2. Much of the time, according to Russell,
even proper names are really
just veiled definite descriptions.
3. Much of the time, according to Russell,
even proper names are really
just veiled definite descriptions.
i.e. 'Bertrand Russell' may really just mean 'Whitehead's co-author' &/or
'Wittgenstein's mentor of-sorts' &/or 'Wishon's favorite philosopher' (in
as much as it means anything on its own.
4. He argues that we are
actually acquainted with very few
other people and things.*
Mostly just sensibilia.
6. Everything else we can only know
through description. For Russell,
it seems knowledge by description
is supposed almost literally dimmer*
than knowledge by acquaintance.
* à la David Hume
7. But the line between description
and acquaintance seems to be
blurring in contemporary society.
12. What about someone I attended high school
with, but only remember by name and
appearance? Am I justified in believing
propositions about her that I only believe
because of... ?
13. What about someone I attended high school
with, but only remember by name and
appearance? Am I justified in believing
propositions about her that I only believe
because of ?
14. Strictly, it would seem, on Russell's theory I'm
not entitled to the degree of certainty reserved
for knowledge by acquaintance of these
propositions.
15. But so much of our knowledge
or, at least, belief,
comes from these sorts of
technologically mediated
impressions at a distance.
16. It seems, for example, like a real possibility that I
have more knowledge about Jay-Z than I do
about my own grandmother.
*Sadly, not my grandmother
17. So, what the heck is knowledge by acquaintance
anymore, anyway?
*Sadly, not my grandmother
