Paradoxes of community forestry formal devolution covering informal expansion of state control: Cases from Nepal and Indonesia
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The document summarizes a presentation on paradoxes in community forestry devolution in Nepal and Indonesia. It finds that while formal devolution grants autonomy to local forest user groups, in practice the state forest administration often maintains informal control. Power network analyses of two community forests reveal uneven power distributions, with the state and other external actors dominating over local groups. This limits the autonomy formally granted by devolution.
![“ Paradoxes of Community Forestry: Formal Devolution Covering Informal Expansion of State Control – Cases from Nepal and Indonesia ” Rosan R. Devkota, Ahmad Maryudi and Max Krott Community Forestry Working Group Institute for Forest and Nature Conservation Policy Georg August University Goettingen, Germany [email_address] “ Taking stock of smallholder and community forestry: Where do we go from here?” 24 - 26 March 2010, Montpellier, France](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/paradoxesofcommunityforestryformaldevolutioncoveringinformalexpansionofstatecontrolcasesfromnepalandindonesia-100415031447-phpapp01/85/Paradoxes-of-community-forestry-formal-devolution-covering-informal-expansion-of-state-control-Cases-from-Nepal-and-Indonesia-1-320.jpg)
![Talk outline ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],25.03.2010]()
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Paradoxes of community forestry formal devolution covering informal expansion of state control: Cases from Nepal and Indonesia
- 1. “ Paradoxes of Community Forestry: Formal Devolution Covering Informal Expansion of State Control – Cases from Nepal and Indonesia ” Rosan R. Devkota, Ahmad Maryudi and Max Krott Community Forestry Working Group Institute for Forest and Nature Conservation Policy Georg August University Goettingen, Germany [email_address] “ Taking stock of smallholder and community forestry: Where do we go from here?” 24 - 26 March 2010, Montpellier, France
- 3. Devolution model of community forestry „ returning the (state) forest to the local people ” Rural development (e.g. road, school, drinking water, health post, rural electrification, community building), livelihhod support, forest management.............. 25.03.2010
- 4. “ The real challenge of devolution is whether local forest users get control over the community forest and can fetch benefits derived from the forests. 25.03.2010
- 6. Practice of devolution process in community forestry 25.03.2010 “ state holds the key in devolution processes” Implementation + Normal operation Stage I Initial stage Stage II Formal handover Stage III Stage IV Trigger Administrative bargening Autonomy - Forest management Outcomes ? Sanctions + Getting started Facilitation -
- 7. “ Devolution processes in community forestry depend mostly on interests of the most powerful external actors” 25.03.2010 Power drives devolution processes in community forestry Internal organization of community forestry are probably not the key factors Inside CF Users User Group Outer sphere Industry NGOs Local government Media Users network Ministry donor Political parties Research institutions
- 8. Elements of power analysis The power (P) = f { Trust ( coercive and liberal ) , Incentives } Incentives Coercive trust Power Liberal trust B A Definition of power: “ Power is a social relationship where an actor ‘A’ exercises influence on another actor B, independent from the will of actor ‘B’” 25.03.2010 “ A is powerful than B ”
- 10. Cases: 25.03.2010 1. Pashupati community forest, Makawanpur, Nepal Forest Area: 168 ha. Handed over- 2005 Total households in the FUG:211 Economic status: poor-135 hhs, medium-65, rich-11 2. Sedyo Rukun community forest ,Gunungkidul, Indonesia Forest Area: 17 ha. Formal agrement: 2007 Total households in the FUG:50
- 15. Power distribution is uneven and very often with 2-3 dominant actors. Uneven distribution of power due to powerful external actors does not give the freedom of ‘autonomy’ to the local forest user groups. 25.03.2010 State Forest user group/committee Donors/research institutions
Notes de l'éditeur
- First ,lets look the role of state forest administration in devolution processes. In practice, at the initial stages of forest user group formation the state has lots of promises and also assist to the user group to formulate management plans. But the real bargaining starts after the formal contract with the group and onwards during implementation and normal operation time. The facilitation slowly goes down and imposed sanctions on the FUG activities such as limiting harvesting and marketing of the forest products. Ultimately, forest user groups can not enjoy their ‘autonomy’. Finally, contribution of CF outcomes to the local forest users are always questionable! Looking to the reality, we can say that state holds the key in devolution processes.
- We offer the following three power factors: liberal trust, coercive trust and incentives that are the keys to explain how the actors drive the activities of community forestry and its outcomes. Liberal trust means that the actor ‘B’ freely beliefs the information by the actor ‘A’, where as in coercive trust actor ‘B’ is forced to accept the information/ decisions by actor ‘A’ and it does not necessarily B believes it. Incentives in community forestry processes motivate actions of the actors. In order to convince other actors, actor ‘A’ offers financial and/ or material sources to ‘B’ in order to dominate the decision of B.