application and in the other supporting documents submitted to the immigration
authorities. Leonardo C. Banez first complained with the CID on November 19, 1980 about the manner petitioner
was admitted into the country and asked for her deportation (Rollo, pp. 77-78). After the EDSA Revolution, he
sent a follow-up letter to the CID requesting action on his 1980 letter-complaint (Rollo, p. 78).
Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19, 1980, when Leonardo C. Banez informed the CID of the illegal
entry of petitioner into the country, more than five years had elapsed before the issuance of the order of her
deportation on September 27, 1990.
In their Comment, public respondents urged that what is barred under Section 37(b) is the deportation of an alien
and claimed that what they ordered was not the deportation of petitioner but merely the revocation of Section
13(a) which refers to the visa previously granted her (Rollo, p. 102).
The "arrest" contemplated by Section 37(b) refers to the arrest for the purpose of carrying out an order for
deportation and not the arrest prior to proceedings to determine the right of the alien to stay in the country. When
public respondents revoked the permanent residence visa issued to petitioner, they, in effect, ordered her arrest and
deportation as an overstaying alien.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the temporary restraining order issued on June 4, 1991 is MADE
PERMANENT.
The Decision of the Board of Commissioners dated September 27, 1990 revoking the issuance of the permanent
resident visa to petitioner and the Resolution dated January 29, 1991 are REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 139465. October 17, 2000]
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.
On January 18, 2000, by a vote of 9-6, we dismissed the petition at bar and ordered the petitioner to furnish
private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period
within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.[1]
On February 3, 2000, the petitioner timely filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. He assails the
decision on the following grounds:
"The majority decision failed to appreciate the following facts and points of substance and of value which, if
considered, would alter the result of the case, thus:
I. There is a substantial difference between an evaluation process antecedent to the filing of an extradition petition
in court and a preliminary investigation.
II. Absence of notice and hearing during the evaluation process will not result in a denial of fundamental fairness.
III. In the evaluation process, instituting a notice and hearing requirement satisfies no higher objective.
IV. The deliberate omission of the notice and hearing requirement in the Philippine Extradition Law is intended to
prevent flight.
V. There is a need to balance the interest between the discretionary powers of government and the rights of an
individual.
VI. The instances cited in the assailed majority decision when the twin rights of notice and hearing may be
dispensed with in this case results in a non sequitur conclusion.
VII. Jimenez is not placed in imminent danger of arrest by the Executive Branch necessitating notice and hearing.
VIII. By instituting a 'proceeding' not contemplated by PD No. 1069, the Supreme Court has encroached upon the
constitutional boundaries separating it from the other two co-equal branches of government.
IX. Bail is not a matter of right in proceedings leading to extradition or in extradition proceedings."[2]

On March 28, 2000, a 58-page Comment was filed by the private respondent Mark B. Jimenez, opposing
petitioner’s Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
On April 5, 2000, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Allow Continuation and Maintenance of Action and
Filing of Reply. Thereafter, petitioner filed on June 7, 2000 a Manifestation with the attached Note 327/00 from
the Embassy of Canada and Note No. 34 from the Security Bureau of the Hongkong SAR Government
Secretariat. On August 15, 2000, private respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion for Leave to File Rejoinder
in the event that petitioner's April 5, 2000 Motion would be granted. Private respondent also filed on August 18,
2000, a Motion to Expunge from the records petitioner's June 7, 2000 Manifestation with its attached note
verbales. Except for the Motion to Allow Continuation and Maintenance of Action, the Court denies these pending
motions and hereby resolves petitioner's Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
The jugular issue is whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
We now hold that private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the extradition process.
First. P.D. No. 1069[3]
which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the time when an
extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its supporting papers, i.e., after the
filing of the petition for extradition in the extradition court, viz:
"Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing; Service of Notices. - (1) Immediately upon receipt of
the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to
answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order . . . Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused
after having received the summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the presiding judgeshall hear the case or
set another date for the hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon
the accused and the attorney having charge of the case."
It is of judicial notice that the summons includes the petition for extradition which will be answered by the
extraditee.
There is no provision in the RP-US Extradition Treaty and in P.D. No. 1069 which gives an extraditee the
right to demand from the petitioner Secretary of Justice copies of the extradition request from the US government
and its supporting documents and to comment thereon while the request is still undergoing evaluation. We
cannot write a provision in the treaty giving private respondent that right where there is none. It is well-settled that
a "court cannot alter, amend, or add to a treaty by the insertion of any clause, small or great, or dispense with any
of its conditions and requirements or take away any qualification, or integral part of any stipulation, upon any
motion of equity, or general convenience, or substantial justice."[4]
Second. All treaties, including the RP-US Extradition Treaty, should be interpreted in light of their
intent. Nothing less than the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory
provides that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose."[5]
(emphasis supplied) The preambular
paragraphs of P.D. No. 1069 define its intent, viz:
"WHEREAS, under the Constitution[,] the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and
amity with all nations;
WHEREAS, the suppression of crime is the concern not only of the state where it is committed but also of any
other state to which the criminal may have escaped, because it saps the foundation of social life and is an outrage
upon humanity at large, and it is in the interest of civilized communities that crimes should not go unpunished;
WHEREAS, in recognition of this principle the Philippines recently concluded an extradition treaty with the
Republic of Indonesia, and intends to conclude similar treaties with other interested countries;
x x x." (emphasis supplied)
It cannot be gainsaid that today, countries like the Philippines forge extradition treaties to arrest the dramatic rise
of international and transnational crimes like terrorism and drug trafficking.Extradition treaties provide the
assurance that the punishment of these crimes will not be frustrated by the frontiers of territorial
sovereignty. Implicit in the treaties should be the unbending commitment that the perpetrators of these crimes will
not be coddled by any signatory state.
It ought to follow that the RP-US Extradition Treaty calls for an interpretation that will minimize if not
prevent the escape of extraditees from the long arm of the law and expedite their trial. The submission of the
private respondent, that as a probable extraditee under the RP-US Extradition Treaty he should be furnished a copy
of the US government request for his extradition and its supporting documents even while they are still under
evaluation by petitioner Secretary of Justice, does not meet this desideratum. The fear of the petitioner Secretary
of Justice that the demanded notice is equivalent to a notice to flee must be deeply rooted on the experience of the
executive branch of our government. As it comes from the branch of our government in charge of the faithful
execution of our laws, it deserves the careful consideration of this Court. In addition, it cannot be gainsaid that
private respondent’s demand for advance notice can delay the summary process of executive evaluation of the
extradition request and its accompanying papers. The foresight of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes did not miss this
danger. In 1911, he held:
"It is common in extradition cases to attempt to bring to bear all the factitious niceties of a criminal trial at
common law. But it is a waste of time . . . if there is presented, even in somewhat untechnical form according to
our ideas, such reasonable ground to suppose him guilty as to make it proper that he should be tried, good faith to
the demanding government requires his surrender."[6]
(emphasis supplied)
We erode no right of an extraditee when we do not allow time to stand still on his prosecution. Justice is best
served when done without delay.
Third. An equally compelling factor to consider is the understanding of the parties themselves to the RP-
US Extradition Treaty as well as the general interpretation of the issue in question by other countries with
similar treaties with the Philippines. The rule is recognized that while courts have the power to interpret treaties,
the meaning given them by the departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation and
enforcement is accorded great weight.[7]
The reason for the rule is laid down in Santos III v. Northwest Orient
Airlines, et al.,[8]
where we stressed that a treaty is a joint executive-legislative act which enjoys the presumption
that "it was first carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was adopted and given the force of
law in the country."
Our executive department of government, thru the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Department
of Justice (DOJ), has steadfastly maintained that the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 do not grant the
private respondent a right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of an extradition process.[9]
This
understanding of the treaty is shared by the US government, the other party to the treaty.[10]
This
interpretation by the two governments cannot be given scant significance. It will be presumptuous for the Court to
assume that both governments did not understand the terms of the treaty they concluded.
Yet, this is not all. Other countries with similar extradition treaties with the Philippines have expressed
the same interpretation adopted by the Philippine and US governments.Canadian[11]
and
Hongkong[12]
authorities, thru appropriate note verbales communicated to our Department of Foreign Affairs,
stated in unequivocal language that it is not an international practice to afford a potential extraditee with a copy of
the extradition papers during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. We cannot disregard such a
convergence of views unless it is manifestly erroneous.

Fourth. Private respondent, however, peddles the postulate that he must be afforded the right to notice and
hearing as required by our Constitution. He buttresses his position by likening an extradition proceeding to a
criminal proceeding and the evaluation stage to a preliminary investigation.
We are not persuaded. An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will
call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.To begin with, the process of
extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused.[13]
His guilt or
innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional
rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee
especially by one whose extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation.[14]
As held by the US Supreme Court
in United States v. Galanis:
"An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the constitutional safeguards that accompany a
criminal trial in this country do not shield an accused from extradition pursuant to a valid treaty."[15]
There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition
proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial.[16]
In contradistinction to a
criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less
stringent standards.[17]
In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt for conviction[18]
while a fugitive may be ordered extradited "upon showing of the existence of a
prima facie case."[19]
Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered
final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the
final discretion to extradite him.[20]
The United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State
exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the nation's foreign relations
before making the ultimate decision to extradite.[21]
As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an extradition
proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not
necessarily apply to the former. This we hold for the procedural due process required by a given set of
circumstances "must begin with a determination of theprecise nature of the government function involved as
well as the private interest that has been affected by governmental action."[22]
The concept of due process is
flexible for "not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure."[23]
Fifth. Private respondent would also impress upon the Court the urgency of his right to notice and hearing
considering the alleged threat to his liberty "which may be more priceless than life."[24]
The supposed threat to
private respondent’s liberty is perceived to come from several provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D.
No. 1069 which allow provisional arrest and temporary detention.
We first deal with provisional arrest. The RP-US Extradition Treaty provides as follows:
"PROVISIONAL ARREST
1. In case of urgency, a Contracting Party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending
presentation of the request for extradition. A request for provisional arrest may be transmitted through the
diplomatic channel or directly between the Philippine Department of Justice and the United States Department of
Justice.
2. The application for provisional arrest shall contain:
a) a description of the person sought;
b) the location of the person sought, if known;
c) a brief statement of the facts of the case, including, if possible, the time and location of the offense;
d) a description of the laws violated;
e) a statement of the existence of a warrant of arrest or finding of guilt or judgment of conviction
against the person sought; and
f) a statement that a request for extradition for the person sought will follow.
3. The Requesting State shall be notified without delay of the disposition of its application and the reasons for any
denial.
4. A person who is provisionally arrested may be discharged from custody upon the expiration of sixty (60) days
from the date of arrest pursuant to this Treaty if the executive authority of the Requested State has not received the
formal request for extradition and the supporting documents required in Article 7." (emphasis supplied)
In relation to the above, Section 20 of P.D. No. 1069 provides:
"Sec. 20. Provisional Arrest.- (a) In case of urgency, the requesting state may, pursuant to the relevant treaty or
convention and while the same remains in force, request for the provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt
of the request for extradition made in accordance with Section 4 of this Decree.
(b) A request for provisional arrest shall be sent to the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, Manila,
either through the diplomatic channels or direct by post or telegraph.
(c) The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation or any official acting on his behalf shall upon receipt of
the request immediately secure a warrant for the provisional arrest of the accused from the presiding judge of the
Court of First Instance of the province or city having jurisdiction of the place, who shall issue the warrant for the
provisional arrest of the accused. The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation through the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs shall inform the requesting state of the result of its request.
(d) If within a period of 20 days after the provisional arrest the Secretary of Foreign Affairs has not received the
request for extradition and the documents mentioned in Section 4 of this Decree, the accused shall be released
from custody." (emphasis supplied)
Both the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 clearly provide that private respondent may be
provisionally arrested only pending receipt of the request for extradition. Our DFA has long received the
extradition request from the United States and has turned it over to the DOJ. It is undisputed that until today, the
United States has not requested for private respondent’s provisional arrest. Therefore, the threat to private
respondent’s liberty has passed. It is more imagined than real.
Nor can the threat to private respondent’s liberty come from Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069, which provides:
"Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately upon receipt of
answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of
the accused which may be served anywhere within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that
the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice. . .
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon
the accused and the attorney having charge of the case." (emphasis supplied)
It is evident from the above provision that a warrant of arrest for the temporary detention of the accused
pending the extradition hearing may only be issued by the presiding judge of the extradition court upon filing of
the petition for extradition. As the extradition process is still in the evaluation stage of pertinent documents and
there is no certainty that a petition for extradition will be filed in the appropriate extradition court, the threat to
private respondent’s liberty is merely hypothetical.
Sixth. To be sure, private respondent’s plea for due process deserves serious consideration involving as it
does his primordial right to liberty. His plea to due process, however, collides with important state interests
which cannot also be ignored for they serve the interest of the greater majority. The clash of rights demands a

delicate balancing of interests approach which is a "fundamental postulate of constitutional law."[25]
The approach
requires that we "take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given
situation or type ofsituation."[26]
These interests usually consist in the exercise by an individual of his basic
freedoms on the one hand, and the government’s promotion of fundamental public interest or policy objectives on
the other.[27]
In the case at bar, on one end of the balancing pole is the private respondent’s claim to due process
predicated on Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law . . ." Without a bubble of doubt, procedural due process of law lies
at the foundation of a civilized society which accords paramount importance to justice and fairness. It has to be
accorded the weight it deserves.
This brings us to the other end of the balancing pole. Petitioner avers that the Court should give more weight
to our national commitment under the RP-US Extradition Treaty to expedite the extradition to the United States of
persons charged with violation of some of its laws. Petitioner also emphasizes the need to defer to the judgment of
the Executive on matters relating to foreign affairs in order not to weaken if not violate the principle of separation
of powers.
Considering that in the case at bar, the extradition proceeding is only at its evaluation stage, the
nature of the right being claimed by the private respondent is nebulous andthe degree of prejudice he will
allegedly suffer is weak, we accord greater weight to the interests espoused by the government thru the
petitioner Secretary of Justice. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, we held that the "Constitution has blocked
out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government."[28]
Under our constitutional scheme, executive power is vested in the President of
the Philippines.[29]
Executive power includes, among others, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans and
the power to enter into treaties or international agreements.[30]
The task of safeguarding that these treaties are
duly honored devolves upon the executive department which has the competence and authority to so act in the
international arena.[31]
It is traditionally held that the President has power and even supremacy over the country’s
foreign relations.[32]
The executive department is aptly accorded deference on matters of foreign relations
considering the President’s most comprehensive and most confidential information about the international scene of
which he is regularly briefed by our diplomatic and consular officials. His access to ultra-sensitive military
intelligence data is also unlimited.[33]
The deference we give to the executive department is dictated by the
principle of separation of powers. This principle is one of the cornerstones of our democratic government. It
cannot be eroded without endangering our government.
The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do it is to facilitate
the extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered by our government.More and more, crimes are
becoming the concern of one world. Laws involving crimes and crime prevention are undergoing
universalization. One manifest purpose of this trend towards globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal
whose activities threaten the peace and progress of civilized countries. It is to the great interest of the Philippines
to be part of this irreversible movement in light of its vulnerability to crimes, especially transnational crimes.
In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the State, the Court stresses that it is not ruling that
the private respondent has no right to due process at all throughout the length and breadth of the
extrajudicial proceedings. Procedural due process requires a determination of what process is due, when it is due,
and the degree of what is due. Stated otherwise, a prior determination should be made as to whether
procedural protections are at all due and when they are due, which in turn depends on the extent to which
an individual will be "condemned to suffer grievous loss."[34]
We have explained why an extraditee has no right
to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. As aforesaid, P.D. No. 1069 which
implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence
against him once the petition is filed in court. Thetime for the extraditee to know the basis of the request for his
extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of the formal petition for extradition. The extraditee's right to
know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage of the extradition process to accommodate the more
compelling interest of the State to prevent escape of potential extraditees which can be precipitated by
premature information of the basis of the request for his extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the
extradition proceedings is the need to be more deferential to the judgment of a co-equal branch of the government,
the Executive, which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater power over matters involving our foreign
relations. Needless to state, this balance of interests is not a static but a moving balance which can be adjusted as
the extradition process moves from the administrative stage to the judicial stage and to the execution stage
depending on factors that will come into play. In sum, we rule that the temporary hold on private respondent's
privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him
of fundamental fairness should he decide to resist the request for his extradition to the United States. There is no
denial of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.
We end where we began. A myopic interpretation of the due process clause would not suffice to resolve the
conflicting rights in the case at bar. With the global village shrinking at a rapid pace, propelled as it is by
technological leaps in transportation and communication, we need to push further back our horizons and work
with the rest of the civilized nations and move closer to the universal goals of "peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity with all nations."[35]
In the end, it is the individual who will reap the harvest of peace and
prosperity from these efforts.
WHEREFORE, the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Decision in the case at bar
promulgated on January18, 2000 is REVERSED. The assailed Order issued by the public respondent judge on
August 9, 1999 is SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on August 17, 1999 is made
PERMANENT. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25 is enjoined from conducting further proceedings
in Civil Case No. 99-94684.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002]
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner, vs. Hon.
GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Morales, and Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42; and MARK B.
JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and hearing before warrants for their
arrest can be issued? Equally important, are they entitled to the right to bail and provisional liberty while the
extradition proceedings are pending? In general, the answer to these two novel questions is
“No.” The explanation of and the reasons for, as well as the exceptionsto, this rule are laid out in this Decision.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to void and set aside the
Orders dated May 23, 2001[1]
and July 3, 2001[2]
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42.
[3]
The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed the issuance of a warrant, but at the same time
granted bail to Jimenez. The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds probable cause against respondent Mark
Jimenez. Accordingly let a Warrant for the arrest of the respondent be issued. Consequently and taking into
consideration Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court fixes the reasonable
amount of bail for respondent’s temporary liberty at ONE MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00), the same to be
paid in cash.
“Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender to this Court his passport and the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation is likewise directed to include the name of the respondent in its Hold Departure
List.”[4]

Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the cancellation of the bond, and the taking of
Jimenez into legal custody.
The Facts
This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion.[5]
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty,[6]
the United States Government, through diplomatic
channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note
Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark
B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of
foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section
5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25.[7]
The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from
filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a
Petition before this Court in the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the
Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting
papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence.[8]
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000
Resolution.[9]
By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed
its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process. This Resolution has become final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the
Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed
as Extradition Case No. 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest
warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The
warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1)
conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section
371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US
Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5)
illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US
Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his
“immediate arrest” pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an “Urgent Manifestation/Ex-
Parte Motion,”[10]
which prayed that petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on
June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court
allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his
Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail
in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below
issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his
temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash.[11]
After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required
cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.[12]
Hence, this Petition.[13]
Issues
Petitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
I.
“The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest
warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
II.
“The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in allowing Jimenez to go on provisional liberty
because:
‘1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in the absence of any law that provides for such power.
‘2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114 (Bail)
of the Rules of Court, as amended, which [were] relied upon, cannot be used as bases for allowing bail in
extradition proceedings.
‘3. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition.
‘4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition, bail is
not a matter of right but only of discretion upon clear showing by the applicant of the existence of special
circumstances.
‘5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition proceedings, the public respondent received no
evidence of ‘special circumstances’ which may justify release on bail.
‘6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special circumstance exists that will engender a well-founded
belief that he will not flee.
‘7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do not ensure compliance by the Philippines
with its obligations under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
‘8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May 10, 2001 in the case entitled ‘Eduardo T. Rodriguez et
al. vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 17, Manila,’ CA-G.R. SP No. 64589, relied upon by the public
respondent in granting bail, had been recalled before the issuance of the subject bail orders.’”[14]
In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled to notice
and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional
liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending. Preliminarily, we shall take up the alleged prematurity of
the Petition for Certiorari arising from petitioner’s failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration in the RTC and to
seek relief in the Court of Appeals (CA), instead of in this Court.[15]
We shall also preliminarily discuss five
extradition postulates that will guide us in disposing of the substantive issues.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Matters
Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition
Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the Extradition
Court: “(1) the issues were fully considered by such court after requiring the parties to submit their respective
memoranda and position papers on the matter and thus, the filing of a reconsideration motion would serve no
useful purpose; (2) the assailed orders are a patent nullity, absent factual and legal basis therefor; and (3) the need
for relief is extremely urgent, as the passage of sufficient time would give Jimenez ample opportunity to escape
and avoid extradition; and (4) the issues raised are purely of law.”[16]
For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner submits the following reasons: “(1) even if
the petition is lodged with the Court of Appeals and such appellate court takes cognizance of the issues and
decides them, the parties would still bring the matter to this Honorable Court to have the issues resolved once and
for all [and] to have a binding precedent that all lower courts ought to follow; (2) the Honorable Court of Appeals
had in one case[17]
ruled on the issue by disallowing bail but the court below refused to recognize the decision as a
judicial guide and all other courts might likewise adopt the same attitude of refusal; and (3) there are pending
issues on bail both in the extradition courts and the Court of Appeals, which, unless guided by the decision that
this Honorable Court will render in this case, would resolve to grant bail in favor of the potential extraditees and
would give them opportunity to flee and thus, cause adverse effect on the ability of the Philippines to comply with
its obligations under existing extradition treaties.”[18]
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior court has
been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule, though,
has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in
case of urgency.[19]
As a fourth exception, the Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration
before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua non, when the questions raised are the same as those
that have already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court.[20]
Aside from being of

this nature, the issues in the present case also involve pure questions of law that are of public interest. Hence, a
motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with.
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari
when there are special and important reasons therefor.[21]
In Fortich v. Corona[22]
we stated:
“[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly [before] it if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant. This has been the judicial policy
to be observed and which has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et. al., Torres vs.
Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman, and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. As we have further stated inCuaresma:
‘x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only
when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is
established policy. x x x.’
“Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of
speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as
correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by
the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, x x x requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the
Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.
“That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals:[23]
‘Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted
a particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we
forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and
proceed directly to the merits of the case.’
In a number of other exceptional cases,[24]
we held as follows:
“This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, and we entertain direct resort to
us in cases where special and important reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the same.”
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings,
we deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression
over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Five Postulates of Extradition
The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or construction of the treaty and the law
on extradition. A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect to its intent.
[25]
Since PD 1069 is intended as a guide for the implementation of extradition treaties to which the Philippines is a
signatory,[26]
understanding certain postulates of extradition will aid us in properly deciding the issues raised here.
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime[27]
by facilitating the arrest
and the custodial transfer[28]
of a fugitive[29]
from one state to the other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of affluent criminals from one
country to another for the purpose of committing crime and evading prosecution has become more
frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that
transcend international boundaries.
Today, “a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon extradition as the major
effective instrument of international co-operation in the suppression of crime.”[30]
It is the only regular system that
has been devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordance with
municipal and international law.[31]
“An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the principle that criminals should be restored to a
jurisdiction competent to try and punish them is that the number of criminals seeking refuge abroad will be
reduced. For to the extent that efficient means of detection and the threat of punishment play a significant role in
the deterrence of crime within the territorial limits of a State, so the existence of effective extradition arrangements
and the consequent certainty of return to the locus delicti commissi play a corresponding role in the deterrence of
flight abroad in order to escape the consequence of crime. x x x. From an absence of extradition arrangements
flight abroad by the ingenious criminal receives direct encouragement and thus indirectly does the commission of
crime itself.”[32]
In Secretary v. Lantion[33]
we explained:
“The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do it is to facilitate the
extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered [into] by our government. More and more, crimes are
becoming the concern of one world. Laws involving crimes and crime prevention are undergoing
universalization. One manifest purpose of this trend towards globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal
whose activities threaten the peace and progress of civilized countries. It is to the great interest of the Philippines
to be part of this irreversible movement in light of its vulnerability to crimes, especially transnational crimes.”
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other
states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that both accept and
trust, each other’s legal system and judicial process.[34]
More pointedly, our duly authorized representative’s
signature on an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the other state to
protect the basic rights of the person sought to be extradited.[35]
That signature signifies our full faith that the
accused will be given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal
proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed, or would have been
directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,[36]
extradition proceedings are not criminal in
nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition which is sui
generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not.
“An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the
rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve
the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of
the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the
guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee x x x.
x x x x x x x x x
“There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition
proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a
criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less
stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited ‘upon showing of the existence of a
prima facie case.’ Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered
final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the
final discretion to extradite him. The United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State
exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the nation’s foreign relations
before making the ultimate decision to extradite.”
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the
innocence of the person sought to be extradited.[37]
Such determination during the extradition proceedings will
only result in needless duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance
through which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try
that person. It is not part of the function of the assisting authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative
of that jurisdiction.[38]
The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the
extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.[39]
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and our
legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption that its implementation will serve the
national interest.

Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity[40]
with the requesting state. On the
other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our country before the world
community. Such failure would discourage other states from entering into treaties with us, particularly an
extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity.[41]
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under the Treaty.
[42]
This principle requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting country if the conditions precedent to
extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, “[t]he demanding government, when it has
done all that the treaty and the law require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the
proper warrant, and the other government is under obligation to make the surrender.”[43]
Accordingly, the
Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the accused, should it be found proper.
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds
reinforcement in the experience[44]
of the executive branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that the
accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting
state.
The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have a
propensity to flee. Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit
to trial in the requesting country.[45]
Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right before
the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite learning that
the requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable -- eloquently speak of
his aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These
circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the
capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once, what is there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity, from
fleeing a second time?
First Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing
Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?
Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC --informing the accused, a fugitive from justice,
that an Extradition Petition has been filed against him, and that petitioner is seeking his arrest -- gives him notice
to escape and to avoid extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that such procedure may set a dangerous
precedent, in that those sought to be extradited -- including terrorists, mass murderers and war criminals -- may
invoke it in future extradition cases.
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should not be hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived of his
constitutional right to liberty without due process. He further asserts that there is as yet no specific law or rule
setting forth the procedure prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, after the petition for extradition has been
filed in court; ergo, the formulation of that procedure is within the discretion of the presiding judge.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments. It states:
“SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately upon receipt of
answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of
the accused which may be served any where within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that
the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice. Upon
receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having received the summons fail to answer within the time
fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for the hearing thereof.
“(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon
the accused and the attorney having charge of the case.” (Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganan’s act of immediately setting for hearing the issuance of a
warrant of arrest? We rule in the negative.
1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word “immediate” to
qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the
issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties,[46]
receiving facts and
arguments[47]
from them,[48]
and giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest
subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered “immediate.” The law could not have intended the word as a
mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination
of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
By using the phrase “if it appears,” the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such
early stage. The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual
situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then available to it,
the court is expected merely to get a good first impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy
initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused.
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of Authentication among others, were the
following: (1) Annex H, the Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage -- trial attorney in the
Campaign Financing Task Force of the Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice; (2) Annexes H to G,
evidentiary Appendices of various exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment, with
Exhibits 1 to 120 (duly authenticated exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment);
(3) Annex BB, the Exhibit I “Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Angela
Byers” and enclosed Statements in two volumes; (4) Annex GG, the Exhibit J “Table of Contents for
Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix” with enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5) Annex MM, the Exhibit L
“Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Betty Steward” and enclosed
Statements in two volumes.[49]
It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression from these records adequate for
him to make an initial determination of whether the accused was someone who should immediately be arrested in
order to “best serve the ends of justice.” He could have determined whether such facts and circumstances existed
as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that the extradition request was prima facie
meritorious. In point of fact, he actually concluded from these supporting documents that “probable
cause” did exist. In the second questioned Order, he stated:
“In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US Government in support of [its] request for extradition of
herein respondent are enough to convince the Court of the existence of probable cause to proceed with the hearing
against the extraditee.”[50]
We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing
an arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having
already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion
when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez.[51]
Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure of the
accused to answer after receiving the summons. In connection with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the
word “hearing” is notably absent from the provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that stage been
intended, the law could have easily so provided. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition
proceedings are summary[52]
in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable
interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings.
“It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something reasonable and something not inconsistent
with generally recognized principles of International Law, nor with previous treaty obligations towards third
States. If, therefore, the meaning of a treaty is ambiguous, the reasonable meaning is to be preferred to the
unreasonable, the more reasonable to the less reasonable x x x .”[53]
Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their
arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an
escape. Neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would
have been defeated by the escape of the accused from the requested state.
2. On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a
hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:
“Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under

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