Presented by Grace Wong, Cecilia Luttrell, Lasse Loft, Anastasia Yang, Maria Brockhaus, Shintia Arwida, Januarti Tjajadi, Pham Thu Thuy and Samuel Assembe-Mvondo at a workshop on 'Sharing insights across REDD+ countries: Opportunities and obstacles for effective, efficient, and equitable carbon and non-carbon results' from 21-23 February 2017 in Naypyidaw, Myanmar.
Assessing REDD+ Benefit Sharing for Efficiency, Effectiveness and Equity
1. Assessing REDD+ Benefit Sharing for
Efficiency, Effectiveness and Equity
Grace Wong, Cecilia Luttrell, Lasse Loft, Anastasia Yang, Maria Brockhaus,
Shintia Arwida, Januarti Tjajadi, Pham Thu Thuy, Samuel Assembe-Mvondo
Sharing Insights Across REDD+ Countries
Naypyidaw, Myanmar, 23 February, 2016
2. Presentation Outline
1. What do we mean by benefit sharing
or benefit distribution in REDD+?
2. Common benefit sharing approaches
and key lessons
3. Who should benefit from REDD+?
Implications and trade-offs
between Effectiveness, Efficiency
and Equity
3. CIFOR REDD+ Benefit Sharing project
Objective: To provide REDD+ policymakers and practitioners with
policy options and guidance to improve the design, development
and implementation of REDD+ benefit sharing mechanisms. The
evidence-based policy options will be framed by experience in six
focal study countries and draws on analysis, pilot schemes and
lessons learned globally.
Timeframe: 1 Feb 2012 – 31 July 2016
Focal countries: Brazil, Peru, Cameroon, Tanzania, Indonesia,
Vietnam
Funding by EC with co-financing from NORAD and AusAID
4. 1. What do we mean by
‘benefit sharing’ in REDD+?
Paris Agreement sets the stage for REDD+ results-based
finance
Benefit sharing = distribution of direct and indirect net gains
from the implementation of REDD+
Direct multiple benefits:
Monetary gains from finance related to REDD+
Benefits associated with the increased availability of
forest products and ecosystem services
Indirect benefits include improved governance, capacity
building and infrastructure provision
5. Benefits come with costs and risks:
Direct financial outlays (implementation and transaction
costs)
Foregone revenues from alternative forest land and
resource use (opportunity costs)
Risks related to changing forest/ land use, tenure,
representation, governance, and management of finance
Benefit sharing mechanism = range of institutional means,
governance structures and instruments that distribute the net
benefits
1. What do we mean by
‘benefit sharing’ in REDD+?
6. 1. The 3E criteria for evaluation
Effectiveness: environmental, social, economic outcomes or performance
Efficiency: the level of administrative and social costs associated
Equity: procedural refers to participation in decision making and negotiation
of competing interests; distributive refers to the allocation of benefits and costs
between different stakeholders; contextual refers to existing social factors,
capabilities
Luttrell et al. 2013; McDermott et al. 2013
7. Market-based instruments: PES (national-level mechanisms in
Brazil and Vietnam; projects implemented in almost all
countries, most notably in Latin America)
Community forestry systems: Mixed success in most
countries, Nepal and Tanzania are best known
Fund-based approaches: Amazon Fund (Brazil), Reforestation
Fund (Indonesia), PFES (Vietnam), PROFONANPE (Peru)
Forest financing instruments: forest and wildlife revenue
redistribution (Cameroon), forest concessions (common)
2. Common approaches to benefit
sharing
Pham, T.T. et al. (2013) Approaches to benefit sharing: A
preliminary comparative analysis of 13 REDD+ countries
8. Market-based systems are more efficient …weak monitoring
and evaluation systems mean effectiveness is unknown
Community forestry is both equitable and effective due to
highly participatory nature …high transaction costs
Fund-based systems can be effective and efficient, if
functioning institutions and sectoral coordination are in
place
Forest financing instruments are potentially effective and easy
to scale-up …marginalizes local people, top-down bureaucracy
Elite capture is a big problem in all cases and in all countries
Co-benefits are uncertain
2. Some key lessons
9. 3. Who should benefit from REDD+?
A REDD+ incentive is only one of many factors influencing
behavior in land use and forest governance – to induce change
towards reducing deforestation and forest degradation
Effectiveness/ efficiency = payments to those who can provide
services in most cost-efficient manner
10. “REDD benefits should reward industries/companies for
potential to reduce large-scale forest emissions”
Data from CIFOR’s GCS policy network analysis, 2011–2013
11. 3. Who should benefit from REDD+?
A REDD+ incentive is only one of many factors influencing
behavior in land use and forest governance – to induce change
towards reducing deforestation and forest degradation
Effectiveness/ efficiency = payments to those who can provide
services in most cost-efficient manner
Equity = who has the right
to benefit?
Trade-offs need to be
properly weighed and
negotiated amongst
relevant stakeholders
12. Equity discourses and
implications (1)
All countries lean towards allocating
benefits to those with legal rights
Unclear and insecure land tenure creates
inequity:
Conflicts between customary and formal
rights over land are evident in almost all
countries studied
Carbon rights are in infancy with no legal
framework
13. The legal status of landuse and rights:
implications for benefit sharing
Project
location
Driver of deforestation Status
Kalimantan
(Indonesia)
Timber, oil palm, mining, concessions,
swidden
Legal
Small scale logging & hunting, fishing,
NTFPs
Legally ambiguous
Transamazon
(Brazil)
Subsistence hunting, small scale
forest management, NTFPs
Legal
Swidden, small scale agriculture,
small and large scale ranching and
logging
Legal/illegal depends
on type & location
Commercial hunting Illegal
14. Equity discourses and
implications (2)
Allocation of REDD+ benefits to low
emitting stewards is not a priority
Seen as a reward to forest communities
Additionality concerns vs. reducing risk
of perverse incentives
16. What costs? Costs to whom?
Data from CIFOR’s GCS study of sub-national REDD+ initiatives, 2011–2013
Project
location
….incur the
greatest
financial losses
…affect the
greatest
number of
people
…create the
most
significant
change in land
use over the
largest area
…contribute
the most to
carbon
emissions
Kalimantan
(Indonesia)
Large scale:
logging, oil palm
& mining
Swidden,
fishing, NTFP
Large scale:
logging, oil
palm & mining
Large scale:
logging & oil
palm
Transamazon
(Brazil)
Small-scale
cattle
Swidden Small-scale
cattle
Small-scale
cattle
Acre (Brazil) Large scale
ranching
Swidden Large scale
ranching
Large scale
ranching
17. Equity implications and
discourses (4)
Benefits should go to effective facilitators
of implementation
Important as incentive to motivate
effective implementation by Government
at different levels and project developers,
but proportion of benefits to be shared
are contentious
18. There is no ‘one size fits all’
Clarifying objectives of national REDD+ before design of a
BSM is critical - clear objectives will help to identify who has
the right to benefit from REDD+
Understanding the risks and winners/losers for each of the
potential policy options is critical for design of equitable BSM
Mix of multiple benefits and beneficiaries– in many cases,
indirect and non-cash benefits are important for motivating
buy-in at different levels
Dialogue with actors at all levels are critical – due process and
inclusive participation in decision-making increases legitimacy
and credibility
4. Negotiating policy options
19. Identifying lessons from different
sectors and experiences
Decentralized management systems: community forestry
systems in Nepal and Indonesia, PES, conditional cash transfers
Public administration/governance: anti corruption measures,
multi level governance structures
Financial structures: trust funds, ecological fiscal transfers, forest
and agriculture fees and taxes, extractive industries (oil, gas and
mining) and royalties
Specific industry processes: FLEGT, forest standards and
certification
Series of info briefs downloadable from:
cifor.org/redd-benefit-sharing/publications/
20. • Key publications from CIFOR’s benefit sharing research:
Wong et al. Forthcoming. An assessment framework for REDD+ benefit sharing mechanisms within a forest policy mix, Environment Policy &
Governance
Luttrell et al. 2017. Lessons for multi-level REDD+ benefit sharing from revenue distribution in extractive sectors (oil and gas, mining).
CIFOR OP.
Pham et al. 2016. Distribution of PFES: research evidence to inform payment guidelines. CIFOR OP 163.
Loft, L. et al. 2016. Risks to REDD+: Potential pitfalls for policy design and implementation. Environmental Conservation.
Le et al. 2016. Being equitable is not always fair: An assessment of PFES implementation in Dien Bien, Vietnam. CIFOR WP
Assembe-Mvondo S. et al. 2015. Comparative Assessment of Forest and Wildlife Revenue Redistribution in Cameroon. CIFOR WP190.
Luttrell C. et al. 2015. Lessons from voluntary partnership agreements for REDD+ benefit sharing. CIFOR OP 134.
May P. et al. 2015. Environmental reserve quotas in Brazil’s new forest legislation: An ex ante appraisal . CIFOR Occasional Paper 131.
Loft, L. et al. 2015. Taking stock of carbon rights in REDD+ candidate countries: Concept meets reality. Forests 6:1031-60.
Börner, J. et al. 2015. Mixing Carrots and Sticks to Conserve Forests in the Brazilian Amazon: A Spatial Probabilistic Modeling Approach. PLOS
One 10 (2).
Torpey-Saboe N. et al. 2015. Benefit Sharing Among Local Resource Users: The Role of Property Rights. World Development, Vol 72
Luttrell, C. et al. 2014 Who should benefit from REDD+? Rationales and realities. Ecology and Society 18(4): 52.
Pham ,T.T. et al. 2014. Local preferences and strategies for effective, efficient and equitable PES benefit distribution options in Vietnam:
Lessons for REDD+. Human Ecology DOI: 10.1007/s10745-014-9703-3
Pham T.T. et al. 2013. Approaches to benefit sharing: A preliminary comparative analysis of 13 REDD+ countries CIFOR WP108.
Assembe-Mvondo, S. et al. 2013. Assessment of the effectiveness, efficiency and equity of benefit sharing schemes under large-scale
agriculture: Lessons from land fees in Cameroon, European Journal of Development Research
• Series of information briefs:
Wong G et al. 2016. Results based payments for REDD+: Lessons on finance, performance and non-carbon benefits. CIFOR Info Brief 138.
Yang, AL. et al. 2015. What can REDD+ benefit sharing mechanisms learn from the European Rural Development Policy? CIFOR Info Brief 126.
Arwida, S. et al. 2015. Lessons from anti-corruption measures in Indonesia, CIFOR InfoBrief 120.
Tjajadi , JS et al. 2015. Lessons from environmental and social sustainability standards. CIFOR InfoBrief 119.
Myers, R. et al. 2015. Benefit sharing in context: A comparative analysis of 10 land use change case studies in Indonesia. CIFOR InfoBrief 118.
Nawir, AA. et al. 2015. Lessons from community forestry in Nepal and Indonesia, CIFOR InfoBrief 112.
Brockhaus M. et al. 2014. Operationalizing safeguards in national REDD+ benefit sharing. CIFOR REDD+ Safeguards Brief no. 2.
Kowler, L. et al. 2014. The legitimacy of multilevel governance structures for benefit sharing REDD+ and other low emissions options in Peru.
CIFOR InfoBrief 101
Wong G. 2014. The experience of conditional cash transfers: Lessons for REDD+ benefit sharing. CIFOR InfoBrief 97.
Loft L. et al. 2014. Lessons from payments for ecosystem services for REDD+ benefit-sharing mechanisms. CIFOR InfoBrief 68.
In the face of numerous emerging first-generation REDD+ activities – both projects and national strategies – CIFOR has started in 2009, a global comparative study on REDD+.
For these assessment steps we apply the following criteria:
Effectiveness
Efficiency
Equity
*
There are a number of discourses around this questions, and what we did was to explore some o the tradeoffs involved in each discourse and the implications these bring for the design of the benefit sharing mechanisms
A broad distinction can be made between effectiveness/ efficiency discourses on the one hand and equity discourses on the other.
Interviews with national-level actors in Brazil and Indonesia show a divergence of views over this. In Indonesia, the idea that REDD benefits should reward large-scale industry was strongly supported by government and private sector respondents, and around half of the NGO/research and donor respondents. In Brazil however, a minority of government and NGO/research respondents agreed with this and there was concern from many that illegal operators would be rewarded as much of the deforestation is carried out by large landowners who do not comply with regulations.
There are a number of discourses around this questions, and what we did was to explore some o the tradeoffs involved in each discourse and the implications these bring for the design of the benefit sharing mechanisms
A broad distinction can be made between effectiveness/ efficiency discourses on the one hand and equity discourses on the other.
A dominant strand is that benefits should be distributed to those with the legal rights (whether statuatory or customary) to those benefits. However in most countries and projects we looked at establishing these legal rights is not straightforward. In none of the countries have the carbon right been clearly legally defined
Some commentators assume that existing land and forest tenure and existing policy instruments for sharing benefits from the forests will serve as the basis for allocating payments for carbon emission reductions. But this assumption may be problematic: owning land or trees does not necessarily mean a legal right to benefit from carbon sequestration. There are at least 2 further aspects to consider :
The first is that the property rights to sequestered carbon, does not necessarily coincide with the rights over the physical resource within which it is contained
The second is that property right to sequestered carbon may be distinct from the right to benefit from selling carbon credits.
And interestingly in the few examples where carbon rights have been legally clarified (e.g., New Zealand until 2008) and the state of Amazonas and Acre in Brazil) the carbon rights did not reflect existing land and forest tenure but were vested in the state.
In Tanzania, for example, the majority of REDD+ projects are taking place on land registered as Village Forest Reserves, which means that there is no legal requirement for the income from these projects to go to the government. However despite the recent shift of control of NR to communities some, particularly at the national level continue to perceive natural resources as nationally owned goods and there are suggestions that carbon rights may be claimed by the state
In many cases small-scale forest users do not possess formal rights . The project we looked at here in Kalimantan which shows that large-scale high-emitting land uses are classified as “legal”, whereas many smaller-scale activities are taking place with no legal recognition. This raises the question of whether or not a reduction in illegal uses should also be compensated. In this case targeting benefits with formal rights may work against the poorest.
Another strand of the equity discourse is that REDD+ benefits should not only go to those actors that have been causing high emissions but also to indigenous groups or other users that have a record of responsible forest management. By taking this approach, a community whose customary rights are not legally recognised but that has been protecting the forests would have strong claims to benefits from REDD+. The effectiveness dilemma of this is that in many of these low-emission situations, additionality cannot be proved.
Low priority.
Another strong discourse is that the actors who shoulder costs should receive benefits.
This debate reflects concerns to ensure that actors are compensated for inputs regardless of the emission reductions that they are directly responsible for. And this concern is reflected in the design of many emerging benefit sharing arrangements at the project level partly due to the recognized need to give actors upfront incentives in order to get them involved.
Designing mechanisms for the compensation of opportunity costs is so far rare amongst the projects we looked at. Within each project itself is a considerable disparity between the stakeholder groups that are predicted to incur the most significant opportunity costs, depending on how one defines ‘cost’
This table highlights potential trade-offs between an opportunity cost approach to benefit sharing depending on whether cost is defined in terms of financial loss and area of land use change or the consideration of the numbers of people whose basic livelihoods may be affected.
Finally, there is a discourse that a proportion of REDD+ benefits should be shared with those actors that are essential for facilitating the implementation of REDD+ , for example project developers and government. However, the determination of the proportion of the benefits that should accrue to these actors is an area for contest. The challenge is to ensure that project implementers receive enough incentive to guarantee effective implementation, while at the same time guarding against them getting windfall profits