Social Forestry & the Paris agreement: Lessons for benefit sharing
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This presentation was given at the session at COP22 titled, "Social forestry sustains local actions to advance the Paris Agreement" organized by CIFOR and the Indonesian Ministry of Environment and Forestry. http://www.cifor.org/cifor-at-cop22/sessions/09-nov/social-forestry-sustains-local-actions-advance-paris-agreement/
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Social Forestry & the Paris agreement: Lessons for benefit sharing
- 1. Grace Wong, M. Brockhaus, Pham T.T., C. Luttrell, L. Loft, A. Yang, S. Arwida, J. Tjajadi, S. Assembe-Mvondo, A. Nawir Indonesia Pavilion, COP Marrakech, 9 November2016 Social Forestry & the Paris agreement: Lessons for benefit sharing
- 2. The Paris Agreement “By comparison to what it could have been, it’s a miracle. By comparison to what it should have been, it’s a disaster” (George Monbiot) Mismatch between what is committed in INDCs and what would be needed to achieve the 2° goal, let alone 1.5° First time forests are explicitly mentioned (Art 5.1) Encourages action for results based payments (e.g. REDD+) (Art 5.2)
- 3. A REDD+ incentive is only one of many drivers influencing behavioral patterns in forest use and governance How can REDD+ compete? Potentially effective if REDD+ monetary incentive > opportunity costs, or ≥ costs of implementing a REDD project or governance of policy Potentially as a driver to change policies and economic incentives from business-as-usual forest exploitation to incorporate other values Other REDD+ non-monetary or indirect benefits are also highly significant REDD+ as an incentive for reducing deforestation and forest degradation
- 4. Assessing 3Es in BSM: incentives, institutions, outcomes The design for a REDD+ benefit sharing mechanism needs to address … the distribution of incentives creation of enabling institutional conditions change in LU practices to realize carbon and non-carbon outcomes … in an effective, efficient and equitable manner Luttrell et al., 2013; Wong et al., forthcoming
- 5. What lessons can we learn from other sectors and experiences for REDD+ benefit sharing? 1. How to operationalize equity, identifying target groups, setting up eligibility criteria? Who has the right to benefit? 2. Are incentives provided for inputs or outcomes? And which is more effective in changing behavior? 3. What is the process of participation and decision-making at multiple levels? 4. How is accountability and outcomes measured and monitored?
- 6. Types and features of BSMs reviewed What kind of BSM is it? What type of governance practice is it? Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) Community Forestry systems (CF) Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) Indigenous People’s trust funds in Brazil (IPTF) European Rural Development Policy (RDP) Forest revenue redistribution schemes Ecological Fiscal Transfers Anti-corruption measures in Indonesia (ACM) Standards and certification (S&C) Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) under FLEGT
- 7. Lessons from the ongoing review of BSMs and governance practices
- 8. Lessons for: 1) Effectiveness 1. Use of input or intermediate indicators do not capture impacts or long-term outcomes – PFES Vietnam: the costs of monitoring longer-term outcomes often result in simplified proxy input indicators that do not adequately capture impacts or performance 2. Use of existing governance systems to reduce transaction costs – Forest revenue redistribution in Cameroon highlights importance to not reinforce flaws of existing systems 3. Involve local government 4. Coordination – discussed everywhere but often lack the resources and institutional authority/ mandate
- 9. Lessons for: 2) Efficiency 1. Role of intermediaries – critical to bridge between the global/national/corporate and multiple local beneficiaries . Examples: National Fund for Forest Financing (FONAFIFO) which manages the Costa Rica PES and the FAS which manages Bolsa Floresta in Brazil 2. Addressing scale 3. Using geographical targeting to increase effectiveness and efficiency – avoiding areas of high opportunity costs (CF in Indonesia) or identifying areas of high priority to ensure sustainable outcomes (RDP) 4. Clarifying tenure based on the nature of the ecosystem service
- 10. Lessons for: 3) Equity 1. Setting eligibility criteria for identifying target beneficiaries often entail trade-offs between efficiency and equity 2. Techniques for assessing and recognizing the level of costs and to whom they are accruing – periodic review of producer costs (Fairtrade) 3. Setting fair payments and payment structure – phased and upfront payments are useful for enabling broad participation - Plan Vivo TGB 4. Paying attention to the type of benefit • There is a focus on development activities and co- benefits • Pros and cons of cash depend on context • Securing rights may be an important co-benefit
- 11. Cross-cutting issues: Accountability/ legitimacy/ MRV 1. Inclusion and participation in process – under- representation of certain groups in decision-making creates risks of elite capture and undermines legitimacy of the system (Vietnam) 2. Transparency – anti-corruption measures in Indonesia: transparency is not sufficient by itself: enforcement and penalties are also important 3. Dispute resolution 4. MRV – FLEGT uses independent auditing and multi- stakeholder oversight to ensure credibility (Indonesia/ Myanmar)
- 12. Key points for REDD+ benefit sharing in social forestry 1. REDD+ and social forestry programs have both benefits and costs • Regular assessments of the different costs in implementing REDD+ and to whom they accrue are important to ensure that stakeholders can be adequately compensated • Mix of benefits and instruments – eg. rights are an important co-benefit when opportunity costs are high 2. Effectiveness depends on governance and requires rigorous MRV system to monitor benefit flows and to measure impacts and outcomes depending on the REDD+ objectives
- 13. Key points for REDD+ benefit sharing in social forestry 3. REDD+ and social forestry requires an inclusive process • Purposeful multi-stakeholder participation throughout the decision-making process can increase the credibility and legitimacy of a program and enhance its chances of successful outcomes. 4. Safeguards can play a role in managing equity and effectiveness concerns • Safeguard indicators need to be grounded in local contexts to be relevant
- 14. • Key publications from CIFOR’s benefit sharing research: Wong et al. Forthcoming. An assessment framework for REDD+ benefit sharing mechanisms within a forest policy mix, Environment Policy & Governance Loft, L. et al. 2016. Risks to REDD+: Potential pitfalls for policy design and implementation. Environmental Conservation. Le, QT et al. 2015. The distribution of powers and responsibilities affecting forests, land use, and REDD+ across levels and sectors in Vietnam: A legal study. CIFOR OP137. Assembe-Mvondo S. et al. 2015. Comparative Assessment of Forest and Wildlife Revenue Redistribution in Cameroon. CIFOR WP190. Luttrell C. et al. 2015. Lessons from voluntary partnership agreements for REDD+ benefit sharing. CIFOR OP 134. May P. et al. 2015. Environmental reserve quotas in Brazil’s new forest legislation: An ex ante appraisal . CIFOR Occasional Paper 131. Loft, L. et al. 2015. Taking stock of carbon rights in REDD+ candidate countries: Concept meets reality. Forests 6:1031-60. Börner, J. et al. 2015. Mixing Carrots and Sticks to Conserve Forests in the Brazilian Amazon: A Spatial Probabilistic Modeling Approach. PLOS One 10 (2). Torpey-Saboe N. et al. 2015. Benefit Sharing Among Local Resource Users: The Role of Property Rights. World Development, Vol 72 Luttrell, C. et al. 2014 Who should benefit from REDD+? Rationales and realities. Ecology and Society 18(4): 52. Pham ,T.T. et al. 2014. Local preferences and strategies for effective, efficient and equitable PES benefit distribution options in Vietnam: Lessons for REDD+. Human Ecology DOI: 10.1007/s10745-014-9703-3 Pham T.T. et al. 2013. Approaches to benefit sharing: A preliminary comparative analysis of 13 REDD+ countries CIFOR WP108. Assembe-Mvondo, S. et al. 2013. Assessment of the effectiveness, efficiency and equity of benefit sharing schemes under large-scale agriculture: Lessons from land fees in Cameroon, European Journal of Development Research • Series of information briefs: Wong G et al. 2016. Results based payments for REDD+: Lessons on finance, performance and non-carbon benefits. CIFOR Info Brief 138. Yang, AL. et al. 2015. What can REDD+ benefit sharing mechanisms learn from the European Rural Development Policy? CIFOR Info Brief 126. Yang, AL. et al. 2015. Lessons from the perceptions of equity and risks in payments for forest environmental services (PFES) fund distribution: A case study of Dien Bien and Son La provinces in Vietnam. CIFOR Brief no. 36. Arwida, S. et al. 2015. Lessons from anti-corruption measures in Indonesia, CIFOR InfoBrief 120. Tjajadi , JS et al. 2015. Lessons from environmental and social sustainability standards. CIFOR InfoBrief 119. Myers, R. et al. 2015. Benefit sharing in context: A comparative analysis of 10 land use change case studies in Indonesia. CIFOR InfoBrief 118. Nawir, AA. et al. 2015. Lessons from community forestry in Nepal and Indonesia, CIFOR InfoBrief 112. Brockhaus M. et al. 2014. Operationalizing safeguards in national REDD+ benefit sharing. CIFOR REDD+ Safeguards Brief no. 2. Kowler, L. et al. 2014. The legitimacy of multilevel governance structures for benefit sharing REDD+ and other low emissions options in Peru. CIFOR InfoBrief 101 Wong G. 2014. The experience of conditional cash transfers: Lessons for REDD+ benefit sharing. CIFOR InfoBrief 97. Loft L. et al. 2014. Lessons from payments for ecosystem services for REDD+ benefit-sharing mechanisms. CIFOR InfoBrief 68.
- 15. We acknowledge the support from: the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), the European Union (EU), the UK Government, the International Climate Initiative (IKI) of the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety (BMUB), Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), and the CGIAR Research Program on Forests, Trees and Agroforestry (CRP-FTA) with financial support from the CGIAR Fund. & all research partners and individuals that have contributed to this research www.cifor.org/knowledge-tree www.cifor.org/asfcc Thank you
Notes de l'éditeur
- (Art 5.1 states: Parties should take action to conserve and enhance, as appropriate sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases as referred to in Article 4, paragraph 1(d), of the Convention, including forests. ) (Article 5.2 links to REDD+, results based payments, joint mitigation adaptation actions and non carbon benefits - in addition, several finance announcements were made during the conference to provide more certainty over REDD+ finance)
- Performance-based arrangements distribute benefits on the condition that the partners receiving the benefits (for example, community groups) have achieved a predefined, measurable, and verifiable standard of performance against a baseline (for example, have restored or protected X hectares of forest). In input-based arrangements, beneficiaries agree with the benefit sharing mechanism management body to carry out specified actions, or refrain from certain actions, in return for up-front monetary or nonmonetary input. No link is provided between the distribution of benefits and future measurable performance in forest management. Direct benefits: monetary gains from finance related to REDD and other benefits generated through the increased availability of forest products & ecosystem services due to conservation of forests. In addition there are indirect benefits such as infrastructure provision and improved policy and governance processes (e.g. tenure clarification, law enforcement)
- For these assessment steps we apply the following criteria: Effectiveness Efficiency Equity
- We chose the mechanisms to review because they are grappling with, and have experience of, many of the same questions that we face in the REDD BS debate These include questions on 1 . How to operationalize equity 2. How to reduce costs 3. How to enhance participation and multi-stakeholder (MS) processes 4. How to address accountability around outcome through the design of the MRV systems One line on each review and what lessons it gives us - i.e. why we looked at it?
- Our different case studies raised a number of lessons regarding institutions design 1. The use of input/intermediate indicators to measure long-term outcomes A common theme across all the mechanisms we looked at is that of the tension between efficiency and equity. One of the areas this is reflected in is the tradeoff between precision of monitoring outcomes and the cost of doing so – this is clearly seen for example in the experience of CCTs (conditional cash transfers) where use of intermediate indicators for ease of implementing conditionality and monitoring (e.g. school enrollment or visits to the clinic) may not fully capture the desired long-term outcomes (e.g. learning achievement or health indicators). The parallel for REDD+ is in choosing between simpler input-based conditionality indicators (e.g. number of trees planted, number of monitoring surveys carried out) or long-term outcome-based indicators (e.g. forest cover maintained, amount of carbon emissions reduced). IN PES schemes it seems that there are few cases where payments are being made on monitoring outputs - partly due to the lack of data & technology as well as low capacity and poor coordination and information exchange between agencies . 2. Using existing governance systems to reduce cost Many reviews (Wunder et al. 2008; OECD 2010; Alston et al. 2013 suggest that the use of existing governance structures can reduce costs. The review of ACMs (anti-corruption mechanisms) shows some benefits of building on existing decentralized government structures due the problems seen by initiatives such as FLEGT etc faced in mainstreaming new initiatives. For example the succes of the Know Your Customer Principle verification mechanism used by banks in Indonesia is said to be partly due to the way in which the system was embedded into day to day standard operating procedures which meant that it did not require many additional transaction costs. 2. Another lesson emerging from our reviews are the longer term benefits of involving local government the design of the BSM .there are two main reasons for this. One is local governments’ proximity to the location of REDD+ implementation and the other is that their comprehension of local context means they have more potential than national government to empower local community by involving them in decision making processes. 4. Coordination The importance of Improving coordination between institutions is a theme running through out many of the mechanisms we looked at. Some of the key aspects to this are that the official coordinatory body should have sufficient authority and resources for the job . The review of ACMs show that a common failure is the lack of funding for such a coodinatory mechanism within the design of the mechanism. This review also suggest that there are advantages in having a coordinating institution which possess both investigative and punitive authorities to oversee and resolve any corruption. However care should be taken to maintain a balance of powers and oversight of the institution itself within the mechanism design. Effectiveness can be enhanced by a clear and strong link between monitoring and payment and clarity regarding the consequences when an infringement of the conditions of a programme occurs. LL: BUT THIS ENHANCEMENT MIGHT LEAD TO HIGH COSTS OF THE MONITORING SYSTEM, SO THE EFFICIENCY QUESTION ARISES. MORE EFFICIENT BECAUSE LESS INFRINGEMENT OR LESS EFFICIENT BECAUSE HIGHER MRV COSTS? The lessons from the ACM and FLEGT reviews in particular feed into design aspects of BSMs around MRV and how to enhance the credibility of MRV systems through getting the design right. The FLEGT debate for example gives us a set of lessons around how to monitor, report and verify against a set of standards as well as how to get a set of standards over which there is broad ownership. Other ACMs looked at give us lessons of the various Institutional arrangements and varying balances between state, private and NGO actors as well as different form of oversight mechanisms and Dispute and conflict mechanisms
- Cost sharing rather than benefit sharing remains the key concern across many of the mechanisms we looked at and a major element of this is how to reduce the costs involved, many of which fall disproportionately on small producers . Some of the mechanisms used to address these issues include : 1. A key aspect emerging from many of the case studies is the important role of intermediaries in facilitating BSMs. The review of PES highlights the way in which intermediaries are key in many PES schemes – particularly those which operate across scales - to help collect and distribute payments and to promote the scheme to potential beneficiaries. Examples include the National Fund for Forest Financing (FONAFIFO) which manages the Costa Rica PES and the independent private nongovernmental institution (FAS) which manage the Bolsa Floresta program 2. Addressing scale e.g. bundling smallholders into groups (Son La and Lam Dong);or using existing contracts et Terrat n Tanzania where use existing contracts between communities and private company 3. Using targeting to increase effectiveness Focus on producers where ES production is high but low cost (link this to focusing on low OpportunityCosts). This targeting may have a equity trade off highlights the need to monitor and adapt payments and targeting criteria where necessary . 4. Clarifying tenure Type of the ecosystem service – the more it has public good characteristics the more costly it is to exclude
- 1) Eligibility criteria CCT programs often experience tension between efficiency and equity, where more complex eligibility criteria to ensure equity outcomes will entail higher costs to implement and to monitor. There is a similar tension for REDD+ in realizing objectives for effectiveness (e.g. households who are eligible based on their expected deforestation behavior) and equity (e.g. reaching the poorest households). Additionality is an important component of CCT programs, and there is some evidence of positive spillovers on the behavior and consumption of households that do not receive the transfer. The magnitude of these spillovers depends on uptake rates, counterfactual compliance and distribution of the opportunity costs of compliance. For REDD+, there is a risk of negative spillovers if targeting is perceived as unfair, particularly by those who may be non-eligible because of the non-additionality of their behavior before payments (e.g. forest stewards). Our review of other mechanisms suggest a number of ways of operationalizing equity ranging from 2) - techniques for assessing and recognizing the level of costs and to whom they are accruing One of the big questions we come up against in the BS debate the importance of incorporating an assessment of cost into the definition of benefit levels. This concern was mirrored most significantly in the reviews of PES and CF where transaction costs can be high - indeed a review of PES systems by (Alston et al) suggests that transaction costs can be up to 66% of income generated The certification body Fairtrade attempts to address this issue through periodcic reviews to ensure producers’ production costs are being covered. They use methodologies which calculate the ‘cost of sustainable production’ from a panel of producers providing detailed farm operating information for a one-year production period. In most of the PES cases we looked at - a major criterion for setting the level of benefits included some form of implementation cost calculation. Wunder’s 2008 review concludes that “in practically every case, payments are based implicitly or explicitly on the cost of ES provision, rather than on the value of the ES.” 3) setting fair payments and payment structures A key technique for dealing with unpredictability of markets is the use of minimum payment or Price setting . For example Plan Vivo requires a minimum of 60 % of the total carbon finance generated go to communities, Fairtrade sets a minimum price to farmers which reduces the risk of price fluctuation faced by the producers, and theoretically ensures the producers are at least compensated for the costs. A key lesson from PES in this respect is the importance of involving both the buyers and sellers in price setting. In Vietnam, for example, the government’s practice of unilaterally setting the level of payment with limited consultation with buyer groups (water supply companies, hydropower plants) has led to a lack of compliance by buyers. As a result, in many provinces, buyers’ willingness to pay is low. Our reviews also show the equity benefit of upfront payments to cover set up costs and to give an initial incentive for participation . This suggests that it may be advantageous to disburse benefits in intervals. To ensure conditionality, some PES schemes provide payments upon delivery of the service and some mix approaches and provide payments both in intervals and for performance. In Fairtrade and Plan Vivo, the pre-financing is disbursed in phases based on meeting performance benchmarks. For example, In the Plan Vivo TGB project in Uganda for example, producers received pre-financing in five instalments within 10 years, based upon certain performances, over the course of 25 year contract. However ths timing does leaves the producers with no financial incentives and sanction in the final 15 years of their contract so as well as the risk for carbon outcomes which this this brings, there may be some temporal equity issues to consider for the end of a project cycle as well as the end 4) Paying attention to the type of benefit One of the big questions facing BS is ‘ in what form should the benefit occur’ i. In kind It is interesting to note that much of the debate in community forestry cases, the IP funds and the certification schemes reviewed showed a preference for in kind or collective level benefit . This is partly due to the concern than cash might exclusively benefit individuals or elites; (Nery et al. 2013.) Fairtrade for example requires buyers to pay a “Fairtrade Premium” to the farmers to ensure the development of common social goals of its members. The premium value can be relatively meager for individual producers, but the sum of money might be significant at a community level. ii At the same time there is a whole strand of debate in the literature on CCT on the benefits of cash and cash transfers With some evidence that cash may be more flexible, efficient and effective than other in-kind transfers (Fiszbein and Schady 2011 ) iii. A striking conclusion from our review of selected CF cases is the importance of rights as a benefit The CF cases highlight the way in which the allocation of rights is more sustainable incentive than performance or input based incentives for maintaining community involvement in situations of inadequate financing – this is because it is hard to get the pricing incentive correct relative to transaction and opportunity costs
- 1. Inclusion and participation All our case studies suggest that multi-stakeholder processes (MSPs) can help Bring credibility, ownership and better design. For example inthe case of the PES scheme in Cidanau, Indonesia, both buyers and sellers prefer the use of multi-stakeholder trust funds, comprising both state and non-state actors, because this increases accountability for management of the funds. From standards review: Both Fairtrade and Plan Vivo require active participation and ownership by producers. In these standards, participating farmers, can organize to form a local governance structure, which takes a lead role in development and implementation of their own management plan to comply with the standards. However MSP do indeed slow down the process (and increase the costs) and this is one of the reasons (as well as concerns over conflict of inters) that the the Amazon Fund appears to restrict participation by indigenous peoples in the decision-making processes the Kayopo Fund. The experience of FLEGT and the elaborate MSP processes that these have included highlight the need for time and compromise in the develppment of such processes. 2. Transparency Transparency emerges as a key design principle across may of the mechanisms we looked at . A key way in which many of the ACMs we reviewed foster transparency and accountability is by incorporating information and communication technology (ICT)—in the form of internet and social media—into the existing process. Examples of this in Indonesia include the posting of local government meetings on you tube and the provision of website information on local budgets by the NGO FITRA - both of these have helped to increase public involvement. However this review also highlighted the importance of there being a clear procedure for follow-up and the involvement of institutions that have the mandate do so act as transparency alone is not sufficient: enforcement and penalties are also important for accountability and effectiveness. 3. Dispute mechanisms This links into the importance of dispute resolution mechanism. An example of the inclusion of a local conflict resolution mechanism comes from Bolas Floresta (Brazil), where ecosystem service providers who breach their contract by failing to conserve forest receive a warning, and must justify their reasons for deforestation to the community association. Those who continue to breach the contract may have the contract terminated (Pereira 2010; Conceicao 2012).. FSC created an independent body which authorizes and monitors the certification body and FSC itself. Accreditation Services International (ASI) allows stakeholders with concerns about a certificate holder to contact the certification holder directly (FSC 2009).