The document summarizes research on risk coping strategies used by smallholder farmers practicing swidden agriculture in Laos and how these farmers may respond to incentives from REDD+ programs. Key findings include: 1) Farmers currently face risks from crop losses, livestock losses, and economic impacts and cope through forest product harvesting, savings, labor, and community support. 2) In games simulating REDD+ incentives, group payments led to greater reductions in forest clearing than individual payments or insurance. 3) Effects of incentives did not always last after the programs ended, suggesting need for longer-term support for livelihoods.

1. Risk coping in swidden livelihoods and
the potential of REDD+ in Laos
Grace Wong, Carl Salk, Cornelia Hett, Shintia Arwida,
Tracy Farrell
IUFRO Beijing, 24 October 2016

2. Laos: Changing from a socialist state …

3. … to a socialist market economy…

4. Land use policies and discourses have
evolved with changing times…
• Nation-building and integration (1970s-1980s)
- Internal resettlement for cultural integration – moving from the uplands
- Move from failed agricultural collectivism (Soviet support) to “New Economic
Mechanism” of market transformation (access to international finance and investors)
• Stopping “chain of degradation” (since 1990)
- Eradicating, stabilizing and slash and burn farming by 2020
- Land and Forest allocation – forest zoning and limiting areas for “rotational farming”
- Protected area system
• Turning land into capital (since 1997)
- National Land titling – encourage investments into market-oriented land uses
- Identifying “empty space” for development – allocation of swidden land to (mainly
foreign) companies for concessions; aggregating remote villages closer to infrastructure
- Decentralization of power over land decisions to provincial administrations
Lestrelin et al. 2012

5. …but objectives with swidden have remained
same …
“Settlements and permanent job creation achieved through
concentration at boundary areas and priority areas […] which made
many families in the area shifted from slash and burn rice cultivation
into commercial production using their local potential […] with
provision of technical-scientific methods to address poverty issues
through progressive development of the villages, the development of
priorities areas and establishment of new towns.”
Achievement of 2011-2015 NSEDP
Government of Lao PDR, 2016

6. Research objectives and methods
Research questions:
 What risks do smallholders in a swidden landscape face and how do they
cope?
 How will they respond to REDD+ incentives that constrain land and forest
use? Can incentives play a role in supporting livelihoods?
Mixed methods:
1. Mapping and analyzing land use and land cover patterns
2. Village level focus group discussions (6) and household surveys on livelihoods, risks
and coping strategies (204)
3. Field-framed games (12) to assess smallholders’ response to, and preference for forest-
based incentives.
Study site: Phonxai district, Luangprabang province

7. Land use/cover in Phonxai district, Luangprabang
Analysis by Cornelia Hett and Sandra Eckert, CDE;
Landsat scenes 128/46, 129/46; 2013
Land use/ land cover % of area Phonxai
Forest 58.9
Young fallow* 27.0
Old fallow* 8.2
Bare/burnt field for swidden 5.2
Paddy 0.3
Flooded paddy or young
rubber/teak
0.4

8. Commune Village Ethnicities Utilities
(electricity)
Resettlement history Conservation
forests
Site 1: Villages are most distant from markets, shallower basin, rapid transitions though development of focal area, multiple
development project interventions, large resettlement.
Phontong Phontong Khmu (60%), Lao (25%);
Hmong (15%)
2010 Consolidated in 1972,
1990
Decreasing
Phontong Bouakkham Khmu (100%) - Consolidated in 1975,
1976, 1978; resettled in
2013
Yes
Site 2: Villages in highest elevation, most forested.
Houaykhing Houaykhing Khmu (57%), Hmong
(43%)
2014 Resettled in 1962;
consolidated in 2003
Yes
Houaykhing Houayha Hmong (90%), Khmu
(10%)
- Consolidated in 1975 Yes
Site 3: Villages closest to markets, year round road access, teak plantations.
Sopchia Sopchia Lao (55%), Khmu (44%),
Hmong (1%)
- Village split in 2001 Yes
Sopchia Houaychia Khmu (100%) - Consolidated in 1983,
2001
n/a

9. Swidden landscape in Phonxai

10. Swidden livelihoods in Phonxai
17%
28%
17%
24…
1%
13%
Food crops (mostly swidden) Livestock
Cash crops Wages
Remittances Forest products
Wong et al., in prep

11. 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Crop loss (drought/floods)
Crop disease/pest
Livestock loss
Market impacts
Death/illness in HH
Most common livelihood shocks
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Harvest more forest products
Use cash savings
Sell assets
Do extra casual labor
Assistance from friends/relatives
Assistance from community /religious orgs
Reduce household spending/consumption
Coping Strategies
Wong et al., in prep
Swidden livelihoods in Phonxai

12. High level of community reciprocity
From the household surveys:
 Approx. 75% of HH receive regular support (mostly food) from
relatives and friends in village and neighboring villages. Kinship
ties were emphasized as important in labor pooling for swidden.
 82.5% of HH also provide support to others both on regular basis
and when in need
 But these are ineffective when shocks are largely covariate

13. Can REDD+ support swidden livelihoods?
Can swidden support REDD+?
How to incentivize reduced forest clearing when complete elimination of
deforestation is not possible or desirable within local context?
 How could REDD+ incentives be structured for swidden farmers in Phonxai?
 What happens when programs end?
Design of a flexible swidden-REDD+ game with different payment mechanisms
 Payouts/ production value:
• Increase with cultivation of plots cleared from forests
• Decrease with reduced ecosystem services from forests
• Depend on random weather
Salk, Lopez and Wong (2016)

14. Game structure
 24 rounds in 3 stages
• Stage 1: no treatment
• Stage 2: 1 of 3 possible treatments
- Individual payments
- Group bonus
- Insurance
• Stage 3: no treatment

15. Hypothesis
Cultivation
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
(Pre-Treatment) (Treatment) (Post-Treatment)
Treatment
Effect
Lasting
Effect

16. Results of the field-based swidden/
REDD+ games

17. Treatments
 Individual bonus:
• 200 point payout if ≤3 patches of forest cultivated
 Group bonus:
• 200 points if ≤24 total patches of forest cultivated by group
 Insurance:
• Guaranteed payout equal to good rain if ≤3 patches of forest
cultivated by individual

18. Changeincultivation
-4-3-2-101
Group Individual Insurance
Bonus Bonus
a * a, b * b
Treatment Effect
Salk, Lopez and Wong (2016)

19. Lasting Effect
Changeincultivation
-4-3-2-101
Group Individual Insurance
Bonus Bonus
a . a a
Salk, Lopez and Wong (2016)

20. Results and Conclusions
 As an effective performance-based incentive: Group payment > individual
payment > insurance.
 Lasting effects are minimal though the group payment shows some
promise. There does not appear to be crowding out effects.
 No impact of insurance – possible reasons include lack of familiarity with
insurance schemes (none exist in the region) and treatment is too
complicated for local understanding
 Swidden farmers can be active/effective contributors to goals of reducing
deforestation and forest degradation
 Design of REDD+ incentives needs to be tailored to local contexts
 There has to be policy space for integrating swidden within the national
REDD+ agenda

21. Thank you!
Email: g.wong@cgiar.org